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The systems used for command and control in the U.S. military are undergoing modernization with an eye toward greater integration and interoperability. Recent arguments have emphasized the increased risk of inadvertent escalation from integrating and comingling conventional and nuclear command and control (NC2) systems. In this report, the authors argue that these concerns are overstated and that the risks introduced are manageable. That said, the different risks associated with using non-dedicated systems for NC2 warrant more-focused attention to (1) achieve mission assurance for command and control, (2) retain presidential and senior leader confidence in command and control capabilities even when systems degrade under attack, and (3) control the ability to send and receive signals of resolve and restraint through command and control.

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Over the past two decades, potential adversaries have developed a wide array of means to disrupt or deny the United States and its allies access to space capabilities that are essential to their security and military operations. This situation and deepening great-power tensions have given new urgency to understanding the counterspace strategies of potential adversaries and how they can be deterred from attacking U.S. and allied space assets or be dissuaded from even developing certain counterspace capabilities. There is no broadly agreed-on framework on the nature and requirements of deterrence in space operations. This report presents such a framework. The authors begin by identifying several foundational principles of deterrence and then consider what lessons pursuit of deterrence in other domains—nuclear and cyber—have for deterrence in space. They examine the nature and requirements of deterrence in the space domain, what constitutes success in space deterrence, what thresholds might lead to a failure of deterrence, and selected national approaches to space deterrence—by China, Russia, France, Japan, and India. Integrating all these components, the authors present three archetypes for space deterrence and consider questions about their application. They conclude that a comprehensive approach to space deterrence is likely to be most successful and should be tailored to address the distinct risk calculus and informational needs of various adversaries across the phases of conflict. Strategic messaging, selective revelation of space capabilities, and development of norms of responsible space behavior can also help deter attacks on space systems.

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Russia has defined its national interests in terms of resisting the U.S.-backed European integration system, challenging or supplanting U.S. influence around the globe, and pursuing an "independent foreign policy" that could bring it into conflict with China at some point in the future. Under the conditions present at the time of this writing, a great power war with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most likely large-scale scenario for which the Russian military must prepare. How is it preparing? What is its strategy? The authors of this report identify and examine key factors to assess the orientation of Russia's military strategy. The factors the authors consider are the overall balance of power, Russian diplomacy with China, Russian views on the character of future war, and key trends in force readiness and mobilization. The authors also explore existing operational concepts to understand how Russia might execute that military strategy. The research for this report was conducted in 2021, prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Military planning --- Strategy. --- Russia (Federation) --- Armed Forces --- Operational readiness. --- Military policy.

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The authors examined potential effects that emerging technologies could have on U.S. national security policy and identified long-term effects that these technologies might have on effectiveness and stability - two major aspects of deterrent relationships. They did this by pursuing several phases of analysis. First, the researchers selected a specific set of eight technology areas from the numerous technologies that could play a role in shaping the practice of deterrence. They then took several complementary steps to assess the problem of deterrence, competitors' views of it, and possible criteria for evaluating the effects of technologies. In parallel with these research efforts, they conducted in-depth assessments of each of the eight technology areas. Finally, they employed four discrete lines of analysis - four "lenses" - to generate possible causal relationships between the eight technology areas and deterrence outcomes. This report highlights two overarching findings of this analysis. First, collections of emerging technologies - especially in the realms of information aggression and manipulation, automation (including automated decision support systems), hypersonic systems, and unmanned systems-hold dramatic implications for both the effectiveness and stability of deterrence. Second, an emerging transition to new ways of warfare, empowered by these same emerging technologies, poses more general risks to U.S. deterrent policies than does any single technology or set of technologies. This research was completed in September 2020, before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has not been subsequently revised.

Deterrence (Strategy) --- Military art and science --- Technological innovations --- United States --- Military policy