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The financial and economic crisis had a devastating impact on bank profits, with loss-making banks reporting global commercial losses of around USD 400 billion in 2008. This comprehensive report sets the market context for bank losses and provides an overview of the tax treatment of such losses in 17 OECD countries; describes the tax risks that arise in relation to bank losses from the perspective of both banks and revenue bodies; outlines the incentives that give rise to those risks; and describes the tools revenue bodies have to manage these potential compliance risks. It concludes with recommendations for revenue bodies and for banks on how risks involving bank losses can best be managed and reduced.
Banks and banking, Central. --- Collateralized debt obligations. --- Inflation (Finance). --- Tax incentives. --- Finance --- Business & Economics --- Banking --- Banks and banking --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. --- Taxation --- Global Economic Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Agricultural banks --- Banking industry --- Commercial banks --- Depository institutions --- Financial crises --- Financial institutions --- Money
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Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of its manufacturing and natural resource sectors by the end of 1997. And in February 1998, the annual inflation rate at last dipped into the single digits. Privatization should have helped with stronger micro-foundations for growth. The conquest of inflation should have cemented macroeconomic credibility, lowered real interest rates, and spurred investment. Instead, Russia suffered a massive public debt-exchange rate-banking crisis just six months later, in August 1998. In showing how this turn of events unfolded, the authors focus on the interaction among Russia's deteriorating fiscal fundamentals, its weak micro-foundations of growth and financial globalization. They argue that the expectation of a large official bailout in the final 10 weeks before the meltdown played an important role, with Russia's external debt increasing by USD 16 billion or 8 percent of post-crisis gross domestic product during this time. The lessons and insights extracted from the 1998 Russian crisis are of general applicability, oil and geopolitics notwithstanding. These include a discussion of when financial globalization might actually hurt and a cutoff in market access might actually help; circumstances in which an official bailout could backfire; and why financial engineering tends to fail when fiscal solvency problems are present.
Access to Finance --- Bailout --- Banking crisis --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Credibility --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Debt Markets --- Debt obligations --- Emerging market --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange rate --- External debt --- Face value --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Globalization --- Gross domestic product --- Inflation --- Inflation rate --- International Bank --- Market access --- Private Sector Development --- Public debt --- Real interest --- Real interest rates --- Repo --- Solvency
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This paper analyzes results of a survey on debt management strategies conducted by the Banking and Debt Management Department of the World Bank. The analysis focuses on (1) whether a public debt management strategy exists in a given country, (2) whether it is made public, and (3) in which form it is imparted. The paper analyzes the distribution of the latter characteristics over different regions, income groups, and levels of indebtedness using graphical analysis. Using regression analysis, it investigates the extent to which basic economic factors can explain the characteristics of public debt management strategies across countries.
Debt Management Department --- Debt Management Strategies --- Debt management strategy --- Debt managers --- Debt Markets --- Debt obligations --- Debt portfolio --- Debt servicing --- Economic Theory and Research --- External Debt --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Government debt --- International Economics & Trade --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Public Debt --- Public Debt Management --- Public Sector Economics and Finance --- Strategic Debt Management
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This paper analyzes results of a survey on debt management strategies conducted by the Banking and Debt Management Department of the World Bank. The analysis focuses on (1) whether a public debt management strategy exists in a given country, (2) whether it is made public, and (3) in which form it is imparted. The paper analyzes the distribution of the latter characteristics over different regions, income groups, and levels of indebtedness using graphical analysis. Using regression analysis, it investigates the extent to which basic economic factors can explain the characteristics of public debt management strategies across countries.
Debt Management Department --- Debt Management Strategies --- Debt management strategy --- Debt managers --- Debt Markets --- Debt obligations --- Debt portfolio --- Debt servicing --- Economic Theory and Research --- External Debt --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Government debt --- International Economics & Trade --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Public Debt --- Public Debt Management --- Public Sector Economics and Finance --- Strategic Debt Management
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Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of its manufacturing and natural resource sectors by the end of 1997. And in February 1998, the annual inflation rate at last dipped into the single digits. Privatization should have helped with stronger micro-foundations for growth. The conquest of inflation should have cemented macroeconomic credibility, lowered real interest rates, and spurred investment. Instead, Russia suffered a massive public debt-exchange rate-banking crisis just six months later, in August 1998. In showing how this turn of events unfolded, the authors focus on the interaction among Russia's deteriorating fiscal fundamentals, its weak micro-foundations of growth and financial globalization. They argue that the expectation of a large official bailout in the final 10 weeks before the meltdown played an important role, with Russia's external debt increasing by USD 16 billion or 8 percent of post-crisis gross domestic product during this time. The lessons and insights extracted from the 1998 Russian crisis are of general applicability, oil and geopolitics notwithstanding. These include a discussion of when financial globalization might actually hurt and a cutoff in market access might actually help; circumstances in which an official bailout could backfire; and why financial engineering tends to fail when fiscal solvency problems are present.
Access to Finance --- Bailout --- Banking crisis --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Credibility --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Debt Markets --- Debt obligations --- Emerging market --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange rate --- External debt --- Face value --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Globalization --- Gross domestic product --- Inflation --- Inflation rate --- International Bank --- Market access --- Private Sector Development --- Public debt --- Real interest --- Real interest rates --- Repo --- Solvency
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Large banks and dealers use and reuse collateral pledged by nonbanks, which helps lubricate the global financial system. The supply of collateral arises from specific investment strategies in the asset management complex, with the primary providers being hedge funds, pension funds, insurers, official sector accounts, money markets and others. Post-Lehman, there has been a significant decline in the source collateral for the large dealers that specialize in intermediating pledgeable collateral. Since collateral can be reused, the overall effect (i.e., reduced ?source' of collateral times the velocity of collateral) may have been a $4-5 trillion reduction in collateral. This decline in financial lubrication likely has impact on the conduct of global monetary policy. And recent regulations aimed at financial stability, focusing on building equity and reducing leverage at large banks/dealers, may also reduce financial lubrication in the nonbank/bank nexus.
Collateralized debt obligations --- Bank loans --- CDOs (Collateralized debt obligations) --- Credit derivatives --- Bank credit --- Loans --- Econometric models. --- Accounting --- Banks and Banking --- Investments: General --- Industries: Financial Services --- Public Finance --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- International Financial Markets --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Pension Funds --- Non-bank Financial Institutions --- Financial Instruments --- Institutional Investors --- Public Administration --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- Social Security and Public Pensions --- Finance --- Investment & securities --- Financial reporting, financial statements --- Banking --- Pensions --- Collateral --- Securities --- Hedge funds --- Financial statements --- Financial institutions --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Pension spending --- Expenditure --- Financial instruments --- Financial services industry --- Finance, Public --- Banks and banking --- United States
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Financial lubrication in markets is indifferent to margin posting via money or collateral; the relative price(s) of money and collateral matter. Some central banks are now a major player in the collateral markets. Analogous to a coiled spring, the larger the quantitative easing (QE) efforts, the longer the central banks will impact the collateral market and associated repo rate. This may have monetary policy and financial stability implications since the repo rates map the financial landscape that straddles the bank/nonbank nexus.
Monetary policy. --- Collateralized debt obligations. --- CDOs (Collateralized debt obligations) --- Credit derivatives --- Monetary management --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Accounting --- Banks and Banking --- Industries: Financial Services --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions --- Corporation and Securities Law --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- International Financial Markets --- Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects --- Public Administration --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- Monetary Policy --- Finance --- Banking --- Financial reporting, financial statements --- Monetary economics --- Collateral --- Repo rates --- Central bank policy rate --- Financial statements --- Financial institutions --- Financial services --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Unconventional monetary policies --- Monetary policy --- Loans --- Interest rates --- Banks and banking --- Finance, Public --- United States
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We study a dynamic economy where credit is limited by insufficient collateral and, as a result, investment and output are too low. In this environment, changes in investor sentiment or market expectations can give rise to credit bubbles, that is, expansions in credit that are backed not by expectations of future profits (i.e. fundamental collateral), but instead by expectations of future credit (i.e. bubbly collateral). During a credit bubble, there is more credit available for entrepreneurs: this is the crowding-in effect. But entrepreneurs must also use some of this credit to cancel past credit: this is the crowding-out effect. There is an "optimal" bubble size that trades off these two effects and maximizes long-run output and consumption. The “equilibrium” bubble size depends on investor sentiment, however, and it typically does not coincide with the “optimal” bubble size. This provides a new rationale for macroprudential policy. A lender of last resort can replicate the “optimal” bubble by taxing credit when the "equilibrium" bubble is too high, and subsidizing credit when the “equilibrium” bubble is too low. This leaning-against-the-wind policy maximizes output and consumption. Moreover, the same conditions that make this policy desirable guarantee that a lender of last resort has the resources to implement it.
Credit --- Collateralized debt obligations --- Business cycles --- CDOs (Collateralized debt obligations) --- Credit derivatives --- Borrowing --- Finance --- Money --- Loans --- Econometric models. --- Financial Risk Management --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Industries: Financial Services --- Production and Operations Management --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Financial Aspects of Economic Integration --- Open Economy Macroeconomics --- Economic Growth of Open Economies --- International Business Cycles --- Globalization: Finance --- International Financial Markets --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Macroeconomics: Production --- Monetary economics --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Macroeconomics --- Collateral --- Lender of last resort --- Productivity --- Financial institutions --- Financial crises --- Production --- Industrial productivity --- Banks and banking, Central --- Slovak Republic
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This text studies how America's global financial power was created and shaped through its special relationship with Britain. The rise of global finance in the latter half of the twentieth century has long been understood as one chapter in a larger story about the postwar growth of the United States. This book challenges this popular narrative.
International finance --- Economic history --- Globalization --- History --- Economic aspects --- History. --- Great Britain --- United States --- Foreign economic relations --- American dollar. --- American politics. --- Anglo-American financial development. --- Bank of England. --- Banking Acts of 1933. --- Barry Eichengreen. --- Bretton Woods. --- Brexit. --- British Bankers’ Association. --- British politics. --- Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance. --- City of London. --- Eric Helleiner. --- Eurodollar markets. --- Federal Reserve Board. --- Glass-Steagall. --- Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System. --- John Maynard Keynes. --- Keynesian. --- Keynesianism. --- Leo Panitch. --- Milton Friedman. --- Rawi Abdelal. --- Regulation Q. --- Sam Gindin. --- States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s. --- The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire. --- Wall Street Crash. --- banking regulation. --- collateralized debt obligations. --- comparative political economy. --- economic geography. --- financial history. --- financial liberalization. --- financial services authority. --- hegemonic stability. --- international studies. --- monetarist. --- recession. --- special relationship.
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