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This paper argues that labor supply elasticities encode information about the determinants of income inequality. In the theoretical framework, individuals choose labor supply conditional on productivities and preferences for consumption relative to leisure. The paper shows that reduced-form labor supply elasticities allow one to isolate the components of income due to productivities versus preferences. The paper then investigates what labor supply elasticities imply about the importance of productivities versus preferences in the United States. Estimates from the literature imply productivities drive most of income inequality. Larger income effects and larger differences between income and hours worked elasticities imply preferences play an increasingly important role.
Elasticity --- Income Inequality --- Inequality --- Labor Markets --- Labor Productivity --- Labor Supply --- Poverty Reduction --- Preference --- Public Sector Development --- Social Protections and Labor
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This paper develops a general theory of optimal income taxation with multiple dimensions of agent heterogeneity. The main technical hurdle in developing this theory is the possibility that individuals have multiple optimal incomes. Using a perturbation approach, optimal tax formulas are derived that account for the possibility that individuals have multiple optima and, hence, account for the possibility that individuals jump between their optimal income levels when the tax schedule is perturbed. The magnitude of these effects is quantified, thereby augmenting the optimal tax formulas from Saez (2001) with additional "jumping effect" terms. The paper provides a partial characterization of when individuals with multiple optimal incomes may exist under the optimal tax schedule. Finally, the paper derives a new methodology to simulate optimal income tax schedules with multidimensional heterogeneity. This method is implemented numerically, showing that individuals with multiple optimal income levels can exist under the optimal tax schedule.
Labor Markets --- Labor Supply --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Marginal Tax Rate --- Optimal Tax --- Productivity --- Public Sector Development --- Social Protections and Labor --- Tax Model --- Taxation --- Taxation and Subsidies
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Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are a popular type of social welfare program that make payments to households conditional on human capital investments in children. Compared to unconditional cash transfers (UCTs), CCTs may exclude some low-income households as access is tied to normal investments in children. This paper argues that conditionalities on children's school enrollment offer an unexplored targeting benefit over UCTs: CCTs target money to households that forgo a discrete amount of child income. This paper shows that the size of this targeting benefit is directly related to the distribution of parental incomes, the size of forgone child incomes, and two elasticities already popular in the literature: the income effect of a UCT and the price effect of a CCT. These elasticities are estimated for a large CCT program in rural Mexico, Progresa, using variation in transfers to younger siblings to identify income effects. In this setting, the analysis finds that the targeting benefit is almost as large as the cost of excluding some low-income households; this implies that 41 percent of the Progresa budget should go to a CCT over a UCT based on targeting grounds alone.
Access and Equity in Basic Education --- Access of Poor to Social Services --- Conditional Cash Transfer --- Education --- Education Finance --- Human Capital Investment --- Poverty Reduction --- School Enrollment --- Social Assistance --- Social Protections and Assistance --- Social Protections and Labor --- Targeting
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