Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Revolution was on everyone's lips. The ancien régime had been cast aside and King Louis XVI had been executed in front of a mocking crowd. Every crowned head in Europe trembled with fear - ideas knew no frontier. The monarchies of Europe had to act swiftly to crush the Revolution, and a coalition of the great powers of Britain, Austria, Prussia and Spain was formed to restore the natural order. The armies of the First Coalition gathered round France's borders, the largest of which was assembled in Flanders. Composed of Anglo-Hanoverian, Dutch, Hessian, Prussian and Imperial Austrian troops, its aim was to invade France and restore the nobility to what was considered their rightful place. Opposing them was the French Armée du Nord. In command of the Anglo-Hanoverian contingent was the son of George III, the Duke of York. The campaign was a disaster for the Coalition forces, particularly during the severe winter of 1794/5 when the troops were forced into a terrible and humiliating retreat. Britain's reputation and that of its military leaders was severely diminished, with the forces of the Revolution sweeping all before them on a tide of populism. Yet, from this defeat grew an army that under the Duke of Wellington would eventually crush the Revolution's greatest general, Napoleon Bonaparte. Of the Flanders Campaign, Wellington, who fought as a junior officer under the Duke of York, remarked that the experience had at least taught him what not to do! Renowned historian Steve Brown has produced one of the most insightful, and much-needed studies of this disastrous but intriguing campaign. He concludes this important work with an analysis that draws striking, and significant comparisons with the Flanders campaigns of 1914 and 1940. How history repeats itself!

Anglo-French War, 1793-1802

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Fought on 16 June 1815, two days before the Battle of Waterloo, the Battle of Quatre Bras has been described as a tactical Anglo-allied victory, but a French strategic victory. The French Marshal Ney was given command of the left wing of Napoleon’s army and ordered to seize the vital crossroads at Quatre Bras, as the prelude to an advance on Brussels. The crossroads was of strategic importance because the side which controlled it could move southeastward along the Nivelles-Namur road. Yet the normally bold and dynamic Ney was uncharacteristically cautious. As a result, by the time he mounted a full-scale attack upon the Allied troops holding Quatre Bras, the Duke of Wellington had been able to concentrate enough strength to hold the crossroads. Ney’s failure at Quatre Bras had disastrous consequences for Napoleon, whose divided army was not able to reunite in time to face Wellington at Waterloo. This revelatory study of the Waterloo campaign draws primarily on French archival sources, and previously unpublished French accounts, to present a balanced view of a battle normally seen only from the British or Anglo-Allied perspective.