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This paper reviews a broad set of indicators of competitiveness in the Macedonian economy and estimates the equilibrium real effective exchange rate (REER) using different methodologies. Although the REER is broadly in equilibrium at present, structural factors are found to hamper competitiveness. While a more competitive exchange rate might improve short-term export performance, sustained improvements require enhanced productivity and resource reallocation to more dynamic sectors, which depends on reforms to improve the business environment.

Competition -- Macedonia (Republic). --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Macedonia (Republic) -- Economic conditions. --- Business & Economics --- Economic History --- Competition --- Macedonia (Republic) --- Economic conditions. --- Competition (Economics) --- Competitiveness (Economics) --- Economic competition --- Economic aspects --- Macedonia (Federated Republic, 1945- ) --- Narodna Republika Makedonija --- NRM --- Maqedonia (Republic) --- N.R.M. --- Makedonija (Republic) --- S.R. Makedonija --- Socijalistička Republika Makedonija --- SR Makedonija --- Socialist Republic of Macedonia --- Maḳedonyah (Republic) --- Makedonii︠a︡ (Republic) --- Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia --- F.Y.R.O.M. --- FYROM --- Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of --- Republika Makedonija --- FYR Macedonia --- Republic of Macedonia --- Република Македонија --- Македонија (Republic) --- Masèdonia (Republic) --- Republiek van Masedonië --- Masedonië (Republic) --- Republik Mazedonie --- Republik Makedonie --- Ehemoligi Jugoslawischi Republik Mazedonie --- Mazedonie (Republic) --- Makedonie (Republic) --- Cynewīse Macedonia --- جمهورية مقدونيا --- Jumhūrīyat Maqdūniyā --- Republica de Macedonia --- Republica Machedonia --- Machedonia (Republic) --- Republica ali Machedonia --- Republica Ex-Iugoslavã ali Machedonia --- Rèpublica de Macèdonie --- Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia --- Ex República Yugoslava de Macedonia --- Masendoña (Republic) --- F.Y.R.O. Masendoña --- Makedoniya (Republic) --- Makedoniya Respublikası --- Keçmiş Yuqoslaviya Makedoniya Respublikası --- Makedonija Kiōng-hô-kok --- Рэспубліка Македонія --- Rėspublika Makedonii︠a︡ --- Македонія (Republic) --- Republika kan Masedonya --- Masedonya (Republic) --- Mazedonien (Republic) --- Makedonien (Republic) --- Republik Mazedonien --- Republik Makedonia --- Makedonia (Republic) --- Republik Yougoslaviat Kent Makedonia --- Република Македония --- Republika Makedonii︠a︡ --- Бивша югославска република Македония --- Bivsha i︠u︡goslavska republika Makedonii︠a︡ --- Commerce --- Conglomerate corporations --- Covenants not to compete --- Industrial concentration --- Monopolies --- Open price system --- Supply and demand --- Trusts, Industrial --- North Macedonia --- Republic of North Macedonia --- Republika Severna Makedonija --- Severna Makedonija --- Република Северна Македонија --- Северна Македонија --- Maqedonia e Veriut --- Republika e Maqedonisë së Veriut --- Exports and Imports --- Foreign Exchange --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- Trade: General --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- International economics --- Real exchange rates --- Real effective exchange rates --- Current account --- Exchange rates --- Exports --- Balance of payments --- North Macedonia, Republic of

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This paper argues that the governance framework of cooperative banks may hamper raising capital, particularly at time of distress, complicating the bank resolution process ?specially for large banks?and may not provide adequate incentives to control banks' management. Reforms should preserve the positive characteristics that make cooperative banks a valuable addition to the Italian financial system, while providing enough flexibility and incentives for banks to adopt a suitable governance model. Our empirical analysis suggests that cooperative banks may enjoy a higher degree of monopoly power than commercial banks. Thus, regulations and the enforcement of antitrust policies should ensure a leveled playing field.

Banks and banking, Cooperative --- Banks and banking --- Cooperative banks --- Credit cooperatives --- People's banks --- Cooperative societies --- Banks and Banking --- Public Finance --- Banking --- Finance: General --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banking law --- Public finance & taxation --- Finance --- Financial services law & regulation --- Commercial banks --- Bank legislation --- Legal support in revenue administration --- Financial institutions --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Competition --- Financial markets --- Capital adequacy requirements --- Financial services industry --- Law and legislation --- Revenue --- Asset requirements --- Italy

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The world financial crisis that started in the US housing market in 2008 brought into evidence deep failures of prudential oversight, linked for the most part to a failure to comprehend and handle systemic risk in a way that could prevent systemic crises. This paper summarizes the responses to the joint World Bank-ASBA survey o the state of systemic oversight in the Latin American and Caribbean financial sectors and reflects on some of the challenges identified by respondents. We found that there is broad consensus among regional financial authorities on the need to enhance the current systemic oversight framework. Improving consolidated supervision to mitigate risk-shifting in conglomerates, adjusting prudential regulations to account for the accumulation of systemic risks, redefining the role of the supervisor to make it more proactive, and improving coordination among local supervisors as well as with foreign supervisors figure preeminently in the regional reform agenda.

Access to Finance --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt Markets --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial regulation --- Financial supervision --- Macro-prudential policies --- Private Sector Development --- Prudential oversight --- Systemic oversight frameworks --- Latin America

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In recent years, there has been renewed interest in providing countercyclical lending and sustainable development financing through national development financial institutions (NDFIs). While NDFIs are often a feasible solution for addressing development needs and closing financing gaps, they are not always the best solution, and their setup and structure need to be tailored to the country's needs. It is important that prior to setting up a new NDFI or increasing the scope of operations of the existing ones, governments consider all available public policy interventions as well as options for private capital involvement to address unmet financing needs of the private sector. NDFIs will likely see strong demand for their interventions in a post- Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) recovery phase. This calls for enhanced NDFI efficiency and effectiveness. To maximize the net benefits of NDFIs and ensure their financial sustainability, NDFIs should be effectively managed and properly supervised. NDFIs have been important actors in the implementation of countercyclical finance in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and have helped mitigate a credit crunch. During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments have taken on large balance-sheet risks to support credit growth, in many cases using NDFIs as administrators of public anti-crisis programs.

Coronavirus --- COVID-19 --- Finance and Development --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Structures --- Non Bank Financial Institutions --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Development --- Small and Medium Size Enterprises --- State-Owned Banks

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The world financial crisis that started in the US housing market in 2008 brought into evidence deep failures of prudential oversight, linked for the most part to a failure to comprehend and handle systemic risk in a way that could prevent systemic crises. This paper summarizes the responses to the joint World Bank-ASBA survey o the state of systemic oversight in the Latin American and Caribbean financial sectors and reflects on some of the challenges identified by respondents. We found that there is broad consensus among regional financial authorities on the need to enhance the current systemic oversight framework. Improving consolidated supervision to mitigate risk-shifting in conglomerates, adjusting prudential regulations to account for the accumulation of systemic risks, redefining the role of the supervisor to make it more proactive, and improving coordination among local supervisors as well as with foreign supervisors figure preeminently in the regional reform agenda.

Access to Finance --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt Markets --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial regulation --- Financial supervision --- Macro-prudential policies --- Private Sector Development --- Prudential oversight --- Systemic oversight frameworks --- Latin America