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Economic history --- Economics --- Post-communism --- Political aspects --- Economic aspects
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334.150.0 --- EEC / European Union - EU -Europese Unie - Union Européenne - UE --- European Union --- 330.05 --- 337.142 --- Institutionele aspecten EG: algemeenheden. --- European Union countries --- -EU countries --- Euroland --- Europe --- Politics and government --- -Politics and government --- Economic integration --- Institutionele aspecten EG: algemeenheden --- European Union countries - Politics and government --- European Union countries - Economic integration
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Structural adjustment (Economic policy) --- RU / Russia - Rusland - Russie --- 37 --- 338.43 --- Geografische economie. Monografieën van streken en landen. --- Regionaal beleid. Industriële ontwikkeling en omschakeling van bepaalde regio's. Nieuwe industrieën. --- Regionaal beleid. Industriële ontwikkeling en omschakeling van bepaalde regio's. Nieuwe industrieën --- Geografische economie. Monografieën van streken en landen --- Russia (Federation) --- Economic policy --- Politics and government
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"Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. Berglof and Claessens provide a framework for understanding these links and how they are shaped by countries' institutional contexts. When the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these countries is a large blockholder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement 'tools' can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate governance mechanisms. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private tools are more effective than public forms of enforcement in the typical environment of most developing and transition countries. However, public enforcement is necessary regardless, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Furthermore, in some countries at least, bottom-up, private-led tools preceded and even shaped public laws. Political economy constraints resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, however, often prevent improvements in the general enforcement environment, and adoption and implementation of public laws in these countries. This paper a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Department is part of a larger effort in the department to help improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries"--World Bank web site.
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The Life in Transition survey II, conducted jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank in late 2010, surveyed almost 39,000 households in 34 countries to assess public attitudes, well-being and the impacts of economic and political change. The Survey provides vivid evidence of precisely how lives have been affected by the global economic crisis and its aftermath.
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