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Fifth-generation (5G) networks are being deployed in the United States and globally and, one day, will replace many older, third- and fourth-generation cellular networks. 5G will provide much higher data rates and lower message latency than older cellular networks. 5G could also provide or support a variety of new applications, such as holographic communications, autonomous vehicles, and internet-of-things communications. However, security concerns have been raised about 5G networks built using Chinese equipment and 5G phones made by some Chinese companies. The United States is reliant on foreign suppliers for 5G infrastructure and key microchips that go into every 5G phone. This report describes 5G security issues, the 5G supply chain, and the competitive landscape in 5G equipment and mobile device markets. It describes where U.S. and Chinese companies have technology or market advantages in the emerging 5G security competition between the United States and China. The report provides recommendations for securing U.S. 5G networks and mobile devices and those used by U.S. allies and foreign partner nations.

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Information and intelligence - and the degree of access to and control of the systems within which the data reside - can yield power and influence at scale. These systems and the networks they create collectively make up digital infrastructure (DI). Spawned from internet growth and the interconnectivity of global telecommunication networks, today's DI - and a country's ownership of, access to, and control over it - has emerged as an area of competition between the United States and China. Beijing and Washington rely on DI to support military forces and use its capabilities to expand national power and extend influence globally. Both countries now aim to shape the DI in ways that align with their long-term strategic priorities and interests. This report defines DI, characterizes the competition for it, and provides evidence showing that how DI evolves carries implications for long-term military competition and conflict. The authors also describe important trends and asymmetries shaping the competition and conclude by discussing the implications and opportunities for the U.S. government and the U.S. Department of Defense.

Cyberspace operations (Military science) --- Cyber intelligence (Computer security) --- Cyberinfrastructure.

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The growing cruise and ballistic missile threat to U.S. Air Force bases in Europe has led Headquarters U.S. Air Forces Europe to reassess defensive options, including active ground-based systems that are currently assigned to the Army. The gap between the cruise missile threat and the U.S. joint force's capacity and capability to counter the threat is particularly worrisome. Constraints on resources and Army prioritization of mobile short-range air defenses for forward forces suggest that shortfalls in air base air defenses are likely to continue unless U.S. Department of Defense force planning and posture decisions give higher priority to these point defenses. This report presents a broad assessment of the threats, defense options, and constraints. The authors offer alternative courses of action for Air Force leadership and assess strengths and weaknesses of each. Although the U.S. Army has been assigned the mission, that mission is not a priority for the Army, as reflected by the lack of dedicated forces. The Air Force is increasingly interested in acquiring its own ground-based air defense but does not believe it has the authority to do so.

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The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) understanding of the military balance is fundamentally based on systems warfare concepts. Systems concepts drive China's perceptions of the successes of its three-decade-old modernization and its identification of enduring or emerging weaknesses. China's leaders recognize the qualitative and quantitative improvements in PLA weapons and technology; however, in key areas essential to conducting systems confrontation and systems destruction warfare, there remain significant gaps that have received the attention of Xi Jinping himself. During Xi's tenure, the PLA has been forced to confront a range of problems that go well beyond technological modernization, force structure, and organizational relationships. Still, both the United States and the PRC, through different evaluation processes, have concluded that war with the other has the potential to be extremely risky from an escalation standpoint, protracted and costly, and fatally harmful to long-term credibility and/or strategic goals. This analysis is one of the first to detail how the PLA understands and assesses military balance. The PLA sees itself as the weaker side in the overall military balance, largely because it has made only limited progress in those key areas that will define future warfare, most importantly informatization and system-of-systems–based operations. Necessary improvements have not materialized quickly and will likely take time because of the PLA's organizational culture and the improvements' systemic complexity. A refined understanding of Beijing's view of the PLA also has significant implications for U.S. policymakers, military commanders, and planners.

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The U.S. Air Force is exploring adaptive basing (AB) concepts to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces to growing air and missile threats and to preserve critical combat capabilities in highly contested environments. These concepts are likely to stress the U.S. Air Force's global mobility capabilities. AB concepts call for force packages to operate in mobile and responsive ways to preserve critical combat capabilities and fight from positions of advantage. Although these concepts place additional and different demands on the U.S. Air Force's global mobility capabilities, their effect on the Mobility Air Forces had not been fully analyzed. These appendixes provide in-depth discussion of the concepts, a detailed examination of the different types of power (hard, soft, and sharp) an adversary could exert on potential allies to limit U.S. base access, and historical case studies from World War II.

Air bases, American --- Air warfare --- Military planning --- Combat sustainability (Military science) --- Air bases --- World War, 1939-1945 --- History --- Aerial operations, American --- Campaigns --- United States. --- Mobilization --- Planning --- Operational readiness