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The Departmental Paper Series presents research by IMF staff on issues of broad regional or cross-country interest. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
Consumer protection --- Deposit insurance. --- Digital currency --- Law and legislation. --- Law and legislation.
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This technical note and manual (TNM) addresses the following issues: advantages and disadvantages of different types of depositor preference, international best practice and experience in adopting depositor preference, and introducing depositor preference in jurisdictions with or without deposit insurance.
Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Bankruptcy --- Liquidation --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Banking --- Finance --- Deposit insurance --- Bank deposits --- Bank resolution framework --- Bank resolution --- Financial sector stability --- Financial crises --- Financial services --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Crisis management --- Banks and banking --- Financial services industry --- United Kingdom --- Deposit insurance.
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This paper argues that in the European Union (EU) deposit insurance funds are too difficult to use in bank resolution and too easy to use outside resolution. The paper proposes reforms in three areas for the effective management of bank failures of small and medium-sized banks in the European Union: making resolution the norm for dealing with failing banks; establishing a common DIS for the European Union; and increasing funding and backstops for deposit insurance while removing constraints on their use for resolution measures. Without these changes, the European Union will continue to be challenged by banks that are too small for resolution and too large for liquidation.
Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Banks and Banking --- Industries: Financial Services --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Finance --- Deposit insurance --- Financial crises --- Bank resolution --- Bank resolution framework --- Distressed institutions --- Financial institutions --- Financial safety nets --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Crisis management --- Financial services industry --- United States
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This technical note and manual (TNM) addresses the following issues: advantages and disadvantages of different types of depositor preference, international best practice and experience in adopting depositor preference, and introducing depositor preference in jurisdictions with or without deposit insurance.
United Kingdom --- Deposit insurance. --- Bank deposits --- Bank resolution framework --- Bank resolution --- Banking --- Bankruptcy --- Banks and Banking --- Banks and banking --- Banks --- Crisis management --- Deposit insurance --- Depository Institutions --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Finance --- Finance: General --- Financial crises --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Risk Management --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Financial sector stability --- Financial services industry --- Financial services --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Liquidation --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages
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This paper argues that in the European Union (EU) deposit insurance funds are too difficult to use in bank resolution and too easy to use outside resolution. The paper proposes reforms in three areas for the effective management of bank failures of small and medium-sized banks in the European Union: making resolution the norm for dealing with failing banks; establishing a common DIS for the European Union; and increasing funding and backstops for deposit insurance while removing constraints on their use for resolution measures. Without these changes, the European Union will continue to be challenged by banks that are too small for resolution and too large for liquidation.
United States --- Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Banks and Banking --- Industries: Financial Services --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Finance --- Deposit insurance --- Financial crises --- Bank resolution --- Bank resolution framework --- Distressed institutions --- Financial institutions --- Financial safety nets --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Crisis management --- Financial services industry
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This paper updates the IMF’s work on general principles, strategies, and techniques from an operational perspective in preparing for and managing systemic banking crises in light of the experiences and challenges faced during and since the global financial crisis. It summarizes IMF advice concerning these areas from staff of the IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM), drawing on Executive Board Papers, IMF staff publications, and country documents (including program documents and technical assistance reports). Unless stated otherwise, the guidance is generally applicable across the IMF membership.
Financial crises. --- Bank resolution framework --- Banking --- Banks and Banking --- Banks and banking --- Banks --- Crisis Management --- Crisis management --- Deposit insurance --- Depository Institutions --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Financial Crises --- Financial crises --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Risk Management --- Global financial crisis of 2008-2009 --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Macroeconomics --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Cyprus
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The global financial crisis (GFC) has renewed interest in emergency liquidity support (sometimes referred to as “Lender of Last Resort”) provided by central banks to financial institutions and challenged the traditional way of conducting these operations. Despite a vast literature on the topic, central bank approaches and practices vary considerably. In this paper we focus on, for the most part, the provision of idiosyncratic support, approaching it from an operational perspective; highlighting different approaches adopted by central banks; and also identifying some of the issues that arose during the GFC.
Banks and banking, Central. --- Banker's banks --- Banks, Central --- Central banking --- Central banks --- Banks and banking --- Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Industries: Financial Services --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Portfolio Choice --- Investment Decisions --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Finance --- Banking --- Financial services law & regulation --- Monetary economics --- Lender of last resort --- Liquidity --- Collateral --- Liquidity risk --- Financial crises --- Asset and liability management --- Financial institutions --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Currencies --- Money --- Economics --- Loans --- Financial risk management --- Banks and banking, Central --- United States
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This departmental paper discusses the evolving prudential frameworks for nonbank issuers of electronic money. Some jurisdictions take a relatively light-touch approach to regulating electronic money issuers (EMIs). Others have sought to apply more stringent requirements to protect electronic money (e-money) users, as the sector has grown in importance. The paper aims to build on previous IMF staff contributions to the literature and to draw policy conclusions for strengthening e-money regulatory regimes; in particular in jurisdictions where issuers, individually or collectively, have grown to a size to which they are of macro-financial importance (see below). Chapter 2 provides background on the development of e-money, its economic benefits, and potential risks. Chapter 3 discusses prudential supervision of EMIs, followed in Chapter 4 by their oversight from a payments system perspective. Chapter 5 discusses potential additional measures for user protection and contingency arrangements for EMI failure. The last chapter presents policy recommendations for policymakers, especially in those emerging market economies and developing countries wherein EMIs have reached a scale at which they could have a significant economic impact if they were to fail.
Consumer protection --- Deposit insurance. --- Digital currency --- Law and legislation. --- Bank deposits --- Banking --- Bankruptcy --- Banks and Banking --- Banks and banking --- Banks and banking, Mobile --- Banks --- Business and Financial --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Clearinghouses --- Computer applications in industry & technology --- Crisis management --- Deposit insurance --- Depository Institutions --- Digital currencies --- Digital or internet economics --- Distributed ledgers --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Finance --- Finance, Public --- Finance: General --- Financial crises --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Instruments --- Financial instruments --- Financial markets --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Financial Risk Management --- Financial risk management --- Financial services industry --- Financial services law & regulation --- Financial services --- Financing Policy --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Goodwill --- Government and the Monetary System --- Industries: Financial Services --- Information technology industries --- Innovation --- Institutional Investors --- Intellectual Property Rights: General --- Law and legislation --- Liquidation --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mobile banking --- Monetary Systems --- Money --- Mortgages --- Non-bank Financial Institutions --- Nonbank financial institutions --- Operational risk --- Other Substantive Areas of Law: General --- Payment Systems --- Payment systems --- Pension Funds --- Political economy --- Regimes --- Research and Development --- Standards --- Technological Change --- Technological innovations --- Technology --- Value of Firms --- Kenya
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This technical note explores the advantages and disadvantages of establishing state-sponsored centralized asset management companies (AMCs) to address high levels of bank asset distress during financial crises. AMCs may offer potential benefits like mitigating downward price spirals or achieving efficiency gains by consolidating creditor claims and scarce expertise. However, significant risks and costs warrant careful consideration. These include extreme uncertainties in asset valuation and substantial operational and financial risks. Past international experiences highlight the dangers of underestimating these risks, potentially turning the AMC into a mechanism for deferring losses to taxpayers, rather than minimizing them, and ultimately increasing long-term public costs and moral hazard. This technical note emphasizes these trade-offs and discusses crucial design elements for effective AMCs: a clear mandate, transfer pricing that prudently reflects asset values and disposal costs, strong governance with independent management, and efficient operational processes promoting transparency and accountability.
Expenditure --- Expenditures, Public --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Financial Institutions and Services: Other --- International Taxation --- Monetary economics --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Public finance & taxation --- Public Finance --- Revenue administration --- Tax administration and procedure --- Tax Evasion and Avoidance
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