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We model unemployment allowing workers to differ by comparative advantage in market work. Workers with comparative advantage are identified by who works more hours when employed. This enables us to test the model by grouping workers based on their long-term wages and hours from panel data. The model captures the greater cyclicality of employment for workers with low comparative advantage. But the model fails to explain the magnitude of countercyclical separations for high-wage workers or the magnitude of procyclical findings for high-hours workers. As a result, it only captures the cyclicality of the extensive, employment margin for low-wage, low-hours workers.
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We model worker heterogeneity in the rents from being employed in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of matching and unemployment. We show that heterogeneity, reflecting differences in match quality and worker assets, reduces the extent of fluctuations in separations and unemployment. We find that the model faces a trade-off--it cannot produce both realistic dispersion in wage growth across workers and realistic cyclical fluctuations in unemployment.
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This paper assesses biases in policy predictions due to the lack of invariance of "structural'' parameters in representative-agent models. We simulate data under various fiscal policy regimes from a heterogeneous-agents economy with incomplete asset markets and indivisible labor supply. Imperfect aggregation manifests itself through preference shocks in the estimated representative-agent model. Preference and technology parameter estimates are not invariant with respect to policy changes. As a result, the bias in the representative-agent model's policy predictions is large compared to the length of predictive intervals that reflect parameter uncertainty.
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We consider a matching model of employment with wages that are flexible for new hires, but sticky within matches. We depart from standard treatments of sticky wages by allowing effort to respond to the wage being too high or low. Shimer (2004) and others have illustrated that employment in the Mortensen-Pissarides model does not depend on the degree of wage flexibility in existing matches. But this is not true in our model. If wages of matched workers are stuck too high in a recession, then firms will require more effort, lowering the value of additional labor and reducing new hiring.
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