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Military objectives often can be pursued using a number of different approaches: airpower versus ground forces, larger munitions versus smaller ones, more- or less-restrictive rules of engagement. Military effectiveness often favors the immediate application of overwhelming force, but militaries and their civilian overseers often opt for more-restrained approaches. Understanding how and why policymakers have chosen to impose these restraints in the past and how and why they are likely to do so in the future is critical to understanding how states will conduct future wars. This report identifies four key trends likely to shape the future exercise of restraint in warfare: the spread of lawfare (or use of law as a weapon of war), the widespread distribution of imagery of U.S. military operations, the increasing effectiveness of false accusations, and the increasing public concern for civilian casualties. These trends are assessed for how likely they are to affect both conflict between states and between states and nonstate actors, in addition to how the effects of these trends might differ for different types of states. Overall, these trends appear likely to further increase the incentives of decisionmakers in liberal democratic states to avoid civilian casualties in conflicts against weaker adversaries and to support investments in capabilities to make this possible. Other states that are more autocratic are not likely to be similarly constrained, and policymakers in democratic states will need to adapt to this asymmetry. Between highly capable state actors, conflict is less likely to occur but could involve very different incentives if operational considerations prompt a sharp reduction in the degree of restraint exercised beyond each state's legal obligations and the public shows a greater tolerance of heightened levels of military casualties and collateral damage to civilians. This report also provides specific recommendations for U.S. policymakers to begin to adapt to these anticipated trends.

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This report seeks to better understand why the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been more successful than its predecessor organization, al Qaeda, in recruiting individuals within the United States. The authors consider whether the demographic profile of individuals drawn to foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) has changed over time or whether new groups are more successful appealing to the same segment of the population. They take an expansive approach, analyzing all known cases of U.S. citizens or persons within the United States connected to a FTO with Islamist orientation since September 11, 2001, and use consistent criteria for inclusion and exclusion to identify individuals meeting this definition, and coding multiple demographic variables. They then conduct a quantitative analysis of the entire population, as well as the population broken down by group and by role (i.e., foreign fighters, homegrown violent extremists, etc.). Their findings reveal that the number of U.S. recruits drawn to al Qaeda and its affiliate groups has declined precipitously, commensurate with the ascent of ISIL, and that the average terrorist recruited by ISIL is not only younger and less educated but more likely to be African American/black or Caucasian/white and a U.S.-born citizen. Historically, terrorist recruits were more likely immigrants of Middle Eastern descent. These findings are relevant to U.S. defense, intelligence, and law enforcement officials, as well as to civilian academic and policymaking audiences, who may be unaware of this altered demographic profile, a perception that could bias counterterrorism policy and efforts.

Terrorists --- Criminals --- Recruiting --- IS (Organization) --- Qaida (Organization) --- ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) --- ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) --- Daech --- Daeş --- Daesh --- Daʻiş --- Dāʻish --- Daisy --- Dâʼisy al-ʻIrāq wa-asy-Syâm --- Daulah Islamiyah Iraq dan Syam --- Dawlah al-Islāmīyah --- Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fi al-'Irāq wa-al-Shām --- ES --- Estado Islâmico --- Estado Islâmico do Iraque --- Estado Islâmico do Iraque e da Síria --- Estado Islâmico do Iraque e Síria --- IGIL --- IŞİD --- Islamic State --- Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham --- Islamic State of Iraq and Syria --- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant --- Islamskoe gosudarstvo Iraka i Levanta --- ИГИЛ --- Исламское государство Ирака и Леванта --- داعش --- دولة الإسلامية --- دولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام‎ --- Qāʻidah (Organization) --- Quaida (Organization) --- Al-Qaida (Organization) --- Qaeda (Organization) --- International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders --- Islamic Salvation Foundation --- Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites --- Islamic Army for the Preservation of Holy Sites --- Islamic Army for the Preservation of the Holy Places --- Al Qaeda (Organization) --- Al Queda (Organization) --- Alʹ-Kaida (Organization) --- Kaida (Organization) --- R̄ekxirawî Elqaʻîde --- Elqaʻîde (Organization) --- تنظيم القاعدة --- قاعدة (منظمة) --- Al-Qaedah (Organization) --- דאעש --- État islamique

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"This report analyzes the U.S. and allied campaign against the al Qa'ida-linked terrorist group al Shabaab in Somalia, examines what steps have been most successful against the group, and identifies potential recommendations. It concludes that, while al Shabaab was weakened between 2011 and 2016, the group could resurge if urgent steps are not taken to address the political, economic, and governance challenges at the heart of the conflict. This study finds that a tailored engagement strategy which involved deploying a small number of U.S. special operations forces to conduct targeted strikes, provide intelligence, and build the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations--was key in degrading al Shabaab. Still, progress in Somalia is reversible in the absence of continued and consistent pressure and political, economic, and social reforms. Today's terrorism and insurgency landscape defies easy solutions, with challenges from the Islamic State, al Qa'ida, and other groups across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. While there has been a significant focus on how and why the U.S. and other Western governments have failed to degrade terrorists and insurgents in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, and other countries, there has been far less attention on successful efforts to degrade groups. In Somalia, there has been limited progress. The challenge will be preventing a reversal"--Publisher's description.

Polemology --- Somalia --- Terrorism --- Counterinsurgency --- Counterguerrilla warfare --- Guerrilla warfare --- Insurgency --- Acts of terrorism --- Attacks, Terrorist --- Global terrorism --- International terrorism --- Political terrorism --- Terror attacks --- Terrorist acts --- Terrorist attacks --- World terrorism --- Direct action --- Political crimes and offenses --- Subversive activities --- Political violence --- Terror --- Prevention --- Evaluation. --- Shabaab (Organization) --- Al-Shabaab (Organization) --- Al-Shabaab (Somalia) --- Ash-Shabaab (Somalia) --- Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen --- Hizbul Shabaab (Somalia) --- HSM (Somalia) --- Movement of Striving Youth (Somalia) --- Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement (Somalia) --- Mujahidin Youth Movement (Somalia) --- MYM (Somalia) --- Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (Somalia) --- Shabaab (Somalia) --- Shabab (Organization) --- Xarakada Mujaahidiinta Alshabaab (Somalia)

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This report analyzes the golden hour—the early phase of a postconflict stability operation—and the actions, organization, and capabilities necessary to seize it and set the conflict-affected country on a path to self-sustaining peace. The report combines a review of the literature in this field and a brief examination of key cases of U.S.-led stability operations. The authors find evidence that the early phases of postconflict operations are, in fact, critical for improving the odds of success and reducing the eventual costs of achieving an acceptable outcome. Both diplomatic and military actions to provide security in the postconflict country, as well as efforts to broker a broad-based coalition in support of the new political order, are essential. The United States must work to improve civil-military coordination in these early phases. There are also several relatively small investments the United States could make now, in a period of relative peace, to prepare for future contingencies so that it will be prepared to seize golden hours when they arise.

Integrated operations (Military science) --- Civil-military relations. --- Security, International. --- United States. --- Stability operations. --- United States --- Armed Forces --- Stability operations --- Operations other than war

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This report addresses how climate change could affect the frequency of conflict in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The report begins with an examination of how the current literature characterizes the relationship between climate change and the incidence of conflict. The report then presents conflict projections out to 2070 for the AOR at the provincial level. The projections are made on the basis of a machine learning framework that uses historical data to train and validate a forecasting model. The projections incorporate anticipated changes in temperature and levels of precipitation, although these climate factors are used to complement other known drivers of conflict, such as an area's political and economic development. This is followed by an analysis of why the strength of the relationship between climate change and future conflict could be underestimated by the consensus in the field and the modeling in this report. The report ends with a modeling excursion that shows how drought could increase conflict risk by affecting economic growth. The purpose of this research is to support CENTCOM leadership and planners and their interagency partners to prepare for a future security environment that is affected by climate change. Understanding the frequency of future conflict in the AOR, as well as the marginal increase that is owed to climate change as a threat multiplier, will enable the U.S. government to better prepare for this future. This report is the third in a series focused on climate change and the security environment.