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A comprehensive description and evaluation of the first three years of the U.S. Acid Rain Program. This environmental control program is the world's first large-scale use of a tradeable emission permit system for achieving environmental goals. The book analyzes the behavior and performance of the market for emissions permits, known as allowances, and quantifies emission reductions, compliance costs, and cost savings associated with the trading program. The book also includes chapters on the historical context in which this pioneering program developed and the political economy of allowance allocations. Finally, the book discusses the program's successes, its weaknesses, and the lesson learned regarding application of the emissions-trading approach to controlling other types of emissions, including greenhouse gases. The volume is an indispensable addition to the library of all interested in the application of marker principles for meeting environmental goals.

Emissions trading --- Air quality management --- Acid rain --- Government policy --- Environmental aspects --- politique de l'environnement --- pollution --- eua --- milieubeleid --- vervuiling --- vsa --- Acid precipitation (Meteorology) --- Rain and rainfall --- Business, Economy and Management --- Economics --- Emissions trading - United States --- Air quality management - Government policy - United States --- Acid rain - Environmental aspects - Government policy - United States

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Environnement --- Air --- Compensation des émissions de carbone --- Environmental law --- Emissions trading --- Carbon offsetting --- Echange de droits d'émission (Environnement) --- Droit --- Pollution --- Echanges de droits d'émission --- Compensation des emissions de carbone --- Echanges de droits d'emission --- Compensation des émissions de carbone --- Echange de droits d'émission (Environnement) --- Echanges de droits d'émission --- Emissions trading - European Union countries --- Carbon offsetting - European Union countries --- Politique de l'environnement

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Developing countries-both importers and exporters-could in fact benefit from carbon dioxide emissions trading to achieve tagets mandated by the Kyoto Protocol. The trading of rights to emit carbon dioxide has not officially been sanctioned by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but it is of interest to investigate the consequences, both for industrial (Annex B) and developing countries, of allowing such trades. Ellerman, Jacoby, and Decaux examine the trading of caps assigned to Annex B countries under the Kyoto Protocol and compare the outcome with a world in which Annex B countries meet their Kyoto targets without trading. Under the trading scenario the former Soviet Union is the main seller of carbon dioxide permits and Japan, the European Union, and the United States are the main buyers. Permit trading is estimated to reduce the aggregate cost of meeting the Kyoto targets by about 50 percent, compared with no trading. Developing countries, though they do not trade, are nonetheless affected by trading. For example, the price of oil and the demand for other developing country exports are higher with trading than without. The authors also consider what might happen if developing countries were to voluntarily accept caps equal to Business as Usual Emissions and were allowed to sell emission reductions below these caps to Annex B countries. The gains from emissions trading could be big enough to give buyers and sellers incentive to support the system. Indeed, a global market for rights to emit carbon dioxide could reduce the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets by almost 90 percent, if the market were to operate competitively. The division of trading gains, however, may make a competitive outcome unlikely: Under perfect competition, the vast majority of trading gains go to buyers of permits rather than to sellers. Even markets in which the supply of permits is restricted can, however, substantially reduce the cost to Annex B countries of meeting their Kyoto targets, while yielding profits to developing countries that elect to sell permits. This paper-a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to examine the impact on developing countries of programs to correct global environmental problems. Denny Ellerman may be contacted at dellerman@mit.edu.

Emissions trading.

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Europe