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Condorcet’s Paradox has been formally studied by an amazing number of people in many different contexts for more than two centuries. Peter Fishburn introduced the basic notion of the Paradox to me in 1971 during a course in Social Choice Theory at Pennsylvania State University. My immediate response to seeing the simple example that he presented was that this phenomenon certainly could not be very likely to ever be observed in reality. Peter quickly suggested that I should work on developing some representations for the probability that the Paradox might occur, and very soon thereafter that pursuit began. It is only after 35 years of effort, with a lot of help from Peter, that I now feel that a good answer can be given to the challenge that was presented in that classroom in 1971. Many people have suggested to me over the years that a book like this should be completed, since the source material is spread over such a wide variety of disciplines of a- demic journals and books that it is very difficult for people to know what has been done, and has not been done, in this area of determining representations for the probability that Condorcet’s Paradox would ever be observed in reality.
Voting --- Mathematical models. --- Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Social choice --- Suffrage --- Caritat, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de, --- Condorcet, Antoine-Nicolas Caritat de, --- Condorcet, C.-F., --- Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas, --- Condorcet, --- De Caritat, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas, --- Kondorsė, Zhan Antuan, --- Economic theory. --- Mathematics. --- Political science. --- Operations research. --- Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. --- Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. --- Political Science. --- Operations Research/Decision Theory. --- Operational analysis --- Operational research --- Industrial engineering --- Management science --- Research --- System theory --- Administration --- Civil government --- Commonwealth, The --- Government --- Political theory --- Political thought --- Politics --- Science, Political --- Social sciences --- State, The --- Math --- Science --- Economic theory --- Political economy --- Economic man --- Game theory. --- Decision making. --- Deciding --- Decision (Psychology) --- Decision analysis --- Decision processes --- Making decisions --- Management --- Management decisions --- Choice (Psychology) --- Problem solving --- Games, Theory of --- Theory of games --- Mathematical models --- Mathematics --- Decision making
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Paradoxes --- Game theory --- Voting --- Economics --- Economics, Mathematical --- Mathematics --- Operations research --- Political science --- Mathematical models --- Voting - Mathematical models
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William V. Gehrlein's Operations Management Cases provides a new collection of cases suited for introductory OM students. These OM cases have all been classroom tested with undergraduates and MBA's and are unique in providing plenty of teachable and tested analysis opportunities for students. Gehrlein's book provides cases on all OM topics, with plenty of emphasis on analytic topics such as forecasting, inventory and scheduling.
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Politics --- Economic schools --- Operational research. Game theory --- politieke wetenschappen --- economisch denken --- speltheorie --- operationeel onderzoek
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Decision making --- Operations research --- Prise de décision --- Recherche opérationnelle --- Mathematical models --- Modèles mathématiques
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This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist. It is well known that hypothetical examples of many different paradoxical election outcomes can be developed, but this analysis examines factors that are related to the process by which voters form their preferences on candidates that will significantly reduce the likelihood that such voting paradoxes will ever actually be observed. It is found that extreme forms of voting paradoxes should be uncommon events with a small number of candidates. Another consideration is the propensity of common voting rules to elect the Condorcet Winner, which is widely accepted as the best choice as the winner, when it exists. All common voting rules are found to have identifiable scenarios for which they perform well on the basis of this criterion. But, Borda Rule is found to consistently work well at electing the Condorcet Winner, while the other voting rules have scenarios where they work poorly or have a very small likelihood of electing a different candidate than Borda Rule. The conclusions of previous theoretical work are presented in an expository format and they are validated with empirically-based evidence. Practical implications of earlier studies are also developed.
Elections. --- Game theory. --- Welfare economics. --- Economics. --- Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice. --- Electoral Politics. --- Game Theory. --- Operations Research/Decision Theory. --- Economic policy --- Economics --- Social policy --- Games, Theory of --- Theory of games --- Mathematical models --- Mathematics --- Electoral politics --- Franchise --- Polls --- Political science --- Politics, Practical --- Plebiscite --- Political campaigns --- Representative government and representation --- Operations research. --- Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy. --- Operational analysis --- Operational research --- Industrial engineering --- Management science --- Research --- System theory --- Decision making. --- Deciding --- Decision (Psychology) --- Decision analysis --- Decision processes --- Making decisions --- Management --- Management decisions --- Choice (Psychology) --- Problem solving --- Decision making
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The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters’ preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters’ preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters’ preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.
Voting --- Mathematical models. --- Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, --- Political science. --- Political economy. --- Game theory. --- Economic theory. --- Public finance. --- Economics. --- Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. --- Political Economy. --- Public Economics. --- Political Science. --- Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Social choice --- Suffrage --- Caritat, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de, --- Condorcet, Antoine-Nicolas Caritat de, --- Condorcet, C.-F., --- Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas, --- Condorcet, --- De Caritat, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas, --- Kondorsė, Zhan Antuan, --- Mathematics. --- International Political Economy. --- Math --- Science --- Administration --- Civil government --- Commonwealth, The --- Government --- Political theory --- Political thought --- Politics --- Science, Political --- Social sciences --- State, The --- Cameralistics --- Public finance --- Currency question --- Economic theory --- Political economy --- Economic man --- Public finances --- Games, Theory of --- Theory of games --- Mathematical models --- Mathematics --- de Caritat, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas, --- Condorcet --- Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat --- de Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat --- de Condorcet, Nicolas --- Schwartz, Joachim, --- Game theory --- Voting - Mathematical models --- Paradoxes --- Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, - marquis de, - 1743-1794
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Politics --- Economic schools --- Public finance --- Public economics --- Operational research. Game theory --- politieke wetenschappen --- economisch denken --- speltheorie --- overheidsfinanciën
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