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Regular use of effective health-products such as insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITN) by a household benefits its neighbors by (a) reducing chances of infection and (b) raising awareness about product-effectiveness, thereby increasing product-use. Due to their potential social benefits and high purchase price, causing free-riding and sub-optimal private procurement, such products may be subsidized in developing countries through means-testing. Owing to associated spillover effects, cost-benefit analysis of such subsidies requires modelling behavioral responses of both the subsidized household and its neighbors. Using experimental data from Kenya where subsidies were randomized, coupled with GPS-based location information, we show how to estimate aggregate ITN use resulting from means-tested subsidies in the presence of such spatial spillovers. Accounting for spillovers introduces infinite-dimensional estimated regressors corresponding to continuously distributed location coordinates and makes the inference problem novel. We show that even if individual ITN use unambiguously increases with increasing incidence of subsidy in the neighborhood, ignoring spillovers may over- or under-predict overall ITN use resulting from a specific targeting rule, depending on the resulting aggregate incidence of subsidy. Applying our method to the Kenyan data, we find that (i) individual ITN use rises with neighborhood subsidy-rates, (ii) under means-testing, predicted ITN use is a convex increasing function of the subsidy incidence and (iii) ignoring spillovers implies a nearly-linear increasing relationship leading to over-estimation of ITN use at lower and under-estimation at higher subsidy rates.
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Many real-life settings of individual choice involve social interactions, causing targeted policies to have spillover effects. This paper develops novel empirical tools for analyzing demand and welfare effects of policy interventions in binary choice settings with social interactions. Examples include subsidies for health product adoption and vouchers for attending a high-achieving school. We show that even with fully parametric specifications and unique equilibrium, choice data, that are sufficient for counterfactual demand prediction under interactions, are insufficient for welfare calculations. This is because distinct underlying mechanisms producing the same interaction coefficient can imply different welfare effects and deadweight-loss from a policy intervention. Standard index restrictions imply distribution-free bounds on welfare. We propose ways to identify and consistently estimate the structural parameters and welfare bounds allowing for unobserved group effects that are potentially correlated with observables and are possibly unbounded. We illustrate our results using experimental data on mosquito-net adoption in rural Kenya.
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This paper concerns the problem of allocating a binary treatment among a target population based on observed covariates. The goal is to (i) maximize the mean social welfare arising from an eventual outcome distribution, when a budget constraint limits what fraction of the population can be treated and (ii) to infer the dual value, i.e. the minimum resources needed to attain a specific level of mean welfare via efficient treatment assignment. We consider a treatment allocation procedure based on sample data from randomized treatment assignment and derive asymptotic frequentist confidence interval for the welfare generated from it. We propose choosing the conditioning covariates through cross-validation. The methodology is applied to the efficient provision of anti-malaria bed net subsidies, using data from a randomized experiment conducted in Western Kenya. We find that subsidy allocation based on wealth, presence of children and possession of bank account can lead to a rise in subsidy use by about 9 percentage points compared to allocation based on wealth only, and by 17 percentage points compared to a purely random allocation.
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Many real-life settings of individual choice involve social interactions, causing targeted policies to have spillover effects. This paper develops novel empirical tools for analyzing demand and welfare effects of policy interventions in binary choice settings with social interactions. Examples include subsidies for health product adoption and vouchers for attending a high-achieving school. We show that even with fully parametric specifications and unique equilibrium, choice data, that are sufficient for counterfactual demand prediction under interactions, are insufficient for welfare calculations. This is because distinct underlying mechanisms producing the same interaction coefficient can imply different welfare effects and deadweight-loss from a policy intervention. Standard index restrictions imply distribution-free bounds on welfare. We propose ways to identify and consistently estimate the structural parameters and welfare bounds allowing for unobserved group effects that are potentially correlated with observables and are possibly unbounded. We illustrate our results using experimental data on mosquito-net adoption in rural Kenya.
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Regular use of effective health-products such as insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITN) by a household benefits its neighbors by (a) reducing chances of infection and (b) raising awareness about product-effectiveness, thereby increasing product-use. Due to their potential social benefits and high purchase price, causing free-riding and sub-optimal private procurement, such products may be subsidized in developing countries through means-testing. Owing to associated spillover effects, cost-benefit analysis of such subsidies requires modelling behavioral responses of both the subsidized household and its neighbors. Using experimental data from Kenya where subsidies were randomized, coupled with GPS-based location information, we show how to estimate aggregate ITN use resulting from means-tested subsidies in the presence of such spatial spillovers. Accounting for spillovers introduces infinite-dimensional estimated regressors corresponding to continuously distributed location coordinates and makes the inference problem novel. We show that even if individual ITN use unambiguously increases with increasing incidence of subsidy in the neighborhood, ignoring spillovers may over- or under-predict overall ITN use resulting from a specific targeting rule, depending on the resulting aggregate incidence of subsidy. Applying our method to the Kenyan data, we find that (i) individual ITN use rises with neighborhood subsidy-rates, (ii) under means-testing, predicted ITN use is a convex increasing function of the subsidy incidence and (iii) ignoring spillovers implies a nearly-linear increasing relationship leading to over-estimation of ITN use at lower and under-estimation at higher subsidy rates.
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