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Zonder onderwerpscode: wereldeconomie, ontwikkelingsproblematiek

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This paper offers an assessment of the methodologies employed to estimate the economic opportunity cost of capital for public sector projects, relying on the Mexican case for an applied empirical exercise. The traditional weighted cost of capital (top-down) approach used in the estimation of Mexico's economic opportunity cost of capital is reviewed and compared to the supply price (bottom-up) approach. With respect to previous studies using the top-down approach, this paper explores the contribution of domestic savings and expands the analysis to include a more detailed examination of the available macroeconomic, labor, financial, and tax information. The re-estimated top-down economic opportunity cost of capital for Mexico comes to 10.4 percent. To confirm these results and provide additional insights regarding the alternative bottom-up approach, the economic opportunity cost of capital is estimated using the supply price plus externalities method. For the case of Mexico, this paper recommends using a combination of estimation models (both the top-down and bottom-up approaches) to check the consistency of results and re-estimating the economic opportunity cost of capital every five years to accommodate for macroeconomic and fiscal changes. More broadly, the paper acknowledges the complexities involved in the estimation of the economic opportunity cost of capital for public investment projects and underlines the relevance of additional considerations, such as changes in global economic trends and country risk ratings, tax distortions, financial sector improvements, the impact of reforms, and data availability.

Banks and Banking Reform --- Debt Markets --- Economic Opportunity Cost of Capital (EOCK) --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Investment & Investment Climate --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Private Sector Development --- Public Investment Projects --- Social Discount Rate --- Supply Price Approach --- Tax Externalities --- Weighted Cost of Capital

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This paper provides a diagnostic framework (DF) for helping governments conceptualize and develop desirable functions and institutional arrangements for public investments managed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The DF also extends its coverage to not-for-profit, quasi-independent government entities. Determining the appropriate approach to managing SOE public investments requires a measured reconciliation of multiple trade-offs. In certain cases, when SOEs make profit-seeking investments for commercial purposes, operate in competitive markets, and make investments that present no major externalities, governments should take a hands-off approach, a scenario that may include cases in which governments simply exit and leave the corporate governance in the hands of private investors. Governments should let SOEs make their own investment decisions in pursuit of business efficiency. In such instances, governments need to establish a level playing field on which SOEs can operate and compete with private actors and exercise their public interest as a shareholder. In other cases, however, governments should establish a robust system - well aligned with the national public investment management (PIM) architecture to regulate SOE investments. This alignment should occur when SOE investments extend the role of line ministries and are financed by the general government budget or involve large-scale projects, posing significant fiscal risks through implicit or explicit contingent liabilities. The PIM practiced by SOEs should also align with the national PIM system when there are potential detrimental impacts on the environment, climate, and resilience. Our DF consists of four matrices intended to be used in combination to assess the gap between a country's current SOE PIM and international best practices. Matrix 1 sketches the guideposts to determine which stakeholders should guard SOE investments, focusing on who. Matrix 2 helps assess PIM functions, focusing on what should be done under each PIM function and by whom. Matrix 3 presents a framework and a set of measurement indicators to evaluate how governments should introduce PIM processes and systems. Matrix 4 gives some consideration to the project viability of SOEs. To effectively apply the DF, it cannot be used mechanically: it must be grounded in a good understanding of the country's political economy and the vested incentives of all stakeholders involved in SOE PIM.

Corporate Governance --- Public Sector Development --- State-Owned Enterprises