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May 2000 - How will stronger patent rights in developing countries affect transnational corporations' behavior in and toward those countries? How will market structure and consumer welfare be affected by extending patent protection to products that could previously be freely imitated? Will research-based transnational corporations devote more resources to developing technologies relevant to needs in developing countries? To address questions about how stronger patent rights will affect India's pharmaceutical industry, Fink simulates the effects of introducing such protection - as required by the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) - on market structure and static consumer welfare. (India must amend its current patent regime by 2005 and establish a transitional regime in the meanwhile.) The model Fink uses accounts for the complex demand structure for pharmaceutical goods. Consumers can choose among various drugs available to treat a specific disease. And for each drug, they have a choice among various differentiated brands. Fink calibrates the model for two groups of drugs - quinolonnes and synthetic hypotensives - using 1992 brand-level data. In both groups, a subset of all available drugs was patent-protected in Western Europe but not India, where Indian manufacturers freely imitated them. The simulation analysis asks how the market structure for the two groups of drugs would have looked if India had granted patents for drugs. It does not take account of the fact that stronger patent protection will not apply to existing drugs and that the Indian government might be able to restrain high drug prices by imposing price controls or granting compulsory licenses. Still, Fink concludes that if future drug discoveries are mainly new varieties of already existing therapeutic treatments, the effect of stronger patent protection is likely to be small. If newly discovered drugs are medicinal breakthroughs, however, prices may rise significantly above competitive levels and static welfare losses may be large. If demand is highly price-elastic, as is likely in India, profits for transnational corporations are likely to be small. But if private health insurance is permitted in India, reducing the price-sensitivity of demand, patent-holders' profits could increase substantially. In light of the fact that the TRIPS Agreement strengthens patent rights in most developing countries, pharmaceutical companies may do more research on, for example, tropical diseases. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the economic consequences of multilateral trade agreements. The author may be contacted at cfink@worldbank.org.
Access to Markets --- Advertising --- Brand --- Brands --- Commercialization --- Competition --- Demand --- Economic Theory and Research --- International Economics & Trade --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market --- Market Structure --- Marketing --- Markets and Market Access --- Price --- Price Controls --- Price Increases --- Prices --- Product --- Products --- Publicity --- Real and Intellectual Property Law --- Sales --- Substitute --- Substitution --- Trademarks
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May 2000 - How will stronger patent rights in developing countries affect transnational corporations' behavior in and toward those countries? How will market structure and consumer welfare be affected by extending patent protection to products that could previously be freely imitated? Will research-based transnational corporations devote more resources to developing technologies relevant to needs in developing countries? To address questions about how stronger patent rights will affect India's pharmaceutical industry, Fink simulates the effects of introducing such protection - as required by the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) - on market structure and static consumer welfare. (India must amend its current patent regime by 2005 and establish a transitional regime in the meanwhile.) The model Fink uses accounts for the complex demand structure for pharmaceutical goods. Consumers can choose among various drugs available to treat a specific disease. And for each drug, they have a choice among various differentiated brands. Fink calibrates the model for two groups of drugs - quinolonnes and synthetic hypotensives - using 1992 brand-level data. In both groups, a subset of all available drugs was patent-protected in Western Europe but not India, where Indian manufacturers freely imitated them. The simulation analysis asks how the market structure for the two groups of drugs would have looked if India had granted patents for drugs. It does not take account of the fact that stronger patent protection will not apply to existing drugs and that the Indian government might be able to restrain high drug prices by imposing price controls or granting compulsory licenses. Still, Fink concludes that if future drug discoveries are mainly new varieties of already existing therapeutic treatments, the effect of stronger patent protection is likely to be small. If newly discovered drugs are medicinal breakthroughs, however, prices may rise significantly above competitive levels and static welfare losses may be large. If demand is highly price-elastic, as is likely in India, profits for transnational corporations are likely to be small. But if private health insurance is permitted in India, reducing the price-sensitivity of demand, patent-holders' profits could increase substantially. In light of the fact that the TRIPS Agreement strengthens patent rights in most developing countries, pharmaceutical companies may do more research on, for example, tropical diseases. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the economic consequences of multilateral trade agreements. The author may be contacted at cfink@worldbank.org.
Access to Markets --- Advertising --- Brand --- Brands --- Commercialization --- Competition --- Demand --- Economic Theory and Research --- International Economics & Trade --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market --- Market Structure --- Marketing --- Markets and Market Access --- Price --- Price Controls --- Price Increases --- Prices --- Product --- Products --- Publicity --- Real and Intellectual Property Law --- Sales --- Substitute --- Substitution --- Trademarks
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One of the most significant developments of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (1986-94) was the inclusion of intellectual property rights (IPRs) issues on the agenda of the multilateral trading system. The resulting Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is one of three pillar agreements, setting out the legal framework in which the World Trade Organization (WTO) has operated since the end of the Uruguay Round. For the multilateral trading system, TRIPS marked the departure from narrow negotiations on border measures such as tariffs and quotas toward the establishment of multilateral rules for trade-affecting measures beyond borders. This move reflected underlying trends in international commerce. Due to the growth of trade in knowledge and information-intensive goods, the economic implications of imitation, copying, and counterfeiting had in many industries become at least as relevant for international commerce as conventional border restrictions to trade. Yet the TRIPS negotiations on intellectual property were marked by significant North-South differences. Developed countries, which host the world's largest intellectual property-producing industries, were the key advocates for comprehensive minimum standards of protection and enforcement of IPRs. By contrast, many developing countries, which see themselves mostly as a consumer of intellectual property, felt that stronger standards of protection would serve to limit access to new technologies and products, thereby undermining poor countries' development prospects. Not surprisingly, the TRIPS Agreement remains one of the most controversial agreements of the WTO.This short paper seeks to provide an introduction to the main instruments used to protect intellectual property in section second, the key economic trade-offs of stronger IPRs in section third, the basic provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in section four, and recent TRIPS developments affecting access to medicines in developing countries in section five.
Access to Markets --- Intellectual Property Rights --- Patents --- Trade Policy --- World Trade Organization
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Promoting quality health services to large population segments is a key ingredient to human and economic development. At its core, healthcare policymaking involves complex tradeoffs between promoting equitable and affordable access to a basic set of health services, creating incentives for efficiencies in the healthcare system, and managing constraints in government budgets. International trade in health services influences these tradeoffs. It presents opportunities for cost savings and access to better quality care, but it also raises challenges in promoting equitable and affordable access. Drawing on a research project of the ASEAN Economic Forum, this paper offers a discussion of trade policy in health services for the ASEAN region. It reviews the state of healthcare in the region, existing patterns of trade, and remaining barriers to trade. The paper also identifies policy measures that could further harness the benefits from trade in health services and address potential pitfalls that deeper integration may bring about.
Antenatal Care --- Clinics --- Dentistry --- Health --- Health Monitoring and Evaluation --- Health Outcomes --- Health Services --- Health, Nutrition and Population --- Hospitals --- Immunization --- Infectious Diseases --- Medical Specialists --- Migration --- Nurses --- Nursing --- Patient --- Patients --- Pharmacists --- Physicians --- Primary Health Care --- Public Health --- Workers
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An important question in the design of bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) covering services is to what extent nonmembers benefit from the trade preferences that are negotiated among members. This question is resolved through services rules of origin. The restrictiveness of rules of origin determines the degree of preferences entailed in market opening commitments, shaping the bargaining incentives of FTAs and their eventual economic effects. Even though the number of FTAs in services has increased rapidly in recent years, hardly any research is available that can guide policymakers on the economic implications of different rules of origin. After outlining the key economic tradeoffs and options for rules of origin in services, the paper summarizes the main findings of a research project that has assessed the rules of origin question for five countries in the ASEAN region. For selected service subsectors and a number of criteria for rules or origin, simulation exercises evaluated which service providers would or would not be eligible for preferences negotiated under a FTA. Among other findings, the simulation results point to the binding nature of a domestic ownership or control requirement and, for the specific case of financial services, a requirement of incorporation.
Agreement On Trade --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Bilateral Trade --- Border Trade --- Corporate Law --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Exporters --- Exports --- External Tariffs --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Free Trade --- Free Trade Agreements --- International Economics & Trade --- Law and Development --- Liberalization of Trade --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market Access --- Preferential Tariff --- Preferential Tariff Treatment --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Public Sector Development --- Rules of Origin --- Tariff Rates --- Tariffs --- Trade Agreement --- Trade and Services --- Trade Barriers --- Trade Law --- Trade Policy --- Trade Preferences --- Transport Costs --- World Trade
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