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This book examines Husserl’s approach to the question concerning meaning in life and demonstrates that his philosophy includes a phenomenology of existence. Given his critique of the fashionable “philosophy of existence” of the late 1920s and early 1930s, one might think that Husserl posited an opposition between transcendental phenomenology and existential philosophy, as well as that in this respect he differed from existential phenomenologists after him. But texts composed between 1908 and 1937 and recently published in Husserliana XLII, Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie (2014), show that the existential Husserl was not opposed but open to the phenomenological investigation of several basic topics of a philosophy of existence. A collection of contributions from a team of internationally recognized scholars drawing on these and other sources, the present volume offers insights into the relationship between phenomenology and philosophy of existence. It does so by (1) delineating the basic outlines of Husserl’s phenomenology of existence, (2) reinterpreting the tension between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Jaspers’s and Heidegger’s philosophy of existence as well as Kierkegaard’s and Sartre’s existentialism, and (3) investigating the existential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenological ethics. Thus focusing on neglected aspects of Husserl’s thought, the volume shows that there is a consensus between classical phenomenology and existential phenomenology on the urgency of addressing the existential questions that in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) Husserl calls “the questions concerning the meaning or meaninglessness of this entire human existence”. The Existential Husserl represents a major contribution to the clarification of the historical and philosophical developments from transcendental phenomenology to existential phenomenology. The book should appeal to a wide audience of many readers at all levels looking for phenomenological answers to existential questions.

Phenomenology. --- Husserl, Edmund, --- Philosophy, Modern --- Husserl, Edmund --- Husserl, Edmond --- Phenomenology --- Existentialism --- Conference proceedings

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Edmund Husserl and Ernst Cassirer rank among the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Despite the differences between their philosophical outlooks, their investigations show a common enduring interest in the exploration of human culture. This volume provides the first extensive analysis of Husserl’s and Cassirer’s approaches to the philosophy of culture, assembling contributions by leading international scholars and young researchers. The chapters offer insights into issues such as the various modalities of sense-giving in culture, the relationship between perception and meaning, the place of science in culture, the dismissal of scientism, and the possibility of humanism.

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The leading question which should guide the analyses contained in this work is, apparently, a very simple one: What is habit according to Husserl? However, a closer look on Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy easily persuades of the difficulty to find an answer to that question. Habit, in fact, belongs to the range of the “operative concepts” of Husserl’s philosophy, i.e. concepts he routinely employs without making them explicitly thematic. Given this premise, we decided to limit the scope of our work to the modest attempt of describing the ‘operative functioning’ of the concept of habit in three different contexts of Husserl’s analyses. Chapter One is devoted to an investigation of Husserl’s first employment of the concept of habitus in Ideen II. In the first paragraph (1.1), we offer a basic definition of the so called transcendental or absolute consciousness by making reference to the introduction in Ideen I of the phenomenological epoché. In the second paragraph (1.2), we tackle the problem of immanent constitution, i.e. the formation of unities in the flowing sphere of mental processes. Since Husserl conceives of habits in Ideen II in terms of possessions of a pure ego, we take into consideration in paragraph 1.3 the static notion of ego developed by Husserl in Ideen I. In section 1.4, we discuss the notion of habit with reference to Husserl’s introduction of a genetic conception of ego in Ideen II. As a consequence of Husserl’s interpretation of habit as “abiding remembering” in § 29 of Ideen II, we undertake in the following paragraph (1.5) a brief analysis of the intentional structure of recollections as laid out by Husserl in the lectures on time from 1905, and compare it to the peculiar form of remembering associated with habitus. Our last analysis in 1.6 is devoted to a possible understanding of habitualities in terms of passive, associative motivations, as it appears in § 56 of Ideen II. Chapter Two undertakes a cl