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Military objectives often can be pursued using a number of different approaches: airpower versus ground forces, larger munitions versus smaller ones, more- or less-restrictive rules of engagement. Military effectiveness often favors the immediate application of overwhelming force, but militaries and their civilian overseers often opt for more-restrained approaches. Understanding how and why policymakers have chosen to impose these restraints in the past and how and why they are likely to do so in the future is critical to understanding how states will conduct future wars. This report identifies four key trends likely to shape the future exercise of restraint in warfare: the spread of lawfare (or use of law as a weapon of war), the widespread distribution of imagery of U.S. military operations, the increasing effectiveness of false accusations, and the increasing public concern for civilian casualties. These trends are assessed for how likely they are to affect both conflict between states and between states and nonstate actors, in addition to how the effects of these trends might differ for different types of states. Overall, these trends appear likely to further increase the incentives of decisionmakers in liberal democratic states to avoid civilian casualties in conflicts against weaker adversaries and to support investments in capabilities to make this possible. Other states that are more autocratic are not likely to be similarly constrained, and policymakers in democratic states will need to adapt to this asymmetry. Between highly capable state actors, conflict is less likely to occur but could involve very different incentives if operational considerations prompt a sharp reduction in the degree of restraint exercised beyond each state's legal obligations and the public shows a greater tolerance of heightened levels of military casualties and collateral damage to civilians. This report also provides specific recommendations for U.S. policymakers to begin to adapt to these anticipated trends.

War --- Military doctrine --- Forecasting.

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War

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The expansion of Chinese military activity and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region has led the United States to undertake its own increase in activity in the region over the past decade. As the United States expands its military activities to safeguard its regional interests, the potential reactions of China are a crucial consideration. This report provides U.S. military planners and policymakers with guidance regarding how the characteristics of different potential U.S. military activities may affect Chinese perceptions and reactions, either in ways that the United States may prefer, such as by enhancing deterrence of People's Republic of China (PRC) aggression against U.S. allies and partners, or in ways that the United States may wish to avoid, such as by increasing the risk of aggression and escalation. The authors developed a framework for assessing likely Chinese reactions to U.S. military activities. The framework identifies the key factors that drive Chinese thinking and reactions, assesses how the characteristics of U.S. activities - their location, the U.S. allies or partners involved, their military capabilities, and the public profile or messaging that accompanies them - have the potential to affect Chinese reactions through each key factor, and provides a typology of potential Chinese reactions organized by their level of intensity. The authors also developed a comprehensive set of potential military activities that the United States could undertake in the Indo-Pacific and evaluated the implications of the framework, highlighting how the PRC would likely perceive and react to different types of activities.

Escalation (Military science) --- Conflict management --- Military planning --- United States --- China --- Indo-Pacific Region --- Military relations --- Strategic aspects.

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When faced with the outbreak of a war or the onset of an international crisis that affects important U.S. interests, U.S. policymakers must consider how best to respond. One option they may consider is to directly intervene militarily in the war or crisis. In this report, the authors create a framework that can be used to rigorously consider the trade-offs between intervening militarily early in a war or crisis, intervening later, and not intervening at all, as well as the trade-offs involved in decisions regarding the size of the potential intervention force to be employed. This framework can provide a better understanding of the relationships between intervention timing, intervention size, and intervention outcomes to inform future debates about whether and when to undertake a military intervention. The authors approached these issues in four ways. They conducted (1) an extensive review of academic and policy literature on relevant topics, (2) a quantitative analysis using a database of 286 crises and wars since 1945 in which important U.S. interests were at stake, (3) a set of 45 short, focused case studies, including both interventions and noninterventions, and (4) a set of four in-depth counterfactual illustrations, in which U.S. intervention decisions were altered from historical events to explore the implications. The findings from these four research approaches lead to recommendations regarding the contextual factors that are most essential for policymakers to consider when making intervention decisions.

Intervention (International law) --- National security --- Case studies. --- United States --- United States. --- Military policy.

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"Armed conflict has declined in both frequency and intensity since the end of the Cold War. The trends are especially clear for interstate conflict, but they also hold true for intrastate conflict. Taking into account historical trends and projections of key conflict drivers, the interstate and intrastate baseline future conflict projections in this report depict a continued decline through 2040, with interstate conflict down to extremely low levels and a much lower incidence of intrastate conflict. Some divergence from these projections is likely. The three factors that most strongly increased interstate conflict expectations were declining U.S. preeminence, declining capabilities of international organizations, and declining prevalence of consolidated democracies. The incidence of intrastate conflict is expected to increase if the capacity of state institutions or the rate of economic growth declines. Although the authors' projections indicate that interstate conflict may be rare in the future, the United States must retain a ready and credible land power deterrent to ensure such a future. Such a deterrent might not be used frequently, but its very existence delays the rise of a challenger and has a dampening effect on the incidence of conflict. The authors' projections also indicate that intrastate conflict (including proxy wars) will continue to be the main form of conflict incidence and, given the U.S. position in the international state system, Army forces are likely to become engaged in such conflicts. The trends toward a decrease in conflict incidence do not necessarily mean fewer U.S. interventions"--Publisher's web site

War --- Guerre --- History --- Research. --- Forecasting. --- Histoire --- Recherche. --- Prévision. --- United States. --- États-Unis. --- Operational readiness. --- État de préparation opérationnelle. --- United States --- Military policy.