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Why did the Great Recession lead to such a slow recovery? I build a model where heterogeneous firms invest in physical and intangible capital, and can default on their debt. In case of default, intangible assets are harder to seize by creditors. Hence, intangible capital faces higher financing costs. This differential is exacerbated in a financial crisis, when default is more likely and aggregate risk bears a higher premium. The resulting fall in intangible investment amplifies the crisis, and gradual intangible spillovers to other firms contribute to its persistence. Using panel data on Spanish manufacturing firms, I estimate the model matching firm-level moments regarding intangibles and financing. The model captures the extent and components of the Great Recession in Spanish manufacturing, whereas a standard model without endogenous intangible investment would miss more than half of the GDP fall. A policy of transfers conditional on firm age could speed up the recovery, as young firms tend to be more financially constrained, particularly regarding intangible investment. Conditioning transfers on firm size or subsidizing credit (as in current E.U. policy) appears to be less effective.
Financial crises. --- Crashes, Financial --- Crises, Financial --- Financial crashes --- Financial panics --- Panics (Finance) --- Stock exchange crashes --- Stock market panics --- Crises --- Financial crises --- E-books --- Investments: General --- Investments: Stocks --- Macroeconomics --- Industries: Manufacturing --- Investment --- Capital --- Intangible Capital --- Capacity --- Financial Crises --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Pension Funds --- Non-bank Financial Institutions --- Financial Instruments --- Institutional Investors --- Labor Economics: General --- Industry Studies: Manufacturing: General --- Investment & securities --- Labour --- income economics --- Manufacturing industries --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Intangible capital --- Depreciation --- Stocks --- Labor --- Manufacturing --- National accounts --- Financial institutions --- Global financial crisis of 2008-2009 --- Saving and investment --- Labor economics --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Spain --- Income economics
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High household wealth is often cited as a key strength of the Italian economy. Both in absolute terms and relative to income, the Italian household sector is wealthier than most euro area peers. A sizable fraction of this wealth is held by the rich and upper middle classes. This paper documents the changes in the Italian household sector’s financial wealth over the past two decades, by constructing the matrix of bilateral financial sectoral exposures. Households became increasingly exposed to the financial sector, which in turn was exposed to the highly indebted real and government sectors. The paper then simulates different financial shocks to gauge the ability of the household sector to absorb losses. Simple illustrative calculations are presented for a fall in the value of government bonds as well as for bank bail-ins versus bailouts.
Banks and Banking --- Investments: Bonds --- Investments: Stocks --- Macroeconomics --- Industries: Financial Services --- Portfolio Choice --- Investment Decisions --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Bankruptcy --- Liquidation --- Pension Funds --- Non-bank Financial Institutions --- Financial Instruments --- Institutional Investors --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Aggregate Factor Income Distribution --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Investment & securities --- Banking --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Stocks --- Sovereign bonds --- Income distribution --- Creditor bail-in --- Financial institutions --- National accounts --- Financial crises --- Financial sector --- Economic sectors --- Banks and banking --- Bonds --- Crisis management --- Financial services industry --- Italy
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The recovery of private investment in Italy has lagged its euro area peers over the past decade. This paper examines the role of elevated labor costs in hindering the recovery. Specifically, labor costs rose faster than labor productivity prior to the global financial crisis and have remained high since, weighing on firms’ profits, capital returns, and thus capacity to invest. Empirical analysis provides evidence for the impact of wages on investment at the sectoral and firm levels. Sectoral wage growth seems unrelated to sectoral productivity growth, but is negatively associated with investment. Firm-level data permit a better identification—by exploiting the interaction between sectoral wage growth (exogenous to the firm) and the lagged labor share of the firm. A 1 percent increase in real wages is estimated to cause a 1/3 percent fall in fixed capital. Profits absorb only ½ of the cost increase, pointing to the role of liquidity constraints. These results highlight the need for labor market reform to reinvigorate investment, and thus labor productivity and job creation.
Labor --- Wage Level and Structure --- Wage Differentials --- Payout Policy --- Capital Budgeting --- Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy --- Labour --- income economics --- Labor costs --- Wages --- Labor share --- Wage adjustments --- Minimum wages --- Minimum wage --- Italy
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The recovery of private investment in Italy has lagged its euro area peers over the past decade. This paper examines the role of elevated labor costs in hindering the recovery. Specifically, labor costs rose faster than labor productivity prior to the global financial crisis and have remained high since, weighing on firms’ profits, capital returns, and thus capacity to invest. Empirical analysis provides evidence for the impact of wages on investment at the sectoral and firm levels. Sectoral wage growth seems unrelated to sectoral productivity growth, but is negatively associated with investment. Firm-level data permit a better identification—by exploiting the interaction between sectoral wage growth (exogenous to the firm) and the lagged labor share of the firm. A 1 percent increase in real wages is estimated to cause a 1/3 percent fall in fixed capital. Profits absorb only ½ of the cost increase, pointing to the role of liquidity constraints. These results highlight the need for labor market reform to reinvigorate investment, and thus labor productivity and job creation.
Italy --- Labor --- Wage Level and Structure --- Wage Differentials --- Payout Policy --- Capital Budgeting --- Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy --- Labour --- income economics --- Labor costs --- Wages --- Labor share --- Wage adjustments --- Minimum wages --- Minimum wage --- Income economics
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Household Wealth and Resilience to Financial Shocks in Italy.
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Does inflation help improve public finances? This paper documents the dynamic responses of fiscal variables to an inflation shock, using both quarterly and annual panel data for a broad set of economies. Inflation shocks are estimated to improve fiscal balances temporarily, as nominal revenues track inflation closely, while nominal primary expenditures take longer to catch up. Inflation spikes also lead to a persistent reduction in debt to GDP ratios, both due to the primary balance improvement and the nominal GDP denominator channel. However, debt only falls with inflation surprises—rises in inflation expectations do not improve debt dynamics, suggesting limits to debt debasement strategies. The results are robust to using various inflation measures and instrumental variables.
Commodity Markets --- Commodity prices --- Currency crises --- Currency --- Deflation --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Economics --- Economics: General --- Exchange rate arrangements --- Fiscal Policy --- Fiscal policy --- Fiscal stance --- Foreign Exchange --- Foreign exchange --- Inflation --- Informal sector --- Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General --- Macroeconomics --- National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General --- Price Level --- Prices
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With the rapid growth of countries' foreign asset and liability positions over the last two decades, financial returns on those positions ('NFA returns') have become material drivers of current accounts and net stock positions. This paper documents the relative importance of NFA return versus trade channels in driving NFA dynamics, for a sample of 52 economies over 1990-2015. While persistent trade imbalances have been a strong force leading to diverging NFA positions, NFA returns have played an important stabilizing role, mitigating NFA divergence. The stabilizing role of NFA returns primarily reflects the response of asset prices, rather than yield differentials or exchange rates. There is also evidence of heterogeneity in the speed of NFA adjustment, with emerging market economies adjusting more rapidly than advanced economies, and reserve-currency countries adjusting more slowly than others. The paper also documents the role of NFA returns as insurance against domestic and global income shocks, with a focus on reserve-currency countries.
Exports and Imports --- Foreign Exchange --- Insurance --- Macroeconomics --- Financial Aspects of Economic Integration --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- Price Level --- Inflation --- Deflation --- Empirical Studies of Trade --- Insurance Companies --- Actuarial Studies --- Aggregate Factor Income Distribution --- International economics --- Insurance & actuarial studies --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Asset prices --- Trade balance --- Income shocks --- Exchange rates --- Prices --- International trade --- Financial institutions --- National accounts --- Balance of trade --- Income --- United States
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What drove the UK productivity slowdown post-GFC, and how is the post-Covid recovery expected to differ? This paper traces the sources of TFP growth in the UK over the last two decades through the lens of a structural model of innovation, using registry data on the universe of firms. The dominant innovation source in the pre-GFC decade were improvements by incumbent firms on their own products, whereas creation of new varieties by entrants took a leading role post-GFC. In the Covid recovery, survey data suggests that creative destruction (i.e., innovation replacing other firms’ products) is expected to gain importance. This emphasizes the need for growth policies that facilitate labor and capital reallocation across firms, in addition to R&D support.
Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- Labor --- Production and Operations Management --- Diseases: Contagious --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Innovation --- Research and Development --- Technological Change --- Intellectual Property Rights: General --- Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General --- Economywide Country Studies: Europe --- Labor Demand --- Production --- Cost --- Capital and Total Factor Productivity --- Capacity --- Macroeconomics: Production --- Labor Economics: General --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Labour --- income economics --- Infectious & contagious diseases --- Total factor productivity --- Job creation --- Productivity --- Job destruction --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Industrial productivity --- Economic theory --- Labor market --- Labor economics
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The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the shift toward digital services. Meanwhile, the race for technological and economic leadership has heated up, with risks of decoupling that could set back trade and growth and hinder the recovery from the worst global recession since the Great Depression. This paper studies the conditions under which a country may seek to erect barriers—banning imports or exports of cyber technologies—and in effect promote decoupling or deglobalization. A well-known result is that banning imports may be optimal in monopolistic sectors, such as the digital sector. The novel result of this paper is that banning exports can also be optimal, and in some cases superior, as it prevents technological diffusion to a challenger that may eventually become the global supplier, capturing monopoly rents and posing cybersecurity risks. However, export or import bans would come at a deleterious cost to the global economy. The paper concludes that fostering international cooperation, including in the cyber domain, could be key to avoiding technological and economic decoupling and securing better livelihoods.
Business and Economics --- Exports and Imports --- Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies --- Trade Policy --- International Trade Organizations --- Technological Change: Choices and Consequences --- Diffusion Processes --- Trade: General --- Innovation --- Research and Development --- Technological Change --- Intellectual Property Rights: General --- Empirical Studies of Trade --- International economics --- Technology --- general issues --- Imports --- Exports --- Trade liberalization --- Trade balance --- International trade --- Commercial policy --- Balance of trade --- China, People's Republic of
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