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In a theoretically based discussion of possibilities for crisis or conflict prevention, especially as they relate to the historic Arab-Israeli conflict, this report specifies objectives, considers past approaches and precedents, and combines the two to identify likely candidates for crisis prevention--arguably, the key objective in the case of the Middle East. In applying its analysis to that region, the report stresses the importance of encouraging interested parties from the Middle East to select, tailor, and pursue approaches that are already available to meet their particular crisis prevention objectives, as well as to begin the selection process by specifying those objectives for themselves.
Pacific settlement of international disputes. --- Conflict management --- Middle East --- Foreign relations. --- Military relations.
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"Soon after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) began in March 2003, RAND Arroyo Center began compiling an authoritative account of the planning and execution of combat and stability operations in Iraq through 2004 in order to identify key issues that could affect Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and other Title 10 functions. "The resulting analysis, completed in January 2006, will interest those involved in organizing, training, and equipping military forces to plan for, deploy to, participate in, and support joint and multinational operations. Although focused primarily on Army forces and activities, the analysis also describes aspects of joint and multinational operations. RAND analysts collected the information in this report from many sources, including unit after-action reports, compilations of lessons learned, official databases, media reports, other contemporary records, and interviews with key participants in OIF. "This report presents a broad overview of the study findings based on unclassified source material. It traces the operation from its root causes in the first Gulf War through operations up to approximately the end of June 2004. It addresses strategy, planning, and organization for OIF; air and ground force operations; personnel, deployment, and logistics issues; coalition operations; the occupation that followed combat operations; and civil-military operations. Also, because the research conducted for this report covers events only through June 2004, events that occurred after that date would alter some of the conclusions and recommendations. In other cases, some recommendations might already have been implemented in whole or in part. Nevertheless, the report's recommendations are provided as they were originally formulated."--Back cover.
Iraq War, 2003-2011 --- Middle East --- Regions & Countries - Asia & the Middle East --- History & Archaeology --- Evaluation --- Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq, 2003-2011 --- Dawn, Operation New, 2010-2011 --- Gulf War II, 2003-2011 --- Iraqi Freedom, Operation, 2003-2010 --- New Dawn, Operation, 2010-2011 --- Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-2010 --- Operation New Dawn, 2010-2011 --- Operation Telic, 2003-2011 --- Persian Gulf War, 2003-2011 --- Telic, Operation, 2003-2011 --- War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 --- Iraq War (2003-2011) --- 2003 - 2011 --- Iraq. --- Iraq War (2003-) --- Bilād al-Rāfidayn --- Bilād --- Irak --- Jumhuriyah al Iraqiyah --- Republic of Iraq
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Weapons of mass destruction --- Government policy --- United States. --- Operational readiness. --- U.S. Army --- US Army
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This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and to proceed with the bilateral North-South inspections endorsed by both sides in 1991. The second strategy would try to influence the future direction of DPRK development. The third strategy would use leverage for prying or dislodging the North from its uncertainty about making constructive arms control arrangements with the South. By treating arms control as a tool of international policymaking that can positively affect the political-military decisions of governments and actively contribute to the achievement of worthwhile objectives (e.g., security, stability, and non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula), the third strategy is the most creative. However, this strategy only works if DPRK nuclear policy is uncertain enough to be susceptible to inducement, or at least capable of movement in one direction or the other.
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A number of important steps have been taken in recent years to improve the planning and management of Army International Activities (AIA). Still, a need remains, and is widely recognized, for a high-level assessment mechanism to allocate AIA resources more efficiently, execute AIA programs more effectively, and highlight the contributions of AIA to the National Military Strategy, the DoD Security Cooperation Guidance, and The Army Plan. This report presents a framework for assessing the value of the Army's non-combat interactions with other militaries. It provides an overview of AIA programs a
Electronic books. --- Military art and science. --- Military assistance, American. --- Military policy. --- Security, International. --- Military policy --- Military assistance, American --- Security, International --- Military art and science --- Military & Naval Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Armies --- International cooperation --- International cooperation. --- United States. --- Foreign service. --- United States --- Military relations --- Fighting --- Military power --- Military science --- Warfare --- Warfare, Primitive --- Collective security --- International security --- American military assistance --- Defense policy --- Military readiness --- Political aspects --- U.S. Army --- US Army --- U.S.A. --- Jungtinės Amerikos valstybės --- Soedinennye Shtaty Si︠e︡vernoĭ Ameriki --- Soedinennye Shtaty Severnoĭ Ameriki --- Si︠e︡vero-Amerikanskīe Soedinennye Shtaty --- Severo-Amerikanskie Soedinennye Shtaty --- Zlucheni Derz︠h︡avy --- USA --- US --- Arhab --- Ar. ha-B. --- Artsot ha-Berit --- ولايات المتحدة الامريكية --- Wilāyāt al-Muttaḥidah al-Amirīkīyah --- ABSh --- Amerika Birlăshmish Shtatlary --- ABŞ --- Amerika Birlăşmi Ştatları --- Forente stater --- Spojené staty americké --- Severo-Amerikanskie Shtaty --- Sjedinjene Američke Države --- Zʹi︠e︡dnani Derz︠h︡avy Ameryky --- Amerikai Egyesült Államok --- Yhdysvallat --- Verenigde Staten --- Egyesült Államok --- Hiwsisayin Amerikayi Miatsʻeal Tērutʻiwnkʻ --- Estados Unidos de América --- United States of America --- Fareyniḳṭe Shṭaṭn --- Artzois Ha'bris --- Estados Unidos da América do Norte --- SShA --- Soedinennye Shtaty Ameriki --- VSA --- États-Unis d'Amérique --- Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika --- Stati Uniti d'America --- Estados Unidos --- EE.UU. --- Stany Zjednoczone --- ĒPA --- Amerika Qūrama Shtattary --- Amerika Qŭshma Shtatlari --- SAD --- Saharat ʻAmērikā --- Hēnomenai Politeiai Amerikēs --- ZSA --- Mei-kuo --- Meiguo --- Mei guo --- ZDA --- Združene države Amerike --- U.S. --- America (Republic) --- Amirika Carékat --- Verenigde State van Amerika --- VS --- ولايات المتحدة --- Wilāyāt al-Muttaḥidah --- ولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة --- Wilāyāt al-Muttaḥidah al-Amrīkīyah --- Estatos Unitos --- Estatos Unitos d'America --- Ètats-Unis d'Amèrica --- Estaos Xuníos d'América --- Estaos Xuníos --- Tetã peteĩ reko Amérikagua --- Istadus Unidus --- Amerika Birlăşmiş Ştatları --- Amerika ka Kelenyalen Jamanaw --- Bí-kok --- Amerika Qushma Shtattary --- AQSh --- Злучаныя Штаты Амерыкі --- Zluchanyi︠a︡ Shtaty Ameryki --- Yunaeted Stet blong Amerika --- Yunaeted Stet --- Vaeinigte Staatn --- Vaeinigte Staatn vo Amerika --- Stadoù-Unanet Amerika --- Sŭedineni amerikanski shtati --- САЩ --- SASht --- Съединените щати --- Sŭedinenite shtati --- Америка (Republic) --- Amerika (Republic) --- Estats Units d'Amèrica --- Америкӑри Пӗрлешӳллӗ Штатсем --- Amerikări Pĕrleshu̇llĕ Shtatsem --- Stati Uniti --- SUA (Stati Uniti d'America) --- Unol Daleithiau America --- Unol Daleithiau --- Amerikas Forenede Stater --- Vereinigte Staaten --- Wááshindoon Bikéyah Ałhidadiidzooígíí --- Zjadnośone staty Ameriki --- Ameerika Ühendriigid --- Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερικής --- Hēnōmenes Politeies tēs Amerikēs --- Η.Π.Α. --- Ē.P.A. --- Usono --- Unuiĝintaj Ŝtatoj de Ameriko --- Американь Вейтьсэндявкс Штаттнэ --- Amerikanʹ Veĭtʹsėndi︠a︡vks Shtattnė --- Ameriketako Estatu Batuak --- Feriene Steaten --- Feriene Steaten fan Amearika --- FS --- Stâts Unîts di Americhe --- Stâts Unîts --- Stáit Aontaithe Mheiriceá --- Steatyn Unnaneysit America --- Steatyn Unnaneysit --- S.U.A. --- Na Stàitean Aonaichte --- NSA --- Mî-koet --- 미국 --- Miguk --- Amerikayi Miatsʻyal Nahangner --- Miatsʻyal Nahangner --- Naval art and science --- War --- International relations --- Disarmament --- International organization --- Peace --- Military history --- Sociology, Military --- National security --- Американь Вейтьсэндявкс Штаттнэ --- Spojené obce severoamerické --- États-Unis --- É.-U. --- ÉU
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U.S. Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 prescribes that services integrate their reserve components into the "total force based on the attributes of the particular component and individual competencies." After more than ten years of war, however, there have been no studies that assess the relative capabilities of Regular Army and reserve component units of the same type. Accordingly, the authors of this study employed a stated preference approach to assess the relative importance of component status relative to a number of other potential determinants of operational effectiveness, including but not limited to unit type, training level, experience in country, and associated costs and risk. The authors found that, on the one hand, Regular Army officers consistently said that Regular Army maneuver units were significantly more effective than their Army National Guard (ARNG) counterparts, but that the latter may be employed in low- to moderate-threat environments with acceptable levels of tactical and operational risk. On the other hand, reserve component officers believed ARNG maneuver units perform as effectively as their Regular Army counterparts with additional training and other preparations. Policymakers will need to decide the degree to which they want to rely on the professional judgment of Regular Army or reserve component officers on this point. Preferences with regard to enablers-units employed to support maneuver forces-were considerably less pronounced, as were those with respect to individuals. In the latter category, the dominant factor in determining individual capability was whether the individual in question had a relevant civilian acquired skill.
Combat sustainability (Military science) --- United States. --- Combat sustainability
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