Listing 1 - 3 of 3 |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
To carry out their various missions (collecting revenue, facilitating trade, and ensuring security), many customs administrations have established a risk management unit. In developing countries, however, because of the lack of dedicated human and material resources, intelligence and risk analysis remain insufficiently developed. In view of the lack of resources, this paper proposes a simple methodology aiming at detecting risky import operations. The mirror analysis first helps to identify and target products or sectors with the greatest risk. Based on the examination of customs declarations patterns (data mining), it is possible to identify and target higher risk economic operators (importers and customs brokers). When implemented in Madagascar, this method has helped to reveal probable fraud cases in the present context of customs reform. Estimates suggest that, in 2014, customs fraud reduced non-oil customs revenues (duties and import value-added tax) by at least 30 percent.
Customs Fraud --- Customs Reform --- Mirror Statistics --- Tax Evasion --- Madagascar
Choose an application
This paper presents a new methodology to detect corruption in customs and applies it to Madagascar's main portrait Manipulation of assignment of import declarations to inspectors is identified by measuring deviations from random assignment prescribed by official rules. Deviant declarations are more at risk of tax evasion, yet less likely to be deemed fraudulent by inspectors, who also clear them faster. An intervention in which inspector assignment was delegated to a third party validates the approach, but also triggered a novel manifestation of manipulation that rejuvenated systemic corruption. Tax revenue losses associated with the corruption scheme are approximately 3 percent of total taxes collected and highly concentrated among a select few inspectors and brokers.
Corruption --- Customs --- International Economics and Trade --- Law and Development --- Public Sector Development --- Tariff Evasion --- Tax Enforcement --- Trade Law --- Trade Policy
Choose an application
This paper examines how providing better information to customs inspectors and monitoring their actions affects tax revenue and fraud detection in Madagascar. First, an instrumental variables strategy is used to show that transaction-specific, third-party valuation advice on a subset of high-risk import declarations increases fraud findings by 21.7 percentage points and tax collection by 5.2 percentage points. Second, a randomized control trial is conducted in which a subset of high-risk declarations is selected to receive detailed risk comments and another subset is explicitly tagged for ex-post monitoring. For declarations not subject to third-party valuation advice, detailed comments increase reporting of fraud by 3.1 percentage points and improve tax yield by 1 percentage point. However, valuation advice and detailed comments have a significantly smaller impact on revenue when potential tax losses and opportunities for graft are large. Monitoring induces inspectors to scan more shipments but does not result in the detection of more fraud or the collection of additional revenue. Better information thus helps curb customs fraud, but its effectiveness appears compromised by corruption.
Corporate Governance and Corruption --- Customs Inspection --- Information Provision --- International Economics and Trade --- Law and Development --- Performance Monitoring --- Private Sector Development --- Randomized Control Trials --- Risk Management --- Tariff Evasion --- Tax Enforcement --- Tax Fraud --- Tax Law --- Third-Party Information
Listing 1 - 3 of 3 |
Sort by
|