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"An analytical approach to corporate reputations from its leading scholar. Public perception, especially in the time of social media, is a core determinant of any organization's success and longevity. It is also fickle: organizations can fall astray of public approval through crisis, mismanagement, or sudden shifts in the public sensibility. In Reputation Analytics, Daniel Diermeier offers the first scientific framework for understanding and managing the vagaries of corporate reputation and public opinion. Drawing on a political scientist's understanding of the formation and dynamics of public opinion, Diermeier infuses his approach with lessons from game theory, psychology, and text analytics to produce a rigorous, altogether original approach that will have immediate application in both scholarship and practice. A milestone work from one of social science's most eminent scholars, Reputation Analytics ushers a new and advanced understanding on a topic that has long eluded such treatment-and an essential work for readers across industry and academics"--

Corporate image --- Public relations firms --- Institutional advertising

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"An analytical approach to corporate reputations from its leading scholar. Public perception, especially in the time of social media, is a core determinant of any organization's success and longevity. It is also fickle: organizations can fall astray of public approval through crisis, mismanagement, or sudden shifts in the public sensibility. In Reputation Analytics, Daniel Diermeier offers the first scientific framework for understanding and managing the vagaries of corporate reputation and public opinion. Drawing on a political scientist's understanding of the formation and dynamics of public opinion, Diermeier infuses his approach with lessons from game theory, psychology, and text analytics to produce a rigorous, altogether original approach that will have immediate application in both scholarship and practice. A milestone work from one of social science's most eminent scholars, Reputation Analytics ushers a new and advanced understanding on a topic that has long eluded such treatment-and an essential work for readers across industry and academics"--

Public relations firms. --- Institutional advertising. --- Corporate image. --- E-books

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Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously, about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed new challenges to the premise of rationality. This groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors--politicians as well as voters--are only boundedly rational. The theory posits learning via trial and error: actions that surpass an actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the future, while those that fall short are less likely to be tried later. Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors construct formal models of party competition, turnout, and voters' choices of candidates. These models predict substantial turnout levels, voters sorting into parties, and winning parties adopting centrist platforms. In multiparty elections, voters are able to coordinate vote choices on majority-preferred candidates, while all candidates garner significant vote shares. Overall, the behavioral theory and its models produce macroimplications consistent with the data on elections, and they use plausible microassumptions about the cognitive capacities of politicians and voters. A computational model accompanies the book and can be used as a tool for further research.

Elections. --- Voting --- Behaviorism (Political science) --- Behavioralism (Political science) --- Behaviouralism (Political science) --- Behaviourism (Political science) --- Political psychology --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Social choice --- Suffrage --- Electoral politics --- Franchise --- Political science --- Plebiscite --- Political campaigns --- Representative government and representation --- Psychological aspects. --- Political systems --- Social psychology --- Condorcet winner. --- Downsian party competition. --- Duverger's Law. --- Markov chain. --- Pareto dominance. --- adaptation. --- aspiration-based adaptation. --- aspiration-based adaptive rule. --- aspiration-based adjustment. --- aspirations. --- bandwagon effect. --- behavior. --- behavioral theory. --- bounded rationality. --- candidates. --- computational model. --- decision making. --- election voting. --- elections. --- equilibrium behavior. --- faction size. --- framing. --- game-theoretic model. --- hedonics. --- heuristics. --- incumbent. --- majority faction. --- multiparty elections. --- parties. --- party affiliation. --- party competition. --- payoffs. --- platforms. --- political parties. --- politicians. --- population size. --- propensity. --- rational choice theory. --- rational choice. --- rationality. --- retrospective voting. --- satisficing. --- search behavior. --- stochastic process. --- turnout. --- two-party elections. --- voter choice. --- voter coordination. --- voter participation. --- voter turnout. --- voters. --- Balloting

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It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number of veto players or the majority requirement for redistribution may reduce property right protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property rights protection. One are formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution which is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where agents without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal blocking power anticipate that the expropriation of other similar players will ultimately hurt them and thus combine their influence to prevent redistributions. Yet, such incentives can be undermined by adding formal constraints. The flip-side of this effect is that individual investment efforts might require coordination. The model also predicts that the distribution of wealth in societies with weaker formal institutions (smaller supermajority requirements) among players without veto power will tend to be more homogenous.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

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It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number of veto players or the majority requirement for redistribution may reduce property right protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property rights protection. One are formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution which is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where agents without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal blocking power anticipate that the expropriation of other similar players will ultimately hurt them and thus combine their influence to prevent redistributions. Yet, such incentives can be undermined by adding formal constraints. The flip-side of this effect is that individual investment efforts might require coordination. The model also predicts that the distribution of wealth in societies with weaker formal institutions (smaller supermajority requirements) among players without veto power will tend to be more homogenous.