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History of philosophy --- Kuhn, Thomas S. --- 1 KUHN, THOMAS S. --- Filosofie. Psychologie--KUHN, THOMAS S. --- 1 KUHN, THOMAS S. Filosofie. Psychologie--KUHN, THOMAS S. --- Science --- Philosophy --- 1 KUHN, THOMAS S --- Filosofie. Psychologie--KUHN, THOMAS S --- Philosophie des sciences.

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Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) transformed the philosophy of science. His seminal 1962 work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions introduced the term "paradigm shift" into the vernacular and remains a fundamental text in the study of the history and philosophy of science. This introduction to Kuhn's ideas covers the breadth of his philosophical work, situating The Structure of Scientific Revolutions within Kuhn's wider thought and drawing attention to the development of his ideas over time. Kuhn's work is assessed within the context of other philosophies of science notably logical empiricism and recent developments in naturalized epistemology. The author argues that Kuhn's thinking betrays a residual commitment to many theses characteristic of the empiricists he set out to challenge. Kuhn's influence on the history and philosophy of science is assessed and where the field may be heading in the wake of Kuhn's ideas is explored.

Science --- Philosophy. --- History. --- Kuhn, Thomas S.

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While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principle areas covered are: The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, or are some categorical and others dispositional? Realism in mathematics and its relation to science: What does a naturalistic commitment of scientific realism tell us about our commitments to mathematical entities? Can this question be framed in something other than a Quinean philosophy? Dispositions and their relation to causation: Can we generate an account of causation that takes dispositionality as fundamental? And if we take dispositions as fundamental, what is the ontological ground of dispositions? Pandispositionalism: Could all properties be dispositional in nature? Natural kinds: Are there natural kinds, and if so what account of their nature should we give? For example, do they have essences? Here we consider how these issues may be illuminated by considering examples from reals science, in particular biochemistry and neurobiology.

Realism --- Science --- Philosophy --- Empiricism --- Universals (Philosophy) --- Conceptualism --- Dualism --- Idealism --- Materialism --- Nominalism --- Positivism --- Rationalism --- Metaphysics --- Philosophy and science --- Science - Philosophy