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State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are causing trouble in the global trading system. They grant financial advantages to other SOEs or private entities leading to market distortions. These financial contributions could be considered a subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). According to the ASCM, in order for that financial contribution to constitute a subsidy, it must be granted by either a ‘government’ or a ‘public body’. The question is whether an SOE can be considered as a ‘public body’ under the ASCM when granting these financial contributions. In the event that SOEs are considered ‘public bodies’, their financial contributions to other SOEs or private entities will qualify as a subsidy under the ASCM. The Appellate Body has looked into the matter, only to conclude that it should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the ASCM is currently unable to capture SOEs. In addition, WTO Members, such as China and the U.S. have different approaches to the matter. The U.S. is arguing that an entity constitutes a ‘public body’ based on its state-ownership. Conversely, China concentrates on the element of governmental functions. As a result, no consensus exists in the interpretation of the term ‘public body’. Nevertheless, other agreements, such as FTAs, the TPP or OECD Guidelines, are an interesting source of inspiration when attempting to discipline SOEs. For example, these agreements contain provisions on ‘commercial consideration’ and ‘non-discriminatory treatment’. To catch SOEs under the ASCM, a new subsidy category can be created or a ‘public body’ presumption could be inserted. Despite these suggestions having their benefits, this paper advocates an enhanced transparency regarding SOEs. Likewise, transparency will benefit the handling of Chinese SOEs. China has the biggest proportion of SOEs in the world. Their behaviour causes market distortions in domestic and foreign markets. In addition, Chinese SOEs are largely inefficient. Moreover, the non-market economy status of China in the WTO exposes the tensions between market economies (for example the U.S.), on which the WTO is based, heterodox markets (for example China). When looking at the issue from a distance we conclude that the difference in economic model, corporate governance and geopolitical goals justify enhanced transparency in order to discipline SOEs in international economic law.