Listing 1 - 10 of 16 | << page >> |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Many economic decisions involve a binary choice - for example, when consumers decide to purchase a good or when firms decide to enter a new market. In such settings, agents' choices often depend on imperfect expectations of the future payoffs from their decision (expectational error) as well as factors that the econometrician does not observe (structural error). In this paper, we show that expectational error, under an assumption of rational expectations, is a source of classical measurement error, and we propose a novel moment inequality estimator that accounts for both expectational error and structural error in a binary choice model. With simulated data and Chilean firm-level customs data, we illustrate the identifying power of our inequalities and show the biases that arise when one ignores either source of error. We use the customs data to estimate the fixed costs exporters face when entering a new market.
Choose an application
Much of the variation in international trade volume is driven by firms' extensive margin decision to participate in export markets. To understand this decision and predict the sensitivity of export flows to changes in trade costs, we estimate a standard model of firms' export participation. In choosing whether to export, firms weigh the fixed costs of exporting against the forecasted profits from serving a foreign market. We show that the estimated parameters and counterfactual predictions from the model depend heavily on how the researcher specifies firms' expectations over these profits. We therefore develop a novel moment inequality approach with weaker assumptions on firms' expectations. Our approach introduces a new set of moment inequalities --odds-based inequalities-- and applies the revealed preference inequalities introduced in Pakes (2010) to a new setting. We use data from Chilean exporters to show that, relative to methods that require specifying firms' information sets, our approach generates estimates of fixed export costs that are 65-85% smaller. Counterfactual reductions in fixed costs generate gains in export participation that are 30% smaller, on average, than those predicted by existing approaches.
Choose an application
In setting prices for physician services, Medicare solicits input from a committee that evaluates proposals from industry. We investigate whether this arrangement leads to prices biased toward the interests of committee members. We find that increasing a measure of affiliation between the committee and proposers by one standard deviation increases prices by 10%, demonstrating a pathway for regulatory capture. We then evaluate the effect of affiliation on the quality of information used in price-setting. More affiliated proposals produce less hard information, measured as lower quality survey data. However, affiliation results in prices that are more closely followed by private insurers, suggesting that affiliation may increase the total information used in price-setting.
Choose an application
Under the Affordable Care Act, individual states have discretion in how they define coverage regions, within which insurers must charge the same premium to buyers of the same age, family structure, and smoking status. We exploit variation in these definitions to investigate whether the size of the coverage region affects outcomes in the ACA marketplaces. We find large consequences for small and rural markets. When states combine small counties with neighboring urban areas into a single region, the included rural markets see .6 to .8 more active insurers, on average, and savings in annual premiums of between $200 and $300.
Choose an application
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) established health insurance marketplaces where consumers can buy individual coverage. Leveraging novel credit card and bank account micro-data, we identify new enrollees in the California marketplace and measure their health spending and premium payments. Following enrollment, we observe dramatic spikes in individuals' health care consumption. We also document widespread attrition, with more than half of all new enrollees dropping coverage before the end of the plan year. Enrollees who drop out re-time health spending to the months of insurance coverage. This drop-out behavior generates a new type of adverse selection: insurers face high costs relative to the premiums collected when they enroll strategic consumers. We show that the pattern of attrition undermines market stability and can drive insurers to exit, even absent differences in enrollees' underlying health risks. Further, using data on plan price increases, we show that insurers largely shift the costs of attrition to non-drop-out enrollees, whose inertia generates low price sensitivity. Our results suggest that campaigns to improve use of social insurance may be more efficient when they jointly target take-up and attrition.
Choose an application
Much of the variation in international trade volume is driven by firms' extensive margin decision to participate in export markets. To understand this decision and predict the sensitivity of export flows to changes in trade costs, we estimate a standard model of firms' export participation. In choosing whether to export, firms weigh the fixed costs of exporting against the forecasted profits from serving a foreign market. We show that the estimated parameters and counterfactual predictions from the model depend heavily on how the researcher specifies firms' expectations over these profits. We therefore develop a novel moment inequality approach with weaker assumptions on firms' expectations. Our approach introduces a new set of moment inequalities --odds-based inequalities-- and applies the revealed preference inequalities introduced in Pakes (2010) to a new setting. We use data from Chilean exporters to show that, relative to methods that require specifying firms' information sets, our approach generates estimates of fixed export costs that are 65-85% smaller. Counterfactual reductions in fixed costs generate gains in export participation that are 30% smaller, on average, than those predicted by existing approaches.
Listing 1 - 10 of 16 | << page >> |
Sort by
|