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This book analyses decision-making in dynamic economic environments. By applying a wide range of methodological approaches, combining both analytical and computational methods, the contributors examine various aspects of optimal firm behaviour and relevant policy areas. Topics covered include optimal control, dynamic games, economic decision-making, and applications in finance and economics, as well as policy implications in areas such as pollution regulation. This book is dedicated to Christophe Deissenberg, a well-known and distinguished scholar of economic dynamics and computational economics. It appeals to academics in the areas of optimal control, dynamic games and computational economics as well as to decision-makers working in policy domains such as environmental policy.
Economic theory. --- Application software. --- Operations research. --- Decision making. --- Economics—Psychological aspects. --- Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. --- Computer Applications. --- Operations Research/Decision Theory. --- Economic Psychology. --- Deciding --- Decision (Psychology) --- Decision analysis --- Decision processes --- Making decisions --- Management --- Management decisions --- Choice (Psychology) --- Problem solving --- Operational analysis --- Operational research --- Industrial engineering --- Management science --- Research --- System theory --- Application computer programs --- Application computer software --- Applications software --- Apps (Computer software) --- Computer software --- Economic theory --- Political economy --- Social sciences --- Economic man --- Decision making --- Economics --- Psychological aspects. --- Behavioral economics --- Behavioural economics
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This book analyses decision-making in dynamic economic environments. By applying a wide range of methodological approaches, combining both analytical and computational methods, the contributors examine various aspects of optimal firm behaviour and relevant policy areas. Topics covered include optimal control, dynamic games, economic decision-making, and applications in finance and economics, as well as policy implications in areas such as pollution regulation. This book is dedicated to Christophe Deissenberg, a well-known and distinguished scholar of economic dynamics and computational economics. It appeals to academics in the areas of optimal control, dynamic games and computational economics as well as to decision-makers working in policy domains such as environmental policy.
Quantitative methods (economics) --- Economics --- Operational research. Game theory --- Mathematical statistics --- Planning (firm) --- Programming --- Computer architecture. Operating systems --- applicatiebeheer --- apps --- economie --- mathematische modellen --- econometrie --- operationeel onderzoek --- architectuur (informatica)
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Quantitative methods (economics) --- Economics --- Operational research. Game theory --- Mathematical statistics --- Planning (firm) --- Programming --- Computer architecture. Operating systems --- applicatiebeheer --- apps --- economie --- mathematische modellen --- econometrie --- operationeel onderzoek --- architectuur (informatica)
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The Taylor rule in combination with the zero lower bound on nominal rates has been shown to create an unintended liquidity-trap equilibrium. The relevance of this equilibrium has been challenged on the basis that it is not stable under least-square learning. In this paper, we show that the liquidity-trap equilibrium is stable under social learning. The learning mechanism we employ includes three realistic elements: mutation, crossover, and tournaments. We show that agents can learn to have pessimistic sentiments about the central bank's ability to generate price growth, giving rise to a stochastically stable environment characterized by deflation and stagnation.
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The Taylor rule in combination with the zero lower bound on nominal rates has been shown to create an unintended liquidity-trap equilibrium. The relevance of this equilibrium has been challenged on the basis that it is not stable under least-square learning. In this paper, we show that the liquidity-trap equilibrium is stable under social learning. The learning mechanism we employ includes three realistic elements: mutation, crossover, and tournaments. We show that agents can learn to have pessimistic sentiments about the central bank's ability to generate price growth, giving rise to a stochastically stable environment characterized by deflation and stagnation.
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