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The paper provides an empirical investigation of labor market pooling. The analysis concentrates on Italian industrial districts and shows that there is scattered evidence of a widespread wage premium. In particular, there is no evidence of district differentials for the returns to seniority while there is evidence of negative differentials for the returns to education. Moreover, dwelling in a district has no impact on the probability of being self-employed and only a minor impact on the likelihood of transiting from wage-and-salary to self-employment. Finally, there is no evidence of higher district worker mobility across jobs.

Labor --- Macroeconomics --- Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity --- Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics: Regional Migration --- Regional Labor Markets --- Population --- Labor Demand --- Wage Level and Structure --- Wage Differentials --- Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility --- Promotion --- Demand and Supply of Labor: General --- Labor Economics: General --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General --- Education: General --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Labour --- income economics --- Education --- Labor markets --- Self-employment --- Labor market --- Labor economics --- Self-employed --- Economic theory --- Italy --- Income economics

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Sequential auction models of labor market competition predict that the wages required to successfully poach a worker from a rival employer will depend on the productivities of both the poached and poaching firms. We develop a theoretically grounded extension of the two-way fixed effects model of Abowd et al. (1999) in which log hiring wages are comprised of a worker fixed effect, a fixed effect for the "destination" firm hiring the worker, and a fixed effect for the "origin" firm, or labor market state, from which the worker was hired. This specification is shown to nest the reduced form for hiring wages delivered by semi-parametric formulations of the canonical sequential auction model of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) and its generalization in Bagger et al. (2014). Fitting the model to Italian social security records, origin effects are found to explain only 0.7% of the variance of hiring wages among job movers, while destination effects explain more than 23% of the variance. Across firms, destination effects are more than 13 times as variable as origin effects. Interpreted through the lens of Bagger et al. (2014)'s model, this finding requires that workers possess implausibly strong bargaining strength. Studying a cohort of workers entering the Italian labor market in 2005, we find that differences in origin effects yield essentially no contribution to the evolution of the gender gap in hiring wages, while differences in destination effects explain the majority of the gap at the time of labor market entry. These results suggest that where a worker is hired from tends to be relatively inconsequential for their wages in comparison to where they are currently employed.