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China's economy, as a whole, has developed rapidly over the past 35 years, and yet its richest county is over 100 times richer in per capita terms than its poorest county. To explain this vast variation in development, David J. Bulman investigates the political foundations of local economic growth in China, focusing on the institutional and economic roles of county-level leaders and the career incentives that shape their behaviour. Through a close examination of six counties complemented by unique nation-wide data, he presents and explores two related questions: what is the role of County Party Secretaries in determining local governance and growth outcomes? And why do County Party Secretaries emphasize particular developmental priorities? Suitable for scholars of political economy, development economics, and comparative politics, this original study analyzes the relationship between political institutions, local governance, and leadership roles within Chinese government to explain the growing divergence in economic development between counties.
Regional economics --- Provincial governments --- Central-local government relations --- Economic development --- Subnational governments --- Economics --- Regional planning --- Regionalism --- Space in economics --- China --- Cina --- Kinë --- Cathay --- Chinese National Government --- Chung-kuo kuo min cheng fu --- Republic of China (1912-1949) --- Kuo min cheng fu (China : 1912-1949) --- Chung-hua min kuo (1912-1949) --- Kina (China) --- National Government (1912-1949) --- China (Republic : 1912-1949) --- People's Republic of China --- Chinese People's Republic --- Chung-hua jen min kung ho kuo --- Central People's Government of Communist China --- Chung yang jen min cheng fu --- Chung-hua chung yang jen min kung ho kuo --- Central Government of the People's Republic of China --- Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo --- Zhong hua ren min gong he guo --- Kitaĭskai︠a︡ Narodnai︠a︡ Respublika --- Činská lidová republika --- RRT --- Republik Rakjat Tiongkok --- KNR --- Kytaĭsʹka Narodna Respublika --- Jumhūriyat al-Ṣīn al-Shaʻbīyah --- RRC --- Kitaĭ --- Kínai Népköztársaság --- Chūka Jinmin Kyōwakoku --- Erets Sin --- Sin --- Sāthāranarat Prachāchon Čhīn --- P.R. China --- PR China --- PRC --- P.R.C. --- Chung-kuo --- Zhongguo --- Zhonghuaminguo (1912-1949) --- Zhong guo --- Chine --- République Populaire de Chine --- República Popular China --- Catay --- VR China --- VRChina --- 中國 --- 中国 --- 中华人民共和国 --- Jhongguó --- Bu̇gu̇de Nayiramdaxu Dundadu Arad Ulus --- Bu̇gu̇de Nayiramdaqu Dumdadu Arad Ulus --- Bu̇gd Naĭramdakh Dundad Ard Uls --- BNKhAU --- БНХАУ --- Khi︠a︡tad --- Kitad --- Dumdadu Ulus --- Dumdad Uls --- Думдад Улс --- Kitajska --- China (Republic : 1949- ) --- Economic conditions --- Regional disparities.
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Regional economics --- Provincial governments --- Central-local government relations --- Economic development --- China
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This paper examines the micro and macro correlates of aid project outcomes in a sample of 3,821 World Bank projects and 1,342 Asian Development Bank projects. Project outcomes vary much more within countries than between countries: country-level characteristics explain only 10-25 percent of project outcomes. Among macro variables, country growth and the policy environment are significantly positively correlated with project outcomes. Among micro variables, shorter project duration and the presence of additional financing are significantly correlated with better project outcomes. In addition, the track record of the project manager in delivering successful projects is highly significantly correlated with project outcomes. There are few significant differences between the two institutions in the relationship between these variables and project outcomes.
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Is there a "middle income trap"? Theory suggests that the determinants of growth at low and high income levels may be different. If countries struggle to transition from growth strategies that are effective at low income levels to growth strategies that are effective at high income levels, they may stagnate at some middle income level; this phenomenon can be thought of as a "middle income trap." This paper does not find evidence for (unusual) stagnation at any particular middle income level. However, it does find evidence that the determinants of growth at low and high income levels differ. These findings suggest a mixed conclusion: middle-income countries may need to change growth strategies to transition smoothly to high-income growth strategies, but this can be done smoothly and does not imply the existence of a middle income trap.
Determinants Of Growth --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Fiscal & Monetary Policy --- Income --- Inequality --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Middle Income Trap --- Poverty Reduction --- Private Sector Development
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This paper examines the micro and macro correlates of aid project outcomes in a sample of 3,821 World Bank projects and 1,342 Asian Development Bank projects. Project outcomes vary much more within countries than between countries: country-level characteristics explain only 10-25 percent of project outcomes. Among macro variables, country growth and the policy environment are significantly positively correlated with project outcomes. Among micro variables, shorter project duration and the presence of additional financing are significantly correlated with better project outcomes. In addition, the track record of the project manager in delivering successful projects is highly significantly correlated with project outcomes. There are few significant differences between the two institutions in the relationship between these variables and project outcomes.
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In this paper, the authors use the lab to test a series of policy proposals designed to constrain rent-seeking behaviour in a policymaking context. The baseline governance game is conducted in the following way: subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four, with one subject randomly selected to be the "policymaker", while the other three are the "citizens". Citizens are informed that they can use their endowments to contribute to a group account. Any amount contributed to the group account are doubled. Once citizens have made their contribution decisions, the policymaker observes the contribution decisions of each citizen, and the total amount in the group account. The policymaker formulates a distribution "policy" to distribute the tokens among all four group members. The game is repeated for 20 rounds. With this basic framework, the authors implement and test the effect of three institutions designed to constrain policymaker rent-seeking behaviour: voting, policy commitment, and punishment. The results show that voting and enforced commitment are the most effective policy mechanisms to constrain rent-seeking, and improve citizen welfare. The authors find policymaker punishment regimes to be largely ineffective, both in reducing rent-seeking and improving welfare of citizens.
Finance --- Game theory --- Governance --- National Governance --- Politics and Government --- Voting
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