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Property and Casualty Solvency Funds as a Tax and Social Insurance System
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Year: 1995 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers
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Year: 1997 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Book
Music in Disney's animated features : Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs to The Jungle Book
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ISBN: 9781496812148 Year: 2017 Publisher: Jackson University Press of Mississippi

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Property and casualty solvency funds as a tax and social insurance system
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Year: 1995 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Book
Property and casualty solvency funds as a tax and social insurance system.
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Year: 1995 Publisher: Cambridge National Bureau Of Economic Research. Working Paper Nr. 5206

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The moral hazard of insuring the insurers
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Year: 1997 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Microeconomics --- Insurance


Book
The moral hazard of insuring the insurers.
Authors: ---
Year: 1997 Publisher: Cambridge National bureau of economic research

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Property and Casualty Solvency Funds as a Tax and Social Insurance System
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Year: 1995 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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When a Property and Casualty (P&C) insurance company becomes insolvent, solvent insurance companies are forced to pay assessments (a form of taxation) to state guarantee funds ('solvency funds') in order to protect the policyholders of the failed companies. We produce estimates of the costs to the guarantee funds of resolving P&C insurance company insolvencies. We find that the total net costs (payments by the fund less recoveries by the fund) of resolving insolvencies are remarkably high. We estimate that the mean ratio of net costs to assets is approximately one, implying that insolvent companies have liabilities that are roughly twice as large as assets when they fail. Our cost estimate for resolving insurance company insolvencies is roughly three times higher than similar estimates for banks. We also find that the ratio of net costs to assets tends to be higher for small firms, poorly capitalized firms, firms writing significant premiums in long tail lines, and firms that fail because of disasters. Our findings also indicate that the resolution of insolvencies is typically quick. More than 60 percent of all costs to the fund for a given insolvency occur within two years, and more than three-quarters of total costs occur within three years. However, we find that firms with a high proportion of premiums in long tail lines take much longer to resolve.

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Book
The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers
Authors: --- ---
Year: 1997 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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State guaranty funds are quasi-governmental agencies that provide insurance to policyholders against the risk of insurance company failure. But insurance provided by guaranty funds, like all insurance, creates moral hazard problems, especially for companies that are insolvent or near-insolvent. The key insight of this paper is that because of the time lag between premium payments and losses (which is especially lengthy in long-tail lines), writing policies is one way for insurance companies to borrow money (i.e., from policyholders). Moreover, the existence of guaranty fund insurance enables insurance companies, even very risky ones, to borrow from policyholders at rates that do not reflect the insurer's default risk. Thus, one way for insurance companies to game the guaranty fund system is to engage in excessive premium writing. Consistent with this idea, we find that insolvent P&C insurance companies tended to have very high premium growth before they failed. More than one-third of the failed insurance companies had premium growth of more than 50 percent in the two years before failure. Moreover, this excessive premium growth was more pronounced in long-tail lines than in short-tail lines. We also find evidence that greater regulatory resources are associated with less gaming of the system.

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