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Can the United States find ways to cooperate with China or Russia in the Indo-Pacific, either to temper geopolitical rivalry or as a strategy to use cooperation with one of the two countries as an advantage against the other? Using official U.S., Chinese, and Russian policy documents, leadership statements, and other sources, the authors of this report assess the prospects for great power cooperation on seven issues: securing a free and open Indo-Pacific, ensuring the defense of key allies and partners, expanding cooperation with new partners in Southeast Asia, ensuring peace in the Taiwan Strait, achieving the denuclearization of North Korea, countering terrorism, and deepening U.S. geostrategic ties with India. The authors find that, because of the divergence in the three countries' strategic views and policy goals, there is little room for U.S. cooperation with China or Russia in the Indo-Pacific. This implies that cooperation in order to tamp down competitive pressures or to drive wedges between Beijing and Moscow is an unpromising approach to managing ties or competition with these great powers. Instead, the United States will be better off focusing on preparations for long-term competition than striving to turn Beijing and Moscow against each other. This research was completed in September 2020, before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and before the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. It has not been subsequently revised.
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The U.S.-China competitive dynamic has been evolving rapidly and is at a critical crossroads. Rather than fostering greater cooperation, the global COVID-19 pandemic escalated tensions and is driving calls to rethink, reframe, and strengthen the U.S. competitive position. The United States might have the capacity and capability to counter China's influence, but China's rapid rise means that decisions about when and how to compete come with significant or even prohibitive costs. These decisions are also bounded by U.S. and international law, or even just the burden of upholding international norms and standards. China is opportunistic in exploiting these gaps. In the long term, societal and economic trends will put the United States at a disadvantage as the next generations of policymakers assume responsibility for the China challenge. Now is the time to revise federal spending priorities to address current and emerging barriers to growth, innovation, and cooperation. The purpose of this report is not to add to the overflowing catalog of policy guidance, strategic directions, and cautionary advice; it is, rather, to offer realistic, actionable policy options that align with U.S. interests but are mindful of the limits of U.S. influence. Policymakers can benefit from a new framework for thinking about this challenge that draws on an assessment of Chinese intentions and addresses how the competitive dynamic does — or could — play out across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power while remaining sensitive to the limits of U.S. competitiveness.
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Key U.S. allies, security partners, and diplomatic interlocutors in the Indo-Pacific have been establishing or deepening their defense ties by branching out, engaging with each other on high-level security consultations, selling or transferring defense articles, engaging in joint defense industrial development, carrying out bilateral training and exercises, and signing defense-related agreements. Today, these nations — Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea — are also cooperating with such non–U.S.-treaty countries as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, which have aligned themselves more closely with the United States as China has grown both more powerful and more assertive in recent years. As a consequence, a set of important new linkages and security commitments among regional actors is forming, with substantial consequences for the United States, China, and the Indo-Pacific region. This report highlights the extent to which regional actors' security initiatives are a response to the perceived threat posed by a rising, assertive China. This report also calls attention to the strong support that the United States continues to enjoy across the region, with numerous actors expanding their security partnerships out of a desire to reinforce the existing regional order centered on a set of U.S. alliances so as to help share the burdens of security maintenance. The analysis points out the importance of understanding the diverse motivations that regional actors have for expanding and deepening their regional security partnerships, and it highlights key areas for building partner capacity. Finally, the authors clarify which aspects of deepening security relationships derive from concerns about China and which stem from considerations other than balancing.
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The role of information warfare in global strategic competition has become much more apparent in recent years. Today's practitioners of what this report's authors term hostile social manipulation employ targeted social media campaigns, sophisticated forgeries, cyberbullying and harassment of individuals, distribution of rumors and conspiracy theories, and other tools and approaches to cause damage to the target state. These emerging tools and techniques represent a potentially significant threat to U.S. and allied national interests. This report represents an effort to better define and understand the challenge by focusing on the activities of the two leading authors of such techniques — Russia and China. The authors conduct a detailed assessment of available evidence of Russian and Chinese social manipulation efforts, the doctrines and strategies behind such efforts, and evidence of their potential effectiveness. RAND analysts reviewed English-, Russian-, and Chinese-language sources; examined national security strategies and policies and military doctrines; surveyed existing public-source evidence of Russian and Chinese activities; and assessed multiple categories of evidence of effectiveness of Russian activities in Europe, including public opinion data, evidence on the trends in support of political parties and movements sympathetic to Russia, and data from national defense policies. The authors find a growing commitment to tools of social manipulation by leading U.S. competitors. The findings in this report are sufficient to suggest that the U.S. government should take several immediate steps, including developing a more formal and concrete framework for understanding the issue and funding additional research to understand the scope of the challenge.
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The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) understanding of the military balance is fundamentally based on systems warfare concepts. Systems concepts drive China's perceptions of the successes of its three-decade-old modernization and its identification of enduring or emerging weaknesses. China's leaders recognize the qualitative and quantitative improvements in PLA weapons and technology; however, in key areas essential to conducting systems confrontation and systems destruction warfare, there remain significant gaps that have received the attention of Xi Jinping himself. During Xi's tenure, the PLA has been forced to confront a range of problems that go well beyond technological modernization, force structure, and organizational relationships. Still, both the United States and the PRC, through different evaluation processes, have concluded that war with the other has the potential to be extremely risky from an escalation standpoint, protracted and costly, and fatally harmful to long-term credibility and/or strategic goals. This analysis is one of the first to detail how the PLA understands and assesses military balance. The PLA sees itself as the weaker side in the overall military balance, largely because it has made only limited progress in those key areas that will define future warfare, most importantly informatization and system-of-systems–based operations. Necessary improvements have not materialized quickly and will likely take time because of the PLA's organizational culture and the improvements' systemic complexity. A refined understanding of Beijing's view of the PLA also has significant implications for U.S. policymakers, military commanders, and planners.
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To what extent can the United States still cooperate with China and Russia in certain areas even in this era of strategic competition? On which issues? What are the obstacles, the potential benefits, and the risks associated with great power cooperation? This report, the first of a four-part series, presents the overarching findings of a study that explored these questions. The authors find that the trade space for cooperation is already narrow; that the obstacles to cooperation — particularly the absence of trust — are growing; that there are comparatively few wedge issues to play China and Russia off of one another; and that the side benefits of pursuing cooperation over competition do not clearly outweigh the costs of doing so. In other words, any cooperation between the powers will be rare and needs to be narrowly focused on making competition safe, and U.S. leaders should expect that the era of strategic competition will be here to stay for the foreseeable future. This research was completed in September 2020, before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has not been subsequently revised.
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Although a non-Arctic state, China has become a significant player in the Arctic region, engaging in economic, scientific, cultural, diplomatic, and military activities in and around various Arctic countries. This report assesses the potential implications of Chinese investments and activities in the Arctic for the regional rules-based order and for regional and transatlantic security. In this research, which was conducted as a collaborative effort between the RAND Corporation and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut, or FOI), the authors evaluate China's strategy and diplomacy in the region and inventory existing activities in the North American Arctic (United States, Canada, and Greenland). The complementary FOI report, China's Economic Influence in the Arctic Region: The Nordic and Russian Cases, is available from FOI's website. Through such approaches as a scenario-based tabletop exercise, this study also takes a broader look beyond the Arctic region to better understand the types and characteristics of Chinese activities that have been problematic and potentially destabilizing in other parts of the world. The authors assess how some of these activities could also arise in the Arctic-a region whose physical, political, economic, and social characteristics set it apart, in many ways, from the rest of the world. They advance five recommendations that the U.S. government-particularly the U.S. Department of Defense-in collaboration with international partners and indigenous populations could take to maintain and reinforce current factors of Arctic resilience and mitigate undesirable Chinese involvement in the region.
Security, International --- Geopolitics --- Arctic regions --- China --- Strategic aspects. --- Foreign economic relations --- Foreign relations
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Quantum technology could eventually deliver transformative new capabilities with significant economic and national security impacts. Only recently has research and development (R&D) expanded beyond basic science research (primarily conducted within academia) to include significant private-sector development and commercialization. The newness of significant private-sector investment in this technology, and the high uncertainty in its eventual applications and their timelines, make it difficult to form a holistic assessment of the overall industrial base in quantum technology. In this report, we develop a set of flexible and broadly applicable metrics for assessing a nation's quantum industrial base, broadly defined, that attempt to quantify the strength of the nation's scientific research, government activity, private industry activity, and technical achievement. We then apply those metrics to the United States and to the People's Republic of China using a mixed-methods approach. The results for each metric are broken down across the three major application domains for quantum technology: quantum computing, quantum communications, and quantum sensing. We conclude with recommendations for policymakers for maintaining the strength of the U.S. quantum industrial base.
Quantum theory. --- Defense industries --- National security. --- United States --- Military policy.
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