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In this report, the authors examine Russian arms exports and the impact of sanctions designed to discourage third country purchases and raise the cost of future Russian malign interference in other nation-states. The authors draw from publicly available information compiled in a database to illustrate when U.S. diplomatic engagement or the prospect of U.S. sanctions has led third countries to reconsider importing Russian weapons. The data set used for this report contains 65 cases in 33 countries of Russian arms export negotiations and sales, beginning in July 2017 and ending in May 2021; these cases illustrate that, as U.S. officials acknowledge, the monetary value of lost Russian arms sales due to U.S. diplomatic efforts buttressed by the prospect of third-party sanctions is difficult to determine with precision. However, there are several examples of countries that clearly entertained purchasing Russian weapons and then, because of the chilling effect of possible sanctions, demurred and opted not to do so. Analysis of these cases indicates that diplomatic outreach to arms-buying countries will likely be most effective when it acknowledges the legacy of Russian arms exports; the desire to assert independence from Russia and/or the United States; and the availability of suitable, competitively priced alternatives to meet buyers' security needs. To better meet the objectives of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the United States must ensure that foreign officials and publics receive a narrative focused mainly on the harm caused by Russian malign behavior rather than the threat of U.S. sanctions.

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Russia’s manipulation of Ukraine in the post-Soviet period, which culminated in a large-scale invasion in 2022, demonstrated that Russia was willing to resort to all means necessary to secure a regional sphere of influence that included Ukraine. But events could have turned out differently. Russia and Ukraine share historical, cultural, religious, and interpersonal ties. Russia in the early 1990s appeared to be on a path toward democratization and constructive relations with its neighbors and the rest of Europe. Many Ukrainians also saw their future as an independent country that was part of a greater Europe in some form. Given the alignment of national interests in the early days of the post–Cold War era, conflict appeared far from inevitable. How did things go so wrong? Using the concept of national identity as a starting point, RAND researchers developed a framework in an effort to illuminate the underlying causes of Russian manipulation, Ukrainian resistance, and the Russia-Ukraine war.

Political culture --- Nationalism --- Russo-Ukrainian War, 2014 --- -Russian Invasion of Ukraine, 2022. --- Group identity --- International Affairs --- Russia --- Ukraine --- Nationalisme --- Guerre russo-ukrainienne, 2014 --- -Invasion russe de l'Ukraine, 2022 --- -Identité collective --- Since 2014 --- Russia (Federation) --- Foreign relations --- Relations extérieures

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The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC®) is one of multiple measures that the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) introduced to enhance security at U.S. ports. Anyone with unescorted access to a secure area at an MTSA-regulated facility, vessel, or outer continental shelf (OCS) facility must have a TWIC. Congress established TWIC to help prevent transportation security incidents. TWIC's primary function is to establish that the holder has passed a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security threat assessment (STA); the TWIC card can also serve as identification. Each secure area at each regulated location must maintain an access control program and verify three things at every access point: identity, presence and validity of the TWIC card, and whether the person has a business purpose at that facility. Currently, facilities are required only to conduct visual verification of the TWIC card, either at each time of entry or at time of enrollment into a facility physical access control system (PACS). A pending regulation, which we call the TWIC-reader rule, would require that any high-risk facility electronically inspect the card and, using biometrics, match it to the holder. The governing legislation requires that an assessment of TWIC determine the program's value in mitigating the risk of terrorism and crime at ports. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security commissioned the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center to complete that comprehensive assessment. In this report, the authors establish factors that increase or decrease TWIC's security value and determine what TWIC's value would need to be to offset the costs of establishing further access control requirements for facilities.