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Recent U.S. national defense policies have focused on the importance of multinational interoperability to meeting U.S. defense goals. However, even with the attention given to interoperability, the Army is still not interoperable with whom it wants, when it wants. One reason for this, the authors argue, is that policymakers do not have a precise enough understanding of why more and better interoperability is needed. In many ways, "interoperability" is a buzzword often asserted as the solution to an unexplained problem. Or worse, as a tautological argument: The need to be interoperable hinges on the fact that, historically, military forces have been rather terrible at doing so. The authors of this report recount both their literature review and structured interviews with planners and leadership involved in multinational interoperability, focusing on describing the various benefits often ascribed to interoperability. They discuss the values of interoperability across multiple dimensions — shaping the strategic environment, increasing capabilities, and reducing resourcing demands. The authors also suggest strategies for realizing those benefits. The authors aim to clarify the benefits of interoperability and spur conversations so that future decisionmakers can better articulate the intended rationale for investing in interoperability and better weigh the benefits against the significant costs and risks that interoperability might entail.

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Finland has long pursued a comprehensive security strategy that brings together all government levers of power, as well as industry, civil society and the general population. Finnish defence, which forms an essential component of this broader security concept, integrates the military instrument alongside other civil authorities and national capabilities. Given its militarily non-aligned status, Finland seeks to strike a balance between retaining sovereign defence capability and working closely with like-minded nations facing common security challenges. Despite recent advances in strengthening regional defence cooperation, questions remain as to Finland's evolving role in the Nordic-Baltic region and what further steps can be taken in future. The Finnish Ministry of Defence asked RAND to provide an independent perspective on Finland's defence posture, the transatlantic dimensions of Finnish security policy in the context of any potential crisis and conflict in the Nordic-Baltic region, and the dilemmas that the government and armed forces could face at the strategic and high operational levels. In particular, this study focused on key challenges and opportunities for further developing bilateral cooperation with the United States. This study's principal conclusion is that defence cooperation can and should proceed at a slow yet steady pace, building on existing foundations and raising the level of ambition as political and resource constraints permit. A combination of initiatives at the strategic and operational levels could yield long-term dividends if pursued systematically and with due consideration for political sensitivities on all sides.

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The deterrence of armed conflict has been studied intensively for decades, as have escalation dynamics along the path to such conflicts. The deterrence of forms of aggression below the level of armed conflict — such hostile measures as economic coercion, political subversion, and military intimidation — has received much less attention. In this report, the authors investigate how the United States might use its military posture in Europe (specifically, ground forces) as part of a strategy to deter these Russian malign activities. The authors identify how forward posture could deter hostile measures through signaling the United States' commitment to its allies and partners, providing irregular capabilities for those partners and allies threatened with political subversion, providing conventional capabilities to neutralize hostile powers' coercion attempts, and providing support for other instruments of U.S. power, such as sanctions. However, forward posture can also lead to an escalation in competitor activities, increasing their sense of threat, incentivizing partners to undertake aggression at levels below armed conflict, and incentivizing third parties to act in ways that increase the likelihood of confrontation. The authors propose ways to calibrate U.S. forward posture to minimize such risks while enhancing deterrence. An Executive Summary of this report is also available.

Deterrence (Strategy) --- Escalation (Military science) --- Dissuasion (Stratégie) --- Escalade (Science militaire) --- United States --- Russia (Federation) --- États-Unis --- Europe --- Military relations --- Relations militaires

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The deterrence of armed conflict has been studied intensively for decades, as have escalation dynamics along the path to such conflicts. The deterrence of forms of aggression below the level of armed conflict — such hostile measures as economic coercion, political subversion, and military intimidation — has received much less attention. In this report, the authors investigate how the United States might use its military posture in Europe (specifically, ground forces) as part of a strategy to deter these Russian malign activities. The authors identify how forward posture could deter hostile measures through signaling the United States' commitment to its allies and partners, providing irregular capabilities for those partners and allies threatened with political subversion, providing conventional capabilities to neutralize hostile powers' coercion attempts, and providing support for other instruments of U.S. power, such as sanctions. However, forward posture can also lead to an escalation in competitor activities, increasing their sense of threat, incentivizing partners to undertake aggression at levels below armed conflict, and incentivizing third parties to act in ways that increase the likelihood of confrontation. The authors propose ways to calibrate U.S. forward posture to minimize such risks while enhancing deterrence.

Deterrence (Strategy) --- Escalation (Military science) --- National security --- Europe --- United States --- Russia (Federation) --- Strategic aspects --- Armed Forces --- Military policy --- Military relations