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Focusing on the international and defense dimensions of U.S.-China competition, the authors of this report make three contributions. First, they intend this report to serve as a planning tool by positing international and defense strategies that could allow China to outcompete the United States. Second, they mean to educate readers on Chinese strategy and policy processes. Third, the authors seek to encourage greater public debate about the nature and stakes of the competition. As presented by the authors, China's international strategy aims to establish the country's primacy in the Asia-Pacific region and leadership of the international order. The international strategy presented seeks to achieve this end state through peaceful methods, although it does not rule out the possibilities of militarized crises or even conflicts of a limited scope, such as proxy wars. The core of the proposed international strategy is a reliance on China's economic prowess and diplomatic maneuver to put Beijing into a position of advantage from which it cannot be dislodged by the United States. A complementary defense strategy would aim to constrain Washington's ability to forestall or prevent its own eclipse by building a superior Chinese military that renders the risks of military conflict intolerably high. A major Chinese military responsibility would be to support diplomatic efforts to shape a favorable international environment by building strong security ties with client states and discrediting or weakening the appeal of the United States as an alternative.

Strategic rivalries (World politics) --- Competition, International. --- Since 2000 --- China --- United States --- China. --- United States. --- Foreign relations --- Politics and government --- Economic policy

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If there is a set of issues where great power cooperation could be most likely, it should be in the global commons. Global commons issues are — by definition — shared by multiple nations. As part of a broader study of great power cooperation in an era of strategic competition, the authors assessed the potential for U.S. cooperation with China or Russia on eight global commons issues: maintaining freedom of access to space, dismantling transnational criminal organizations/networks, countering violent extremist organizations, promoting global stability, preserving access to the air and maritime commons, preventing nuclear arms races, preventing militarization of the Arctic, and maintaining the openness of cyberspace. The authors sought to understand where the United States, China, and Russia share interests on these issues, what the obstacles to cooperation are, and where the United States might be able to deepen its cooperation with one or both powers. The authors find that the trade space for cooperation is already narrow and usually focused more on civilian aspects of these domains rather than core security matters. In general, there is more room for the United States to cooperate with Russia than with China, and there are significant obstacles to cooperation, with a lack of trust being the most common. Finally, cooperation produces both positive and negative externalities, and the costs of cooperation do not always outweigh the likely benefits.

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To what extent can the United States still cooperate with China and Russia in certain areas even in this era of strategic competition? On which issues? What are the obstacles, the potential benefits, and the risks associated with great power cooperation? This report, the first of a four-part series, presents the overarching findings of a study that explored these questions. The authors find that the trade space for cooperation is already narrow; that the obstacles to cooperation — particularly the absence of trust — are growing; that there are comparatively few wedge issues to play China and Russia off of one another; and that the side benefits of pursuing cooperation over competition do not clearly outweigh the costs of doing so. In other words, any cooperation between the powers will be rare and needs to be narrowly focused on making competition safe, and U.S. leaders should expect that the era of strategic competition will be here to stay for the foreseeable future. This research was completed in September 2020, before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has not been subsequently revised.