Listing 1 - 8 of 8 |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
In our daily life, it really seems as though we have free will, that what we do from moment to moment is determined by conscious decisions that we freely make. You get up from the couch, you go for a walk, you eat chocolate ice cream. It seems that we're in control of actions like these; if we are, then we have free will. But in recent years, some have argued that free will is an illusion. The neuroscientist (and best-selling author) Sam Harris and the late Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner, for example, claim that certain scientific findings disprove free will. In this engaging and accessible volume in the Essential Knowledge series, the philosopher Mark Balaguer examines the various arguments and experiments that have been cited to support the claim that human beings don't have free will. He finds them to be overstated and misguided. Balaguer discusses determinism, the view that every physical event is predetermined, or completely caused by prior events. He describes several philosophical and scientific arguments against free will, including one based on Benjamin Libet's famous neuroscientific experiments, which allegedly show that our conscious decisions are caused by neural events that occur before we choose. He considers various religious and philosophical views, including the philosophical pro-free-will view known as compatibilism. Balaguer concludes that the anti-free-will arguments put forward by philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists simply don't work. They don't provide any good reason to doubt the existence of free will. But, he cautions, this doesn't necessarily mean that we have free will. The question of whether we have free will remains an open one; we simply don't know enough about the brain to answer it definitively.
Philosophical anthropology --- Free will and determinism --- Free will and determinism. --- Philosophy --- Philosophy & Religion --- Ethics --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- PHILOSOPHY/General --- PHYSICAL SCIENCES/General
Choose an application
This work presents an argument that the problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events.
Free will and determinism. --- Ethics. --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Philosophy --- Values --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- PHILOSOPHY/General --- Free will and determinism
Choose an application
Demonstrating that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical Platonism, the author establishes that both Platonism and anti-Platonism are defensible views by solving the important problems associated with each of these views.
Mathematics --- Platonists. --- Platonism --- Philosophers --- Philosophy, Ancient --- Logic of mathematics --- Mathematics, Logic of --- Philosophy. --- Platonists --- Philosophy --- Mathematics - Philosophy
Choose an application
This Element defends mathematical anti-realism against an underappreciated problem with that view-a problem having to do with modal truthmaking. Part I develops mathematical anti-realism, it defends that view against a number of well-known objections, and it raises a less widely discussed objection to anti-realism-an objection based on the fact that (a) mathematical anti-realists need to commit to the truth of certain kinds of modal claims, and (b) it's not clear that the truth of these modal claims is compatible with mathematical anti-realism. Part II considers various strategies that anti-realists might pursue in trying to solve this modal-truth problem with their view, it argues that there's only one viable view that anti-realists can endorse in order to solve the modal-truth problem, and it argues that the view in question-which is here called modal nothingism-is true.
Mathematics --- Anti-realism. --- Modality (Logic) --- Philosophy. --- Modal logic --- Logic --- Nonclassical mathematical logic --- Bisimulation --- Antirealism --- Philosophy --- Logic of mathematics --- Mathematics, Logic of
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Listing 1 - 8 of 8 |
Sort by
|