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Governments use tax expenditures (TEs) to provide financial support or benefits to taxpayers. The budgetary impact of TEs can be similar to that of direct outlays: after the support is provided, less money is available to fund other government priorities. Systematic evaluations are needed to guide informed decision-making and to avoid a situation where the narrative on the benefits of TEs is primarily driven by profiting stakeholders. By TE "evaluation," this note refers to a process that seeks to systematically inform policymakers on the desirability of introducing or maintaining specific tax benefits by gathering and analyzing available quantitative and qualitative information on their effects. Evaluation processes can be tailored to different levels of data availability and analytical capacity. An evaluation should focus on the policy objective of a TE and whether it effectively and efficiently contributes to that policy objective. Although important lessons can be learned from country practices in implementing increasingly ambitious evaluation processes, there is no single best-practice approach to replicate.
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This paper investigates the costs and benefits of concluding double tax treaties with investment hubs. Based on a sample of 41 African economies from 1985–2015, the results suggest that signing treaties with investment hubs is not associated with additional investments; yet, these treaties tend to come with nonnegligible revenue losses. Building on a theoretical model, the paper investigates the role of treaty shopping in driving nominal investment flows and provides indirect evidence for its importance in the sample.
Domestic resource mobilization --- Double tax treaties --- Economic adjustment and lending --- Governance --- International economics and trade --- International law --- International trade and trade rules --- Law and development --- Legal products --- Legal reform --- Macroeconomics and economic growth --- Public sector development --- Social development --- Social policy --- Tax law --- Tax treaty policy --- Taxation and subsidies --- Treaties --- Exports and Imports --- Public Finance --- Taxation --- Corporate Taxation --- International Investment --- Long-term Capital Movements --- Multinational Firms --- International Business --- Business Taxes and Subsidies --- Tax Evasion and Avoidance --- Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies --- Public finance & taxation --- Corporate & business tax --- Finance --- Revenue administration --- Corporate income tax --- Foreign direct investment --- Double taxation --- Withholding tax --- Taxes --- Balance of payments --- Revenue --- Corporations --- Investments, Foreign --- Income tax --- Mauritius
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The Cost and Benefits of Tax Treaties with Investment Hubs: Findings from Sub-Saharan Africa.
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This paper develops a simple model to explore whether a higher detection probability for offshore tax evaders—e.g. because of improved exchange of information between countries and/or due to digitalization of tax administrations—renders it optimal for governments to introduce a voluntary disclosure program (VDP) and, if so, under what terms. We find that if the VDP is unanticipated, it is likely to be optimal for a revenue-maximizing government to introduce a VDP with relatively generous terms, i.e. a low or even negative penalty. When anticipated, however, the VDP is neither incentive compatible nor optimal, as it induces otherwise compliant taxpayers to evade tax. A VDP can then only be beneficial if tax evasion induces an external social cost beyond the direct revenue foregone, e.g., due to adverse effects on overall tax morale. In contrast to the common view that VDPs should come along with additional enforcement effort, we find that governments should relax enforcement if the VDP itself provides more powerful incentives to come clean.
Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- Taxation --- Public Finance --- Tax Evasion and Avoidance --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Tax planning and compliance --- Public finance & taxation --- Tax evasion --- Revenue administration --- Tax administration core functions --- Tax return filing compliance --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Tax administration and procedure --- Revenue --- Indonesia
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This paper develops a simple model to explore whether a higher detection probability for offshore tax evaders—e.g. because of improved exchange of information between countries and/or due to digitalization of tax administrations—renders it optimal for governments to introduce a voluntary disclosure program (VDP) and, if so, under what terms. We find that if the VDP is unanticipated, it is likely to be optimal for a revenue-maximizing government to introduce a VDP with relatively generous terms, i.e. a low or even negative penalty. When anticipated, however, the VDP is neither incentive compatible nor optimal, as it induces otherwise compliant taxpayers to evade tax. A VDP can then only be beneficial if tax evasion induces an external social cost beyond the direct revenue foregone, e.g., due to adverse effects on overall tax morale. In contrast to the common view that VDPs should come along with additional enforcement effort, we find that governments should relax enforcement if the VDP itself provides more powerful incentives to come clean.
Indonesia --- Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- Taxation --- Public Finance --- Tax Evasion and Avoidance --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Tax planning and compliance --- Public finance & taxation --- Tax evasion --- Revenue administration --- Tax administration core functions --- Tax return filing compliance --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Tax administration and procedure --- Revenue
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This paper reviews the rapidly growing empirical literature on international tax avoidance by multinational corporations. It surveys evidence on main channels of corporate tax avoidance including transfer mispricing, international debt shifting, treaty shopping, tax deferral and corporate inversions. Moreover, it performs a meta analysis of the extensive literature that estimates the overall size of profit shifting. We find that the literature suggests that, on average, a 1 percentage-point lower corporate tax rate will expand before-tax income by 1 percent—an effect that is larger than reported as the consensus estimate in previous surveys and tends to be increasing over time. The literature on tax avoidance still has several unresolved puzzles and blind spots that require further research.
Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Taxation --- Corporate Taxation --- Multinational Firms --- International Business --- Business Taxes and Subsidies --- Tax Evasion and Avoidance --- Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Corporate & business tax --- Public finance & taxation --- Corporate income tax --- Tax avoidance --- Corporate taxes --- Personal income --- Revenue administration --- Taxes --- National accounts --- Corporations --- Tax evasion --- Income --- Revenue --- United States
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This paper describes, and where possible tentatively quantifies, likely tax spillovers from the U.S. corporate income tax reform that was part of the broader 2017 tax reform. It calculates effective tax rates under various assumptions, showing among other findings, how the interest limitation and the Foreign Derived Intangible Income provision can raise or reduce rates. It tentatively estimates that under constant policies elsewhere, the rate cut will reduce tax revenue from multinationals in other countries by on average 1.6 to 5.2 percent. If other countries react in line with historical reaction functions, the revenue loss from multinationals rises to an average of 4.5 to 13.5 percent. The paper also discusses profit-shifting, real location, and policy reactions from the more complex features of the reform.
Public Finance --- Taxation --- Corporate Taxation --- Business Taxes and Subsidies --- International Fiscal Issues --- International Public Goods --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Public finance & taxation --- Corporate & business tax --- Corporate income tax --- Effective tax rate --- Average effective tax rate --- Revenue administration --- Marginal effective tax rate --- Taxes --- Tax policy --- Tax administration and procedure --- Corporations --- Revenue --- United States
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Simplifying tax policy comes with costs and benefits. This paper explores simplification options for the taxation of MNEs, an area where administrative and compliance costs of the current rules are large. Simplified approaches seek to reduce these costs by relying on an approximation of the true tax base, potentially distorting resource allocation. We examine the efficiency cost of transfer pricing simplification theoretically and empirically. Using a sample of 300,000 firms located in 22 countries, we estimate that common transfer pricing practices reduce efficiency between 0.25 and 2.2 percent of total factor productivity across sectors. Focusing on the manufacturing sector, we then observe that simplification more than doubles sectoral inefficiency on average. However, large differences exist, with moderate efficiency costs in several sectors.
Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- International Taxation --- Production and Operations Management --- Taxation --- Industries: Manufacturing --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Production --- Cost --- Capital and Total Factor Productivity --- Capacity --- Macroeconomics: Production --- Industry Studies: Manufacturing: General --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Public finance & taxation --- Manufacturing industries --- Transfer pricing --- Taxes --- Total factor productivity --- Productivity --- Tax wedge --- Tax policy --- Manufacturing --- Economic sectors --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Industrial productivity --- Tax administration and procedure --- Mexico
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Expected inflation has few real effects in purely private economies, but this is not the case when the tax system is not neutral with respect to inflation. In practice, tax systems are not neutral—though some have attempted to be so in the past—and this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the most relevant non-neutralities drawing both on existing literature and showing new illustrations and evidence of the effects. The paper shows, for example, how taxing inflationary gains can have tremendous impact on effective tax rates—even at relatively low rates of inflation. It also shows how partial adjustment—for only some types of incomes—can create additional distortions. A new empirical analysis reveals how the erosion of the value of depreciation allowances through inflation affects investment. Finally the paper discusses policy options to address such non-neutralities.
Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- Inflation --- Investments: General --- Taxation --- Labor --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Investment --- Capital --- Intangible Capital --- Capacity --- Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits --- Private Pensions --- Aggregate Factor Income Distribution --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Public finance & taxation --- Labour --- income economics --- Prices --- Depreciation --- National accounts --- Income tax systems --- Taxes --- Non-wage benefits --- Income --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Saving and investment --- Income tax --- Employee fringe benefits --- United States
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We analyze the impact of exchange of information in tax matters in reducing international tax evasion between 1995 and 2018. Based on bilateral deposit data for 39 reporting countries and more than 200 counterparty jurisdictions, we find that recent automatic exchange of information frameworks reduced foreign-owned deposits in offshore jurisdictions by an average of 25 percent. This effect is statistically significant and, as expected, much larger than the effect of information exchange upon request, which is not significant. Furthermore, to test the sensitivity of our findings, we estimate countries’ offshore status and the impact of information exchange simultaneously using a finite mixture model. The results confirm that automatic (and not upon request) exchange of information impacts cross-border deposits in offshore jurisdictions, which are characterized by low income tax rates and strong financial secrecy.
Banks and Banking --- Taxation --- Criminology --- Personal Finance -Taxation --- Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies --- Tax Evasion and Avoidance --- Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Public finance & taxation --- Banking --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Tax evasion --- Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) --- Offshore financial centers --- Bank deposits --- Revenue administration --- Crime --- Financial services --- Double taxation --- Taxes --- Personal income tax --- Money laundering --- Banks and banking --- International finance --- Income tax --- United States
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