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Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
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Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards
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Year: 2020 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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A Primer on securitization
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ISBN: 0585002924 0262276984 9780585002927 9780262112116 0262112116 9780262276986 0262611635 9780262611633 Year: 1996 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press

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A Primer on Securitization introduces readers to America's newest system of raising capital: what it is, how it operates, and what difference securitization makes. Gathering fourteen lectures by the pioneers of securitization and by current practitioners--from Freddie Mac, Paine Webber, JP Morgan, Chrysler, McKinsey & Co, and other major players--A Primer on Securitization introduces readers to America's newest system of raising capital: what it is, how it operates, and what difference securitization makes. The securitization process bypasses financial intermediaries that have historically collected deposits and loaned them to those seeking funds, and links borrowers directly to money and capital markets. Although little has been written about what is perhaps one of the most important innovations to emerge in financial markets since the 1930s, securitization has revolutionized the way that the borrowing needs of consumers and businesses are met. Today, for example, over two-thirds of all home loans are being securitized, along with substantial percentages of auto loans and credit card receivables, and the process continues to expand into new fields including synthetic securities. Authoritative and practical, these lectures show how securitization was developed to fill a gap in financial markets. They discuss the nature and causes of the market imperfections that made securitization a valuable source of funds, and describe how securitization has linked local mortgage markets with international capital markets. Readers will gain a broad perspective of the different parties--the borrower, the loan originator, the servicer, the rating agency, the special purpose vehicle, the credit enhancer, the underwriter, and the investor--as well as a detailed analysis of how these parties relate to one another. From the inception of the secondary mortgage market through the collapse of the Granite funds, readers will learn not only about the success but also about the excesses and failures that typically accompany the development of any product in the real or financial sector.


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Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
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Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Valuation has an externality: it creates information on which adverse selection can occur. We study a market in which investors (or lenders) buy uncertain future cash flows that are ex ante identical but ex post heterogeneous across assets from sellers (or borrowers) with reservation values. There exists a limited amount of a costly technology that can be purchased before the market opens that allows an investor to value an asset — to get a private signal of the future payoff of that asset. Because sellers of assets that are valued and are rejected can sell to other investors, there are strategic complementarities in the choice of the capacity to do valuation, the private benefits to valuation exceed its social benefits, the market can exhibit multiple equilibria, and the market can deliver a unique valuation equilibrium when it is more efficient to transact without valuation. In the region of multiplicity, the move from a pooling equilibrium to a valuation equilibrium is always socially inefficient and has many features of a financial crisis: interest rate spreads rise, trade declines, unsophisticated investors leave the market, and sophisticated investors make profits. The efficient equilibrium in the region of multiplicity can be ensured by a large investor with the ability to commit to a price. We characterize several policies that can improve on market outcomes.


Book
Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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We study a market for funding real investment in which valuation creates information on which adverse selection can occur. Unlike in previous models, higher amounts of valuation are associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation, and this strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria. In this region, the equilibrium without valuation is always more efficient despite funding projects that valuation would reveal as unprofitable. Valuation equilibria look like credit crunches. A large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit to a price and, for some parameters, only if subsidized.

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A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards
Authors: --- --- ---
Year: 2020 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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We develop a tractable dynamic model of credit markets in which lending standards and the quality of potential borrowers are endogenous. Competitive banks privately choose their lending standards: whether to pay a cost to screen out some unprofitable borrowers. Lending standards have negative externalities and are dynamic strategic complements: tighter screening worsens the future pool of borrowers for all banks and increases their incentives to screen in the future. Lending standards can amplify and prolong temporary downturns, affecting lending volume, credit spreads, and default rates. We characterize constrained-optimal policy which can generally be implemented as a government loan insurance program. When markets recover, they may do so only slowly, a phenomenon we call "slow thawing." Finally, we show that limits on lending such as from capital constraints naturally incentivize tight lending standards, further amplifying shocks to credit markets.

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