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This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly to firms' experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. We then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America.
Bribe --- Bribes --- Business Transactions --- Corrupt --- Corrupt Officials --- Corrupt Practices --- Corruption --- Corruption and Anticorruption Law --- Crime and Society --- Democracy --- E-Business --- Graft --- Multinational --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Social Development
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This paper estimates the elasticity of substitution of U.S. imports using detailed trade data over the 1990-2003 period. The authors use a two-stage least squares framework in order to identify the elasticity parameter of interest. The authors use the elasticity estimates to assess the extent to which Latin American and Chinese goods compete in the U.S. market by providing forecasts of how alternative policy scenarios may affect exports to the United States. The analysis considers the following scenarios: (i) currency revaluation in China; (ii) elimination of U.S. tariffs on Latin American exports under a hemispheric free trade agreement; and (iii) the elimination of quotas on apparel and textile exports under the Multi-Fiber Agreement. The findings show that a 20-percent appreciation of the renminbi reduces Chinese exports to the United States by a fifth, although since other regions increase sales to that market (0.5 percent for Latin America), U.S. imports decline by only 1.7 percent. Hemispheric free trade would increase Latin America's exports to the United States by around 3 percent. The removal of the quotas would lead to a sharp increase in Chinese sales to the United States (40 percent), but Latin America would see its share of the U.S. market decline by around 2 percent (2.5 percentage points). China's gains would come mainly at the expense of other regions of the world.
Comparative advantage --- Competitiveness --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Elasticity --- Elasticity of substitution --- Exports --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Forecasts --- Free Trade --- Free trade --- International Economics & Trade --- Low tariffs --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets and Market Access --- Public Sector Development --- Quotas --- Trade policy
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This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly to firms' experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. We then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America.
Bribe --- Bribes --- Business Transactions --- Corrupt --- Corrupt Officials --- Corrupt Practices --- Corruption --- Corruption and Anticorruption Law --- Crime and Society --- Democracy --- E-Business --- Graft --- Multinational --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Social Development
Choose an application
This paper estimates the elasticity of substitution of U.S. imports using detailed trade data over the 1990-2003 period. The authors use a two-stage least squares framework in order to identify the elasticity parameter of interest. The authors use the elasticity estimates to assess the extent to which Latin American and Chinese goods compete in the U.S. market by providing forecasts of how alternative policy scenarios may affect exports to the United States. The analysis considers the following scenarios: (i) currency revaluation in China; (ii) elimination of U.S. tariffs on Latin American exports under a hemispheric free trade agreement; and (iii) the elimination of quotas on apparel and textile exports under the Multi-Fiber Agreement. The findings show that a 20-percent appreciation of the renminbi reduces Chinese exports to the United States by a fifth, although since other regions increase sales to that market (0.5 percent for Latin America), U.S. imports decline by only 1.7 percent. Hemispheric free trade would increase Latin America's exports to the United States by around 3 percent. The removal of the quotas would lead to a sharp increase in Chinese sales to the United States (40 percent), but Latin America would see its share of the U.S. market decline by around 2 percent (2.5 percentage points). China's gains would come mainly at the expense of other regions of the world.
Comparative advantage --- Competitiveness --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Elasticity --- Elasticity of substitution --- Exports --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Forecasts --- Free Trade --- Free trade --- International Economics & Trade --- Low tariffs --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets and Market Access --- Public Sector Development --- Quotas --- Trade policy
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We study whether international trade fosters democracy. The likely endogeneity between democracy and trade is addressed via the gravity model of trade, allowing us to obtain a measure of natural openness. This serves as our instrumental variable for actual trade openness à la Frankel and Romer (1999). We use this powerful instrument to obtain estimates of the causal impact of openness on democratization. A positive impact of openness on democracy is apparent from about 1895 onwards. Late nineteenth century trade globalization may have helped generate the "first wave" of democratization. Between 1920 and 1938 countries more exposed to international trade were less likely to become authoritarian. Finally, our post-World War II results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in trade with other countries could bring countries like Indonesia, Russia or Venezuela to be as democratic as the US, Great Britain or France. We also see some variation in the impact of openness by region and note that commodity exporters and petroleum producers do not seem to become more democratic by exporting more of such items.
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