Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

What is it for something in the mind to represent something? Robert Cummins looks at the familiar problems of representation theory (what information is represented in the mind, what form mental representation takes, how representational schemes are implemented in the brain, what it is for one thing to represent another) from an unprecedented angle. Instead of following the usual procedure of defending a version of "indicator" semantics, Cummins begins with a theory of representational error and uses this theory to constrain the account of representational content. Thus, the problem of misrepresentation, which plagues all other accounts, is avoided at the start. Cummins shows that representational error can be accommodated only if the content of a representation is intrinsic - independent of its use and causal role in the system that employs it. Cummins's theory of error is based on the teleological idea of a "target," an intentional concept but one that differs importantly from that of an ordinary intentional object. Using this notion he offers a schematic theory of representation and an account of propositional attitudes that takes exception with some popular positions, such as conceptual role semantics, Fodor's representational theory of the mind, and Putnam's twin-earth examples.

Philosophical anthropology --- Theory of knowledge --- Representation (Philosophy) --- Mental representation --- Philosophy & Religion --- Philosophy --- Representation, Mental --- Representationalism (Philosophy) --- Representationism (Philosophy) --- Abstraction --- Perception --- Culture --- Mental representation.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The World in the Head collects the best of Robert Cummins' papers on mental representation and psychological explanation. Running through these papers are a pair of themes: that explaining the mind requires functional analysis, not subsumption under ""psychological laws"", and that the propositional attitudes--belief, desire, intention--and their interactions, while real, are not the key to understanding the mind at a fundamental level. Taking these ideas seriously putsconsiderable strain on standard conceptions of rationality and reasoning, on truth-conditional semantics, and on our interpret

Mental representation. --- Philosophy of mind. --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Representation, Mental --- Philosophy --- Cognitive science --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology --- Abstraction --- Perception

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The scientific study of 'wellbeing' involves both objective and subjective variables. While objective wellbeing can be simply measured as tangible aspects of the living environment, measuring subjective wellbeing involves quantifying self-reported feelings. Although reliable and valid measures can be achieved, in a cross-cultural context differences in language and culture present formidable challenges to measurement comparability. This Element begins by describing the behaviour of subjective wellbeing in single cultures, using the theory of homeostasis. Robert A. Cummins then discusses cross-cultural differences in subjective wellbeing, with a focus on measurement invariance as a means of ensuring the validity of comparative results. Cummins proposes that the major barrier to creating such comparability of measurement is a pervasive response bias that differs between cultures. He concludes that current instruments are inadequate to provide valid cross-cultural measures of subjective wellbeing, and that suitable measures may be created as short forms of current scales.

Quality of life. --- Well-being. --- Quality of life --- Well-being --- Research. --- Well-being - Cross-cultural studies --- Happiness - Cross-cultural studies --- Well-being - Research - Methodology --- Happiness - Research - Methodology --- Happiness --- Research --- Methodology.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The scientific study of 'wellbeing' involves both objective and subjective variables. While objective wellbeing can be simply measured as tangible aspects of the living environment, measuring subjective wellbeing involves quantifying self-reported feelings. Although reliable and valid measures can be achieved, in a cross-cultural context differences in language and culture present formidable challenges to measurement comparability. This Element begins by describing the behaviour of subjective wellbeing in single cultures, using the theory of homeostasis. Robert A. Cummins then discusses cross-cultural differences in subjective wellbeing, with a focus on measurement invariance as a means of ensuring the validity of comparative results. Cummins proposes that the major barrier to creating such comparability of measurement is a pervasive response bias that differs between cultures. He concludes that current instruments are inadequate to provide valid cross-cultural measures of subjective wellbeing, and that suitable measures may be created as short forms of current scales

Well-being --- Happiness