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National security --- China. --- China --- Military policy --- Defenses
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This report on Singapore is part of a project examining the perspectives of U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific as they formulate and implement their responses to China's more assertive foreign and security policy behavior in the region and to a more competitive U.S.-China relationship. Singapore views its relations and partnership with the United States as essential to its security policy. It sees the U.S. regional presence as playing an indispensable role in ensuring its ability to navigate a regional security environment that is increasingly complicated by China's growing influence and more-assertive Chinese behavior. At the same time, China is Singapore's most important trading partner, and Singapore aims to maintain a stable relationship with China even as it resists Chinese influence and interference. The U.S.-Singapore relationship is a success story: Singapore has been and remains a strategic partner for U.S. diplomacy and security efforts in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region more broadly. To sustain this success in ways that will buttress U.S. competitive advantage will require a steady hand at the helm of the relationship, strengthening ties across economic and security domains while recognizing the importance to Singapore of stable relations with and growing economic ties to China. Singapore's geographic location astride the Straits of Malacca, its outsize influence in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the military support afforded the United States by infrastructure and access in Singapore make investments in U.S. attention and treasure both necessary and worthwhile.
Great powers --- Security, International --- Foreign relations. --- 2000-2099 --- Singapore --- China --- United States --- China. --- Indo-Pacific Region. --- Singapore. --- Southeast Asia. --- United States. --- Foreign relations
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Recent analysis of China's military modernization effort has focused heavily on the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) development of concepts and capabilities to deter or delay foreign forces responding to crises along China's periphery. However, China developed these capabilities within the context of broader strategic requirements. This study describes China's overarching national and security strategies and its approach to war and escalation control; summarizes its military capabilities developments; and reviews its concepts for deterrence in strategic and conventional domains. This report is intended as a general reference document for senior defense officials and other policymakers seeking an understanding of the links between China's national development strategy and its security and defense policies, strategies and concepts. The information in this report assesses the perceptions of China's leaders on many critical issues -- from their views of the international security environment and domestic and international threats, to their approaches to crisis management and escalation control, to the development of military capabilities and deterrence concepts. As this study indicates, these Chinese assessments are not static; they evolve as China's standing in the world increases and its national interests grow, and the conclusions Chinese planners draw from such assessments also change. The necessity of continuing to monitor and analyze emerging literature and assessments on concepts discussed in this report--particularly those with broader implications for current events, such as China's defense of territorial claims in the South China Sea and prospects for crisis management--will be crucial"--Publisher's description
National security --- China. --- China --- Military policy --- Defenses
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In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to complete ongoing force modernization efforts by 2035 and become a world-class military capable of fighting and winning wars in any theater of operations by 2050. Although the PLA has made impressive modernization progress over the past three decades, it is unclear how this effort would translate to battlefield performance between now and Xi's 2035 goal. Chinese military theory, strategy, and operational concepts are key to understanding how the PLA might fight when called on to do so. In this report, the authors assess China's current military theory, strategy, and guiding principles, and they also delineate notional doctrinal or operational concepts that likely underpin People's Liberation Army military planning. The assessments in this report are derived from analysis of authoritative Chinese government, military, media, and scholarly sources, supplemented by a literature review of Western scholarship. The authors analyzed these sources to understand, from the Chinese perspective, People's Republic of China policy and strategic direction regarding PLA force development over time. This report is intended as a primer for U.S. Department of Defense strategists and planners as they conduct campaign planning and formulate responses to China's evolving military strategy and doctrine.
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To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors identified and characterized China's grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades. China's central goals are to produce a China that is well governed, socially stable, economically prosperous, technologically advanced, and militarily powerful by 2050. China has delineated specific objectives regarding economic growth, regional and global leadership in evolving economic and security architectures, and control over claimed territory. In several cases, these objectives bring China into competition, crisis, and even potential conflict with the United States and its allies. China's leaders clearly recognize this and have delineated and prioritized specific actors and actions as threats to the achievement of these objectives. With the United States, China seeks to manage the relationship, gain competitive advantage, and resolve threats emanating from that competition without derailing other strategic objectives (particularly those in the economic realm). Preparing for a triumphant or ascending China seems most prudent for the United States because these scenarios align with current national development trends and represent the most-challenging future scenarios for the U.S. military. In both scenarios, the U.S. military should anticipate increased risk to already threatened forward-based forces in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and a loss of the ability to operate routinely in the air and sea space above and in the Western Pacific.
China --- United States --- Foreign relations --- Forecasting. --- Relations --- Cina --- Kinë --- Cathay --- Chinese National Government --- Chung-kuo kuo min cheng fu --- Republic of China (1912-1949) --- Kuo min cheng fu (China : 1912-1949) --- Chung-hua min kuo (1912-1949) --- Kina (China) --- National Government (1912-1949) --- China (Republic : 1912-1949) --- People's Republic of China --- Chinese People's Republic --- Chung-hua jen min kung ho kuo --- Central People's Government of Communist China --- Chung yang jen min cheng fu --- Chung-hua chung yang jen min kung ho kuo --- Central Government of the People's Republic of China --- Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo --- Zhong hua ren min gong he guo --- Kitaĭskai︠a︡ Narodnai︠a︡ Respublika --- Činská lidová republika --- RRT --- Republik Rakjat Tiongkok --- KNR --- Kytaĭsʹka Narodna Respublika --- Jumhūriyat al-Ṣīn al-Shaʻbīyah --- RRC --- Kitaĭ --- Kínai Népköztársaság --- Chūka Jinmin Kyōwakoku --- Erets Sin --- Sin --- Sāthāranarat Prachāchon Čhīn --- P.R. China --- PR China --- PRC --- P.R.C. --- Chung-kuo --- Zhongguo --- Zhonghuaminguo (1912-1949) --- Zhong guo --- Chine --- République Populaire de Chine --- República Popular China --- Catay --- VR China --- VRChina --- 中國 --- 中国 --- 中华人民共和国 --- Jhongguó --- Bu̇gu̇de Nayiramdaxu Dundadu Arad Ulus --- Bu̇gu̇de Nayiramdaqu Dumdadu Arad Ulus --- Bu̇gd Naĭramdakh Dundad Ard Uls --- BNKhAU --- БНХАУ --- Khi︠a︡tad --- Kitad --- Dumdadu Ulus --- Dumdad Uls --- Думдад Улс --- Kitajska --- China (Republic : 1949- )
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In Asia over the past decade, democratization has been uneven. Asia is the only world region for which democracy scores have improved over the past two decades. However, as shown by the illiberal trend in recent years in many countries of South and Southeast Asia, including those that are long-established democracies, democracy remains fragile. Why do some Asian states consolidate democratic gains while others slide toward authoritarianism? In this report, RAND researchers study democratization and the factors that influence it among small Asian states, identify policies that can support democratization, and examine how external actors can help countries democratize. They follow a three-stage approach: (1) a literature review to identify global and Asian trends in democratization and to identify factors that might influence it; (2) a statistical analysis to discover the factors that are statistically significant for Asia relative to global factors; and (3) interview-based case studies of four Asian states — Taiwan, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia — at different stages of democratization.
Democracy --- Asia --- Pacific Area
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China's leaders' quest to achieve an artificial intelligence (AI) capability to perform a variety of civilian and military functions starts with mastering big data analytics — the use of computers to make sense of large data sets. The research conducted by the authors of this report indicates that China is aggressively working toward becoming a global leader in big data analytics as part of its plan to achieve great power status; indeed, President Xi Jinping has articulated that China should become the global center for AI by 2030. Beijing's efforts are guided by a national big data strategy, an effort that encompasses economic, military, police, and intelligence functions. The authors find that Beijing is already using big data analytics to survey the country's domestic population and enhance its military capabilities. Improvements in big data analytics have supported Beijing's monitoring and control of its citizens — including ethnic minorities.
Big data --- Government policy --- China.
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The U.S. Department of Defense has been increasingly focused on competition with Russia and China and, in the extreme, the possibility of great power war. To inform thinking about what might follow such a war, RAND researchers generated four hypothetical near-term great power war scenarios and assessed how the postwar strategic environment would change in each scenario. These scenarios offer planners and decisionmakers plausible narratives about future great power wars with different features to help them examine assumptions and think about how wartime choices could affect postwar U.S. objectives. The scenarios in this report illustrate the complex relationships between wartime and postwar goals. They show how a U.S. victory could provoke a stronger alignment between China and Russia or lead to greater determination and hostility in the recently defeated adversary. A U.S. defeat, meanwhile, could enhance U.S. efforts to recruit allies and partners, while also increasing the likelihood of nuclear proliferation among U.S. allies and partners. Indeterminate war outcomes could heighten the risk of a quick return to conflict while sapping alliance cohesion. The complexity and variability of these results highlight the importance for U.S. policymakers of considering postwar outcomes in prewar planning.
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In long-term strategic competition with China, how effectively the United States works with allies and partners will be critical to determining U.S. success. To enable closer cooperation, the United States will need to understand how allies and partners view the United States and China and how they are responding to U.S.-China competition. In this report, which is the main report of a series on U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific, the authors define what U.S.-China competition for influence involves and comparatively assess U.S.-China competition for influence in six countries in Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—as well as the roles of three U.S. allies and partners that are active in Southeast Asia—Australia, India, and Japan. The authors first explore why the United States is competing with China in the Indo-Pacific and what the two are competing for. They then develop a framework that uses 14 variables to assess relative U.S.-Chinese influence across countries in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing from interviews in all nine countries and data gathered, the authors apply this framework to assess how regional countries view U.S.-China competition in their respective countries and how China views competition in each of the regional countries. Finally, the authors discuss how the United States could work more effectively with allies and partners in Southeast Asia and beyond.
Great powers --- Security, International --- Security, International --- Foreign relations. --- 2000-2099 --- United States --- China --- China. --- Indo-Pacific Region. --- Southeast Asia. --- United States. --- Foreign relations --- Foreign relations
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