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Amphibious leaders of seven North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations-France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States-participate in the Amphibious Leaders Expeditionary Symposium (ALES), a forum for general and flag officers to discuss opportunities for improved interoperability, command and control (C2), and utilization of amphibious forces within NATO. Meeting since 2016, ALES efforts have focused on integrating existing forces to contribute to NATO's deterrence posture and collective defense at the major joint operation plus (MJO+) level. In 2017-2018, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa asked the RAND Corporation to design and facilitate three events with the objective of identifying suitable C2 constructs and associated doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and interoperability considerations for large-scale NATO maritime and amphibious operations. Aided by a scenario centered on confrontation with a near-peer competitor, maritime and amphibious leaders explored how to leverage NATO's existing amphibious capacity by aggregating national capabilities into a coherent C2 structure. In this report, the authors analyze the results of these three events, note their observations, and state implications and potential next steps for NATO.
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Recent U.S. national defense policies have focused on the importance of multinational interoperability to meeting U.S. defense goals. However, even with the attention given to interoperability, the Army is still not interoperable with whom it wants, when it wants. One reason for this, the authors argue, is that policymakers do not have a precise enough understanding of why more and better interoperability is needed. In many ways, "interoperability" is a buzzword often asserted as the solution to an unexplained problem. Or worse, as a tautological argument: The need to be interoperable hinges on the fact that, historically, military forces have been rather terrible at doing so. The authors of this report recount both their literature review and structured interviews with planners and leadership involved in multinational interoperability, focusing on describing the various benefits often ascribed to interoperability. They discuss the values of interoperability across multiple dimensions — shaping the strategic environment, increasing capabilities, and reducing resourcing demands. The authors also suggest strategies for realizing those benefits. The authors aim to clarify the benefits of interoperability and spur conversations so that future decisionmakers can better articulate the intended rationale for investing in interoperability and better weigh the benefits against the significant costs and risks that interoperability might entail.
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Airpower is critical to improving NATO's defense and deterrence posture in response to Russia's aggressive actions and continued military modernization, as recognized in NATO's 2018 Joint Air Power Strategy. The capabilities of European air forces to defend allies in conflict are evolving, and the trend line in platform modernization is leading in the right direction, most critically with the introduction of fifth-generation aircraft. European allies are also beginning to invest more in personnel, training, and equipment availability. Taken together, these developments could decrease Russia's ability to achieve its operational and political-military objectives in a theater-wide conflict. The authors—drawing from interviews, an expert roundtable, and relevant literature—assess the specific opportunities and challenges that European air forces need to address to position themselves as central contributors to NATO's deterrent posture at the vanguard of any foreseeable combat air campaign. Specifically, they focus on maximalist conditions—high-intensity operations that would require rapid and large-scale application of airpower, conducted in the European theater. Their analysis examines the capabilities of the 13 allied air forces in Europe capable of making the most substantial contribution to large-scale combat operations.
Air forces --- Air power --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. --- Air Forces. --- Europe.
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Finland has long pursued a comprehensive security strategy that brings together all government levers of power, as well as industry, civil society and the general population. Finnish defence, which forms an essential component of this broader security concept, integrates the military instrument alongside other civil authorities and national capabilities. Given its militarily non-aligned status, Finland seeks to strike a balance between retaining sovereign defence capability and working closely with like-minded nations facing common security challenges. Despite recent advances in strengthening regional defence cooperation, questions remain as to Finland's evolving role in the Nordic-Baltic region and what further steps can be taken in future. The Finnish Ministry of Defence asked RAND to provide an independent perspective on Finland's defence posture, the transatlantic dimensions of Finnish security policy in the context of any potential crisis and conflict in the Nordic-Baltic region, and the dilemmas that the government and armed forces could face at the strategic and high operational levels. In particular, this study focused on key challenges and opportunities for further developing bilateral cooperation with the United States. This study's principal conclusion is that defence cooperation can and should proceed at a slow yet steady pace, building on existing foundations and raising the level of ambition as political and resource constraints permit. A combination of initiatives at the strategic and operational levels could yield long-term dividends if pursued systematically and with due consideration for political sensitivities on all sides.
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Competing visions of European strategic autonomy have been widely debated in European Union (EU) policy circles. The term itself has undergone a fast evolution: from an initial focus on defence to inclusion of a much broader set of security considerations such as the economy, health or technology, to name just a few. At its core, however, the concept retains an important defence dimension. Yet the path towards greater EU defence integration has been bumpy and focused on setting up new institutions, frameworks and programmes often without providing adequate resources, sustained political support or clear outputs. This legacy raises questions for the future of European strategic autonomy in defence and means many experts still view the concept with scepticism. This study examines the implications of three different possible futures of European strategic autonomy in defence, using a scenario methodology. A first scenario envisages the development of a strong European pillar of NATO on the basis of current trends. A second scenario considers a faltering EU defence integration and transatlantic fragmentation. A third and final scenario envisages a strong EU defence that does not rely on NATO for access to military capabilities and structures. Through these scenarios, this study seeks to answer the fundamental question of 'What does European strategic autonomy in defence mean for the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and EU-US relations'?
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The deterrence of armed conflict has been studied intensively for decades, as have escalation dynamics along the path to such conflicts. The deterrence of forms of aggression below the level of armed conflict — such hostile measures as economic coercion, political subversion, and military intimidation — has received much less attention. In this report, the authors investigate how the United States might use its military posture in Europe (specifically, ground forces) as part of a strategy to deter these Russian malign activities. The authors identify how forward posture could deter hostile measures through signaling the United States' commitment to its allies and partners, providing irregular capabilities for those partners and allies threatened with political subversion, providing conventional capabilities to neutralize hostile powers' coercion attempts, and providing support for other instruments of U.S. power, such as sanctions. However, forward posture can also lead to an escalation in competitor activities, increasing their sense of threat, incentivizing partners to undertake aggression at levels below armed conflict, and incentivizing third parties to act in ways that increase the likelihood of confrontation. The authors propose ways to calibrate U.S. forward posture to minimize such risks while enhancing deterrence. An Executive Summary of this report is also available.
Deterrence (Strategy) --- Escalation (Military science) --- Dissuasion (Stratégie) --- Escalade (Science militaire) --- United States --- Russia (Federation) --- États-Unis --- Europe --- Military relations --- Relations militaires
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As a founding member of NATO, Norway supports efforts to enhance deterrence, crisis management and regional security in the North Atlantic and High North — a region commonly understood to include territories in Scandinavia and northern Russia, as well as the surrounding waters of the Arctic Ocean, Barents Sea and North Sea. To help ensure effective delivery of these tasks and inform ongoing strategy and policy development, Norway needs insight into other NATO Allies' perspectives on strategic opportunities and challenges in the region. Researchers from RAND Europe and the RAND Corporation combined a targeted document review with expert workshops and field visits to gather and analyse evidence in support of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence's (MOD) strategy development, planning and defence policy. Researchers examined the perspectives of defence officials from Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, the US and NATO institutions and this analysis fed into a summary of findings alongside five strategic options for the MOD to consider.
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The deterrence of armed conflict has been studied intensively for decades, as have escalation dynamics along the path to such conflicts. The deterrence of forms of aggression below the level of armed conflict — such hostile measures as economic coercion, political subversion, and military intimidation — has received much less attention. In this report, the authors investigate how the United States might use its military posture in Europe (specifically, ground forces) as part of a strategy to deter these Russian malign activities. The authors identify how forward posture could deter hostile measures through signaling the United States' commitment to its allies and partners, providing irregular capabilities for those partners and allies threatened with political subversion, providing conventional capabilities to neutralize hostile powers' coercion attempts, and providing support for other instruments of U.S. power, such as sanctions. However, forward posture can also lead to an escalation in competitor activities, increasing their sense of threat, incentivizing partners to undertake aggression at levels below armed conflict, and incentivizing third parties to act in ways that increase the likelihood of confrontation. The authors propose ways to calibrate U.S. forward posture to minimize such risks while enhancing deterrence.
Deterrence (Strategy) --- Escalation (Military science) --- National security --- Europe --- United States --- United States --- United States --- Russia (Federation) --- Strategic aspects --- Armed Forces --- Military policy --- Military relations --- Military relations
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