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The global spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) created a fertile ground for attempts to influence and destabilize different populations and countries. Both Russia and China appear to have employed information manipulation during the COVID-19 pandemic in service to their respective global agendas. This report uses exploratory qualitative analysis to systematically describe the types of COVID-19-related malign and subversive information efforts with which Russia- and China-associated outlets appear to have targeted U.S. audiences from January 2020 to July 2020 and organizes them into a framework. This work lays the foundation for a better understanding of how and whether Russia and China might act and coordinate in the domain of malign and subversive information efforts in the future. This report is the first in a series that will use big data, computational linguistics, and machine learning to test findings and hypotheses generated by the initial analysis. This report is part of RAND's Countering Truth Decay initiative, which considers the diminishing role of facts and analysis in political and civil discourse and the policymaking process. Disinformation and its rampant spread online and offline is one of the key drivers of Truth Decay. Agents—notably such foreign actors as Russia and China and their proxies—fuel and contribute to the explosion in disinformation observed over the past decade. Knowing how Russia and China operate in this space can help inform our understanding of the Truth Decay phenomenon and efforts to mitigate it.

Big data --- COVID-19 (Disease) --- Propaganda, Anti-American --- Propaganda, Russian. --- Propaganda, Chinese. --- Social aspects --- Political aspects --- China. --- Russia. --- United States.

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How can the success (or failure) of Army special operations missions be assessed? The authors develop a methodology for doing so that relies on operational, intelligence, and ambient (publicly available) data, since operational level special operations commands often lack robust staff and resources to generate assessment-specific information. The method assesses the plan's lines of effort and their objectives, develops relevant measures of effectiveness and indicators, and gathers appropriate qualitative and quantitative data. The resulting analysis is presented to the appropriate commander, who can then use the information to adjust lines of effort or activities and other elements. The seven-step process is illustrated through a fictional scenario. Implementation will include incorporating the approach into doctrine and training and standing up an assessment cell. The cell requires access to data streams and appropriate analytic platforms and reachback support.

Special operations (Military science) --- Special forces (Military science) --- Evaluation.

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Policymakers and researchers are increasingly concerned that the U.S. veteran community is at increased risk of radicalization to violent extremism. Although subsequently revised downward, early reports suggested that as many as one in five Capitol Hill attackers was currently or had previously been affiliated with the U.S. military. Extremist groups actively target military members and veterans for recruitment targets because of their training and operational, logistic, and leadership skills. The unique and often lonely experience of leaving the military has been hypothesized to make veterans susceptible to such recruitment. To help address these concerns, the authors conducted a nationally representative survey of veterans to examine the prevalence of support for specific extremist groups and ideologies, including support for political violence. The authors compared their results with those from surveys of the general population. Among other findings, the veteran community, as a whole, did not manifest higher support than the general population. Interestingly, the majority of those who supported political violence were not also supporters of specific groups. A separate appendix provides cross-tabulation data.

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Ukrainian populations that speak the Russian language or are of Russian descent might be appealing targets for Russian propaganda. RAND Corporation research from 2018 analyzing Russian-language Twitter feeds emanating from Eastern Europe identified two large and influential communities: one group of seemingly "pro-Ukraine activists" who oppose Russian influence and support Ukrainian democracy and another group of seemingly "pro-Russia activists" who disseminate Russian social media content and oppose an independent Ukraine. RAND researchers used Twitter advertisements to solicit survey participation from the most-influential members of this pro-Ukraine activist community, influential members of the pro-Russia community, and a general population of Russian-language Twitter users from Ukraine. These advertisements successfully recruited 146 pro-Ukraine activists, 66 pro-Russia activists, and 1,103 general population respondents. The goal of this survey was to identify the extent to which pro-Ukraine activists used Twitter and other social media platforms to counter Russian influence in the region. The survey results demonstrate that a large percentage of pro-Ukraine activists support the United States and European Union and oppose Russia and its influence on Ukraine. Pro-Russia activists support Russia and have mixed views on the European Union and the United States. Large percentages of the pro-Ukraine activists also report using Twitter to help counter Russian influence. They take this activism to other social media accounts and to offline channels, including talking to family members or friends and — to a lesser extent — participating in advocacy groups.

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Violence against women and children continues to challenge well-being in Australia, especially for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. In this report, the authors discuss their evaluation of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet's (PM&C's) Third Action Plan (3AP) of the National Plan to Reduce Violence Against Women and Their Children, and specifically 3AP's Priority Area 2: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Women and Their Children. PM&C provided funding to 14 different service providers across Australia that work specifically on family issues in Aboriginal communities. Aboriginal communities are mostly located in remote and sparsely populated areas, creating challenges for service delivery. The 3AP funding was intended to help service providers deliver initiatives to address one or more of four categories: (1) trauma-informed therapeutic services, (2) men's behaviour change programs, (3) intensive family case management and (4) victim services through legal service providers. This report is intended to guide the Australian government's future work in providing family violence services in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, and to provide lessons to other organisations outside the federal government that may want to undertake similar work. Researchers conducted a thematic analysis of interviews with site staff and analysed site documentation to make recommendations stemming from the evaluation findings. The authors' recommendations can serve as a strong foundation for increasing funders' return on investment and creating long-term change in these communities across Australia.