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book (19)

digital (8)


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English (27)


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Book
Bank moral hazard and market discipline
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Year: 1999 Publisher: London

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Book
The structure of bank relationships, endogenous monitoring and loan rates
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Year: 2001 Publisher: London London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group

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Digital
Credit market competition and liquidity crises
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Year: 2014 Publisher: Munich CESifo

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Digital
Competition and stability: what's special about banking?
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Year: 2002 Publisher: Frankfurt am Main ECB

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Private finance


Digital
Financial system: shock absorber or amplifier?
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Year: 2008 Publisher: Basle BIS

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Book
Credit market competition and liquidity crises.
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Year: 2013 Publisher: London Centre For Economic Policy Research,.

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Book
Financial system: shock absorber or amplifier?
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Year: 2008 Publisher: Basel Bank for international settlements - Monetary and Economic Department

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Digital
Financial Connections and Systemic Risk
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Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two different network structures. In a clustered network groups of financial institutions hold identical portfolios and default together. In an unclustered network defaults are more dispersed. With long term finance welfare is the same in both networks. In contrast, when short term finance is used, the network structure matters. Upon the arrival of a signal about banks' future defaults, investors update their expectations of bank solvency. If their expectations are low, they do not roll over the debt and there is systemic risk in that all institutions are early liquidated. We compare investors' rollover decisions and welfare in the two networks.


Digital
Stakeholder governance, competition and firm value
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Year: 2014 Publisher: Munich CESifo

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Digital
Bank mergers, competition and liquidity
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Year: 2003 Publisher: Frankfurt am Main ECB

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