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The EU's fiscal framework needs reform. While existing fiscal rules have had some impact in constraining deficits, they did not prevent deficits and debt ratios that have threatened the stability of the monetary union in the past and that continue to create vulnerabilities today. The framework also has a poor track record at managing trade-offs between containing fiscal risks and stabilizing output. Finally, the framework does not provide sufficient tools for EU-wide stabilization. This was most visible during the decade following the euro area sovereign debt crisis, when structurally low real interest rates stretched the policy tools of the European Central Bank (ECB), leading to a persistent undershooting of its inflation target. This paper proposes a new framework based on risk-based EU-level fiscal rules, strengthened national institutions, and a central fiscal capacity. First, risk-based EU-level fiscal rules would link the speed and ambition of fiscal consolidation to the level and horizon of fiscal risks, as identified by debt sustainability analysis (DSA) using a common methodology developed by a new and independent European Fiscal Council (EFC). The 3 percent deficit and 60 percent debt reference values would remain. Second, all member countries would be required to enact medium-term fiscal frameworks consistent with the EU-level rules-that is, to ensure convergence over the medium-term to an overall fiscal balance anchor by setting expenditure ceilings. Independent national fiscal councils (NFCs) would have a much stronger role to strengthen checks and balances at the national level (including undertaking or endorsing macroeconomic projections and performing DSAs to assess fiscal risks). The European Commission (EC) would continue to play its key surveillance role as articulated in the Maastricht Treaty and the EFC would be the center of a peer network of fiscal councils. Third, building on the recent experience with the NextGenerationEU (NGEU), an EU fiscal capacity (FCEU) would improve euro area macroeconomic stabilization and allow the provision of common EU public goods-a task that has become more urgent given the green transition and common security concerns. Central to the proposal is a mutually reinforcing relationship between EU rules and national-level implementation. Strengthening implementation requires both better national ownership of the rules and their application and greater congruence of national-level frameworks with EU-level rules. The former can only be achieved by rules that convincingly balance the needs of members with the avoidance of negative externalities across members. This argues for a risk-based approach-the first pillar of our proposal. The latter requires a stronger role for significantly upgraded national level frameworks-the second pillar of our proposal.
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Relative to the US, productivity growth and investment in R&D in lagging in the EU, where it is more difficult to finance and scale up promising, innovative startups. Many of the most successful EU startups move elsewhere for financing, causing the EU to lose out on both the direct growth benefits and positive spillovers from these innovative firms. The EU could nurture innovative startups by accelerating the development of its venture capital (VC) ecosystem. Reducing regulatory frictions, especially ones that deter pensions funds and insurers from investing in VC, combined with well-designed tax incentives for R&D investments could help accelerate the development of the VC sector. These and other key CMU initiatives, such as the consolidation of stock markets and reforming and harmonizing insolvency regimes, will take time. Given the urgency to boost innovation, giving public financial institutions like the European Investment Fund a more active and expanded role in kickstarting VC markets where needed and in familiarizing investors with the VC asset class can be a helpful interim step.
Brokerage --- Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General --- Expenditure --- Finance --- Finance: General --- Financial institutions --- Financial Instruments --- Financial markets --- Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Industries: Financial Services --- Innovation --- Institutional Investors --- Insurance companies --- Intellectual Property Rights: General --- Investment Banking --- Labor --- Mutual funds --- Non-bank Financial Institutions --- Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits --- Pension Funds --- Pension spending --- Pensions --- Private Pensions --- Public Finance --- Ratings and Ratings Agencies --- Research and Development --- Social Security and Public Pensions --- Stock exchanges --- Stock markets --- Technological Change --- Venture Capital
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This note outlines a concrete proposal for a euro area central fiscal capacity (CFC) that could help smooth both country-specific and common shocks. Specifically, it proposes a macroeconomic stabilization fund financed by annual contributions from countries that are used to build up assets in good times and make transfers to countries in bad times, as well as a borrowing capacity in case an exceptionally large shock exhausts the fund’s assets. To address moral hazard risks, transfers from the CFC—beyond a country’s own net contributions—would be conditional on compliance with the EU fiscal rules. The note also discusses several features aimed at avoiding permanent transfers between countries and making the CFC function as automatically as possible—to limit the scope for disputes over its operation—both of which are important points to make it politically acceptable.
Capacity --- Capital --- Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy --- Economic theory --- Finance --- Finance: General --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial risk management --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Fiscal Policy --- Fiscal policy --- Fiscal rules --- Fiscal stabilization --- Income economics --- Intangible Capital --- International Fiscal Issues --- International Public Goods --- Investment --- Investments: General --- Labor --- Labour --- Macroeconomics --- Macroeconomics: Production --- National accounts --- Output gap --- Production and Operations Management --- Production --- Public Finance --- Return on investment --- Saving and investment --- Stabilization --- Stress testing --- Treasury Policy --- Unemployment rate --- Unemployment --- Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search --- Spain
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The EU’s fiscal framework needs reform. While existing fiscal rules have had some impact in constraining deficits, they did not prevent deficits and debt ratios that have threatened the stability of the monetary union in the past and that continue to create vulnerabilities today. The framework also has a poor track record at managing trade-offs between containing fiscal risks and stabilizing output. Finally, the framework does not provide sufficient tools for EU-wide stabilization. This was most visible during the decade following the euro area sovereign debt crisis, when structurally low real interest rates stretched the policy tools of the European Central Bank (ECB), leading to a persistent undershooting of its inflation target. This paper proposes a new framework based on risk-based EU-level fiscal rules, strengthened national institutions, and a central fiscal capacity. First, risk-based EU-level fiscal rules would link the speed and ambition of fiscal consolidation to the level and horizon of fiscal risks, as identified by debt sustainability analysis (DSA) using a common methodology developed by a new and independent European Fiscal Council (EFC). The 3 percent deficit and 60 percent debt reference values would remain. Second, all member countries would be required to enact medium-term fiscal frameworks consistent with the EU-level rules—that is, to ensure convergence over the medium-term to an overall fiscal balance anchor by setting expenditure ceilings. Independent national fiscal councils (NFCs) would have a much stronger role to strengthen checks and balances at the national level (including undertaking or endorsing macroeconomic projections and performing DSAs to assess fiscal risks). The European Commission (EC) would continue to play its key surveil¬lance role as articulated in the Maastricht Treaty and the EFC would be the center of a peer network of fiscal councils. Third, building on the recent experience with the NextGenerationEU (NGEU), an EU fiscal capacity (FCEU) would improve euro area macroeconomic stabilization and allow the provision of common EU public goods—a task that has become more urgent given the green transition and common security concerns. Central to the proposal is a mutually reinforcing relationship between EU rules and national-level imple¬mentation. Strengthening implementation requires both better national ownership of the rules and their application and greater congruence of national-level frameworks with EU-level rules. The former can only be achieved by rules that convincingly balance the needs of members with the avoidance of negative externali¬ties across members. This argues for a risk-based approach—the first pillar of our proposal. The latter requires a stronger role for significantly upgraded national level frameworks—the second pillar of our proposal.
Framing (Building) --- Debts, External. --- Economics --- Expenditure --- Expenditures, Public --- Fiscal councils --- Fiscal governance --- Fiscal Policy --- Fiscal policy --- Fiscal risks --- International agencies --- International Agreements and Observance --- International Economics --- International institutions --- International organization --- International Organizations --- Macroeconomics --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Political Economy --- Political economy --- Public Administration --- Public finance & taxation --- Public Finance --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Public Policy --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- Netherlands, The
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