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We have thoughts, feelings and emotions, and we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? This book explores these questions.
Philosophical anthropology --- Theory of knowledge --- Affective and dynamic functions --- Social psychology --- Social perception. --- Empathy. --- Perception sociale --- Empathie
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Cognition --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Cognition. --- Philosophy --- Epistemology --- Theory of knowledge --- Psychology --- Philosophical Overview --- Hedonism --- Stoicism --- Overview, Philosophical --- Overviews, Philosophical --- Philosophical Overviews --- Philosophies --- Cognitive Function --- Cognitions --- Cognitive Functions --- Function, Cognitive --- Functions, Cognitive --- Knowledge, Theory of. --- Philosophy. --- Cognitive psychology --- Pharmacy Philosophy --- Pharmacy Philosophies --- Philosophies, Pharmacy --- Philosophy, Pharmacy --- Connaissance (Théorie de la) --- Kennisleer.
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People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create (or attempt to create) surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis.
Empathy. --- Social perception. --- Empathy --- Social perception --- Cognition, Social --- Interpersonal perception --- Social cognition --- Interpersonal relations --- Perception --- Social cognitive theory --- Attitude (Psychology) --- Caring --- Emotions --- Social psychology --- Sympathy
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Social epistemology. --- Theory of knowledge --- Epistémologie sociale --- Social epistemology --- Epistemology, Social --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Social role --- Knowledge, Sociology of --- Épistémologie --- Épistémologie des sciences sociales --- Épistémologie --- Épistémologie des sciences sociales
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These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism.Part I defends the simulation approach to mentalistic ascription and explores the psychological mechanisms of ontological individuation. Part II shows why epistemology needs help from cognitive science - not only to evaluate cognitive agents but also to illuminate the practices of epistemic evaluators. Parts III and IV explain how philosophical projects can be reshaped through interchange with social science. An epistemological study of scientific activity exploits the economic paradigm, and philosophical tools are applied to analyze power in society.Alvin I. Goldman is Professor of Philosophy and Research Scientist in Cognitive Science at the University of Arizona. During 1991-92 he served as President of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division.Contents:Mind and Metaphysics. Interpretation Psychologized. Metaphysics, Mind, and Mental Science. Cognition and Modal Metaphysics. Individual Epistemology. A Causal Theory of Knowing. Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. What Is justified Belief? Strong and Weak justification. Psychology and Philosophical Analysis. Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology. Social Epistemology. Foundations of Social Epistemics. Epistemic Paternalism: Communication and Control in Law and Society. An Economic Model of Scientific Activity and Truth Acquisition (with Moshe Shaked). Social Power. Toward a Theory of Social Power. On the Measurement of Power.
Knowledge, Sociology of. --- Philosophy and cognitive science. --- Philosophy and social sciences. --- Connaissance [Sociologie de la ] --- Filosofie en cognitieve wetenschap --- Filosofie en sociale wetenschappen --- Kennis [Sociologie van de ] --- Knowledge [Sociology of ] --- Philosophie et science cognitive --- Philosophie et sciences sociales --- Sociologie van de kennis --- Philosophie et sciences cognitives --- Philosophy of science --- Knowledge, Theory of. --- Théorie de la connaissance --- Sociologie de la connaissance --- Philosophy and cognitive science --- Knowledge [Theory of ]
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This book articulates an original scheme for the conceptualization of action. Beginning with a new approach to the individuation of acts, it delineates the relationships between basic and non-basic acts and uses these relationships in the definition of ability and intentional action. The author exhibits the central role of wants and beliefs in the causation of acts and in the analysis of the concept of action.Professor Goldman suggests answers to fundamental questions about acts, and develops a set of ideas and principles that can be used in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, ethics, and other fields, including the behavioral sciences.Originally published in 1977.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Psychology. --- Behavioral sciences --- Mental philosophy --- Mind --- Science, Mental --- Human biology --- Philosophy --- Soul --- Mental health --- Behaviorism (Psychology) --- Act (Philosophy) --- Béhaviorisme (Psychologie) --- Action (Philosophie) --- Psychologie
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What distinguishes humankind from other species? A leading candidate is our facility at mutual understanding (""theory of mind""), our ability to ascribe thoughts, desires, and feelings to one another. How do we do this? Folk-wisdom says, ""By empathy -- we put ourselves in other people's shoes"". In the last few decades this idea has moved from folk-wisdom to philosophical conjecture to serious scientific theory. This volume collects essays by Alvin Goldman, many of which have played a major role in crystallizing this ""simulation,"" or ""empathizing,"" account of mindreading and showing how
Philosophy of mind. --- Cognitive neuroscience. --- Cognitive neuropsychology --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Cognitive science --- Neuropsychology --- Philosophy --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology --- Cognitive psychology --- Theory of knowledge
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In this title Alvin Goldman approaches many epistemological issues as questions about legitimate methods or pathways to knowledge.
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