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In this paper, we use a bank-level panel dataset to investigate the determinants of bank interest margins in the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) over the period 1998–2013. We apply the dealership model of Ho and Saunders (1981) and its extensions to assess the extent to which high spreads of banks in the CCA can be related to bank-specific variables, to competition, and to macroeconomic factors. We find that interest spreads are affected by operating cost, credit risk, liquidity risk, bank size, bank diversification, banking sector competition, and macroeconomic policies; but the impact depends on the country.

Bank management. --- Banks and banking. --- International finance. --- Finance --- Business & Economics --- Banking --- Banks and Banking --- Industries: Financial Services --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects --- Financial services law & regulation --- Credit risk --- Central bank policy rate --- Market risk --- Loans --- Banks and banking --- Financial risk management --- Interest rates --- Armenia, Republic of

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The paper analyzes the relationship between bank competition and stability, with a specific focus on the Middle East and North Africa. Price competition has a positive effect on bank liquidity, as it induces self-discipline incentives on banks for the choice of bank funding sources and for the holding of liquid assets. On the other hand, price competition may have a potentially negative impact on bank solvency and on the credit quality of the loan portfolio. More competitive banks may be less solvent if the potential increase in the equity base—due to capital adjustments—is not large enough to compensate for the reduction in bank profitability. Also, banks subject to stronger competitive pressures may have a higher rate of nonperforming loans, if the increase in the risk-taking incentives from the lender’s side overcomes the decrease in the credit risk from the borrower’s side. In both cases, country-specific policies for market entry conditions—and for bank regulation and supervision—may significantly affect the sign and the size of the relationship. The paper suggests policy reforms designed to improve market contestability and to increase the quality and independence of prudential supervision.

Banks and banking --- Bank liquidity --- Bank failures --- Financial risk management --- Risk management --- Agricultural banks --- Banking --- Banking industry --- Commercial banks --- Depository institutions --- Finance --- Financial institutions --- Money --- Failure of banks --- Business failures --- Liquidity (Economics) --- State supervision --- Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Islamic Banking and Finance --- Industries: Financial Services --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Corporation and Securities Law --- Production, Pricing, and Market Structure --- Size Distribution of Firms --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Bankruptcy --- Liquidation --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Other Economic Systems: Public Economics --- Financial Economics --- Financial services law & regulation --- Competition --- Bank solvency --- Credit risk --- Islamic banking --- Financial markets --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Financial services --- Nonperforming loans --- Islamic countries --- Loans --- Saudi Arabia

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"The economic model in many developed and developing countries is characterized by a 'Big Government' whose intervention limits free competition in the capital, commodity, and labor markets. Since 2009, to remedy mass-unemployment, many leading countries have been locked into an expansionary fiscal policy, repressive money policy, record public and private debts, explosive asset prices, unstable exchange rates, and heightened uncertainties. Likewise, many developing countries have been unable to reach autonomous development despite their vast territories and natural resources, remaining dependent on foreign aid without which they will fall into economic disorder. Islamic Macroeconomics proposes an Islamic model that offers significant prospects for economic growth and durable macroeconomic stability, and which is immune to the defects of the economic models prevailing both in developed and developing countries. An Islamic model advocates a limited government confined to its natural duties of defence, justice, education, health, infrastructure, regulation, and welfare of the vulnerable population. It prohibits interest-based debt and money, and requires full liberalization of all markets including labor, financial, commodity, trade, and foreign exchange markets. The government should be Sharia-compliant in its taxation power and regulatory intervention; it ought to reduce unproductive spending in favor of productive spending. This book is essential reading for students and academics of Islamic economics and finance, economists, practitioners, and researchers."--Provided by publisher.

Economics --- Banks and banking --- Religious aspects --- Islam.