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In 1999 the city of Bogota, Colombia launched the concession school program designed to broaden the coverage and quality of basic education. It consists of a contract between a group of private schools and the public educational system such that private agents provide education for low-income students. This paper tests three main hypotheses concerning the impact of concessions on the quality of education: first, dropout rates are lower in concession schools than in similar public schools; second, other public schools nearby the concession schools have lower dropout rates in comparison with other public schools outside the area of influence; and third, test scores from concession schools are higher than scores in similar public schools. The paper presents evidence in favor of the three hypotheses using propensity score and matching estimators.

Academic Achievement --- Disability --- Dropout Rates --- Education --- Education for All --- Education Reform and Management --- Educational System --- Effective Schools and Teachers --- Gender --- Gender and Education --- Learning --- Literature --- Low-Income Students --- Papers --- Primary Education --- Private Education --- Private Schools --- Quality of Education --- Research --- School --- Schools --- Secondary Education --- Social Protections and Labor --- Student --- Teacher --- Teachers --- Teaching --- Tertiary Education --- University --- Workers

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Low student learning is a common finding in much of the developing world. This paper uses a relatively unique dataset of five semiannual rounds of standardized test data to characterize and explain the short-term changes in student learning. The data are collected as part of the quality assurance system for a public-private partnership program that offers public subsidies conditional on minimum learning levels to low-cost private schools in Pakistan. Apart from a large positive distributional shift in learning between the first two test rounds, the learning distributions over test rounds show little progress. Schools are ejected from the program if they fail to achieve a minimum pass rate in the test in two consecutive attempts, making the test high stakes. Sharp regression discontinuity estimates show that the threat of program exit on schools that barely failed the test for the first time induces large learning gains. The large change in learning between the first two test rounds is likely attributable to this accountability pressure given that a large share of new program entrants failed in the first test round. Schools also qualify for substantial annual teacher bonuses if they achieve a minimum score in a composite measure of student test participation and mean test score. Sharp regression discontinuity estimates do not show that the prospect of future teacher bonus rewards induces learning gains for schools that barely did not qualify for the bonus.

Education --- Education For All --- Learning --- Learning levels --- Learning outcomes --- Pass rate --- Primary Education --- Private school --- Quality assurance --- Quality standards --- Secondary Education --- Standardized tests --- Student learning --- Teaching and Learning --- Tertiary Education --- Test scores