Listing 1 - 5 of 5 |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
Using data on syndicated loan issuances by emerging market firms, we find that an increase in the external debt of emerging market governments significantly raises the borrowing costs of the domestic corporate sector. This finding suggests that a higher level of public external debt "crowds out" foreign credit to the private sector by increasing the risk of a sovereign debt crisis and thereby making exposure to corporate sector debt less desirable. The effect is stronger in countries with weak creditor rights. The results highlight the potential costs of fiscal expansions for the domestic corporate sector even when debt is issued in foreign markets.
Bank loans. --- Syndicated loans. --- Syndicates (Finance). --- Banks --- Debt Management --- Debt --- Debts, External --- Debts, Public --- Depository Institutions --- Emerging and frontier financial markets --- Exports and Imports --- External debt --- Finance --- Finance: General --- Financial services industry --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Industries: Financial Services --- International economics --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Loans --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Public debt --- Public finance & taxation --- Public Finance --- Sovereign Debt --- Syndicated loans --- United States
Choose an application
We examine how the cost of corporate credit varies around fiscal consolidations aimed at reducing government debt. Using a new dataset on fiscal consolidations and syndicated corporate loan data, we find that loan spreads increase with fiscal consolidations, especially for small firms, domestic firms, and for firms with limited alternative financing sources. These adverse effects are mitigated substantially if consolidations are large, and can be avoided if consolidations are also accompanied with more adaptable macroeconomic policies and implemented by a stable government. These findings suggest that lenders price the short-term recessionary effects in loans but large consolidations can reduce or undo the increase in spreads, especially under favorable country conditions, by signaling credibility and creating expansionary expectations.
Debts, External. --- Debts, External --- Syndicated loans. --- Participating loans --- Loans --- Debts, Foreign --- Debts, International --- External debts --- Foreign debts --- International debts --- Debt --- International finance --- Investments, Foreign --- Syndicated loans --- E-books --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Public Finance --- Industries: Financial Services --- Fiscal Policy --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm --- National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Finance --- Public finance & taxation --- Monetary economics --- Fiscal consolidation --- Public debt --- Credit --- Fiscal policy --- Financial institutions --- Money --- Debts, Public --- Italy
Choose an application
Doing More for Less? New Evidence on Lobbying and Government Contracts.
Choose an application
We study how credit market deregulation and increased international financial openness have changed corporate borrowing. The evidence comes from a large panel of publicly traded firms in 38 countries over the period 1994-2002. Reforms are measured with a comprehensive new index that tracks six separate dimensions. We find that these transformations have increased leverage and lengthened debt maturity in advanced economies, as expected, suggesting that in these countries corporate credit markets have become deeper. In emerging economies, the picture is more mixed: more international openness has led to more leverage but shorter debt maturity. Financial sector reforms have reduced leverage, while their effects on debt maturity have differed depending on the type of reform. Importantly, the differential impact of openness and reforms on the leverage and debt maturity of firms in advanced and emerging market countries also emerges when we distinguish between firms that are potentially financially constrained and firms that are not. These findings suggest that in emerging economies fundamental institutional weaknesses make it difficult to secure the benefits of international financial openness and domestic financial reforms.
Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Investments: Bonds --- Money and Monetary Policy --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Finance --- Banking --- Investment & securities --- Monetary economics --- Securities markets --- Bond ratings --- Credit --- Emerging and frontier financial markets --- Capital market --- Banks and banking --- Bonds --- Financial services industry --- United States --- Corporations --- International finance. --- Corporate debt. --- Finance.
Choose an application
Why do firms lobby? This paper exploits the unanticipated sequestration of federal budget accounts in March 2013 that reduced the availability of government funds disbursed through procurement contracts to shed light on this question. Following this event, firms with little or no prior exposure to the federal accounts that experienced cuts reduced their lobbying spending. In contrast, firms with a high degree of exposure to the cuts maintained and even increased their lobbying spending. This suggests that, when the same number of contractors competed for a piece of a reduced pie, the more affected firms likely intensified their lobbying efforts to distinguish themselves from the others and improve their chances of procuring a larger share of the smaller overall. These findings are stronger in government-dependent sectors and when there is intense competition. The evidence is more consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for lobbying.
Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Public Finance --- Political Economy --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- International Financial Markets --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Finance --- Public finance & taxation --- Competition --- Asset valuation --- Expenditure --- Financial markets --- Asset and liability management --- Asset-liability management --- Expenditures, Public --- United States
Listing 1 - 5 of 5 |
Sort by
|