Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

"This paper presents new data from 150 countries showing that former cabinet members, central bank governors, and financial regulators are many orders of magnitude more likely than other citizens to become board members of banks. Countries where the politician-banker phenomenon is more prevalent have higher corruption and more powerful yet less accountable governments, but not better functioning financial systems. Regulation becomes more pro-banker where this happens more often. Furthermore, a higher fraction of the rents that are created accrue to bankers, former politicians are not more likely to be directors when their side is in power, and banks are more profitable without being more leveraged. Rather than supporting a public interest view, the evidence is consistent with a capture-type private interest story where, in exchange for a non-executive position at a bank in the future, politicians provide for beneficial regulation. "--World Bank web site.

Bank directors. --- Banking law.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

"A well developed financial system enhances competition in the industrial sector by allowing easier entry. The impact varies across industries, however. For some, small changes in financial development quickly induce entry and dissipate incumbents' rents, generating strong incentives to oppose improvement of the financial system. In other sectors incumbents may even benefit from increased availability of external funds. The relative strength of promoters and opponents determines the political equilibrium level of financial system development. This may be perturbed by the effect of trade liberalization in the strength of each group. Using a sample of 41 trade liberalizers Braun and Raddatz conduct an event study and show that the change in the strength of promoters vis-a-vis opponents is a very good predictor of subsequent financial development. The result is not driven by changes in demand for external funds, or by the success of the trade policy. The relationship is mediated by policy reforms, the kind that induces competition in the financial sector, in particular. Real effects follow not so much from capital deepening but mainly through improved allocation. The effect is stronger in countries with high levels of governance, suggesting that incumbents resort to this costly but more subtle way of restricting entry where it is difficult to obtain more blatant forms of anti-competitive measures from politicians. This paper--a product of the Investment and Growth Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the relation between finance and the macroeconomy"--World Bank web site.

Finance --- Free trade

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Venezuela had one of the poorest economies in Latin America, but by 1970 it had become the richest country in the region and one of the twenty richest countries in the world, ahead of countries such as Greece, Israel, and Spain. Between 1978 and 2001, however, Venezuela’s economy went sharply in reverse, with non-oil GDP declining by almost 19 percent and oil GDP by an astonishing 65 percent. What accounts for this drastic turnabout? The editors of Venezuela Before Chávez, who each played a policymaking role in the country’s economy during the past two decades, have brought together a group of economists and political scientists to examine systematically the impact of a wide range of factors affecting the economy’s collapse, from the cost of labor regulation and the development of financial markets to the weakening of democratic governance and the politics of decisions about industrial policy. Aside from the editors, the contributors are Omar Bello, Adriana Bermúdez, Matías Braun, Javier Corrales, Jonathan Di John, Rafael Di Tella, Javier Donna, Samuel Freije, Dan Levy, Robert MacCulloch, Osmel Manzano, Francisco Monaldi, María Antonia Moreno, Daniel Ortega, Michael Penfold, José Pineda, Lant Pritchett, Cameron A. Shelton, and Dean Yang.

Financial crises --- Crashes, Financial --- Crises, Financial --- Financial crashes --- Financial panics --- Panics (Finance) --- Stock exchange crashes --- Stock market panics --- Crises --- Venezuela --- Venesuėla --- Republic of Venezuela --- República de Venezuela --- Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela --- República Bolivariana de Venezuela --- Gobierno Bolivariano --- Estados Unidos de Venezuela --- Венесуэла --- Баліварыянская Рэспубліка Венесуэла --- Balivaryi︠a︡nskai︠a︡ Rėspublika Venesuėla --- Венецуела --- Venet︠s︡uela --- Боливарска република Венецуела --- Bolivarska republika Venet︠s︡uela --- Βενεζουέλα --- Venezouela --- Μπολιβαριανή Δημοκρατία της Βενεζουέλας --- Bolivarianē Dēmokratia tēs Venezouelas --- 베네수엘라 --- Penesuella --- 베네수엘라 볼리바르 공화국 --- Penesuella Bollibarŭ Konghwaguk --- Венесуэл --- Venesuėl --- Bu̇gd Naĭramdakh Bolivaryn Venesuėl Uls --- ベネズエラ --- Benezuera --- ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国 --- Benezuera Boribaru Kyōwakoku --- Боливарианская Республика Венесуэла --- Bolivarianskai︠a︡ Respublika Venesuėla --- Venecuela --- Bolivarska Republika Venecuela --- Venezuelan bolivariaaninen tasavalta --- Bolivarianska republiken Venezuela --- Bolivarcı Venezuela Cumhuriyeti --- Wenesuela --- Wenesuela Boliwar Respublikasy --- Венесуела --- Боліварианська Республіка Венесуела --- Bolivaryansʹka Respublika Venesuela --- 委內瑞拉 --- Weineiruila --- 委內瑞拉玻利瓦爾共和國 --- Weineiruila Boliwa'er Gongheguo --- Economic policy. --- Economic conditions --- E-books --- Financial crises. --- Venezuela.