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Bureaucracy --- Executive departments --- Government executives --- Political planning --- #SBIB:041.IOS --- #SBIB:35H006 --- #SBIB:35H120 --- #SBIB:35H200 --- Planning in politics --- Public policy --- Planning --- Policy sciences --- Politics, Practical --- Public administration --- Executives --- Public officers --- Departments, Executive --- Government ministries --- Ministries, Government --- Ministries, State --- State ministries --- Administrative agencies --- Interorganizational relations --- Political science --- Organizational sociology --- History --- Bestuurswetenschappen: theorieën --- Functioneel gedecentraliseerde besturen / overheidsondernemingen: algemeen --- Overheidsmanagement: algemene werken --- #A0504PO --- United States. --- History. --- History of North America --- anno 1800-1899 --- anno 1900-1999 --- United States --- United States of America

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Until now political scientists have devoted little attention to the origins of American bureaucracy and the relationship between bureaucratic and interest group politics. In this pioneering book, Daniel Carpenter contributes to our understanding of institutions by presenting a unified study of bureaucratic autonomy in democratic regimes. He focuses on the emergence of bureaucratic policy innovation in the United States during the Progressive Era, asking why the Post Office Department and the Department of Agriculture became politically independent authors of new policy and why the Interior Department did not. To explain these developments, Carpenter offers a new theory of bureaucratic autonomy grounded in organization theory, rational choice models, and network concepts. According to the author, bureaucracies with unique goals achieve autonomy when their middle-level officials establish reputations among diverse coalitions for effectively providing unique services. These coalitions enable agencies to resist political control and make it costly for politicians to ignore the agencies' ideas. Carpenter assesses his argument through a highly innovative combination of historical narratives, statistical analyses, counterfactuals, and carefully structured policy comparisons. Along the way, he reinterprets the rise of national food and drug regulation, Comstockery and the Progressive anti-vice movement, the emergence of American conservation policy, the ascent of the farm lobby, the creation of postal savings banks and free rural mail delivery, and even the congressional Cannon Revolt of 1910.

Political planning --- Government executives --- Bureaucracy --- Executive departments --- History. --- History. --- History. --- History. --- United States. --- History. --- United States. --- Arnold, R. Douglas. --- Bigelow, Willard. --- Brand, Charles. --- Cockrell Committee. --- Dahl, Robert. --- Devine, Edward. --- Estabrook, Leon. --- Farm Bloc. --- Fulton, Charles. --- Gary, James. --- Goff, H. --- Grosh, Aaron. --- Hall, B. M. --- Hays, Will. --- Hedges, Florence. --- Howard, Robert. --- Innis, Squire. --- Jardine, William. --- Johnson, Ronald. --- Katznelson, Ira. --- Kenyon, William. --- Knights of Labor. --- Lauman, George. --- Louisiana Lottery. --- Mayhew, David. --- McCraw, Thomas. --- Noble, Edwin. --- Scott, Roy. --- administrative learning. --- bank war. --- ecological control. --- narrative panel. --- organizational capacity. --- packing regulation.

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When regulations (or lack thereof) seem to detract from the common good, critics often point to regulatory capture as a culprit. In some academic and policy circles it seems to have assumed the status of an immutable law. Yet for all the ink spilled describing and decrying capture, the concept remains difficult to nail down in practice. Is capture truly as powerful and unpreventable as the informed consensus seems to suggest? This edited volume brings together seventeen scholars from across the social sciences to address this question. Their work shows that capture is often misdiagnosed and may in fact be preventable and manageable. Focusing on the goal of prevention, the volume advances a more rigorous and empirical standard for diagnosing and measuring capture, paving the way for new lines of academic inquiry and more precise and nuanced reform.

Deregulation --- Trade regulation --- Pressure groups