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Auch wenn in jungster Zeit ein neues Interesse der materialen Kulturwissenschaften an Fragen der Normativitat zu beobachten ist, steht das Thema dort - im Unterschied zum Projekt von "Rechtsanalyse als Kulturforschung" - doch auch in Konkurrenz zu Phanomenen der Diversitat, Singularitat oder Situativitat, die als Schlusselthemen der Gegenwart weitaus mehr Aufmerksamkeit finden. Hat die Asthetik vor diesem Hintergrund ein ambivalentes, gespanntes oder gar paradoxes Verhaltnis zum Normativen, sind auch die Kulturwissenschaften gefordert, sich dem Thema in ihrem jeweiligen Gegenstandsbereich zu widmen. Der Band setzt hier an und reflektiert das Problem der asthetischen Normativitat in der Musik grundlegend und exemplarisch mit Beitragen aus der Musikgeschichte, der Popmusikforschung, der Musiktheorie, der Musikethnologie, der Musiksoziologie und den Sound Studies.
Music --- Normativity (Ethics) --- Sound
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Law --- Normativity (Ethics). --- Philosophy.
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Virtue. --- Ethics. --- Normativity (Ethics)
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This book critically examines philosophical naturalism, evaluates the prospects for naturalizing such normative properties as being a reason, and proposes a theory of action-explanation. This theory accommodates an explanatory role for both psychological properties, such as intention, and normative properties, such as having an obligation or being intrinsically good. The overall project requires distinguishing philosophical from methodological naturalism, arguing for the possibility of a scientifically informed epistemology that is not committed to the former, and freeing the theory of action-
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The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality-namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing.The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms.The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.--
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This book explores the epistemic dimension of right action within the framework of analytic philosophy, focusing on the significance of perspective in determining moral actions. It contrasts objectivism, which asserts that right actions are determined by all objective features of a situation, with perspectivism, which emphasizes the importance of individual perspective in moral deliberation. The author argues that facts beyond one's perspective cannot guide or motivate action, challenging the traditional objectivist view. This work, based on the author's doctoral thesis, is intended for scholars and students of philosophy, particularly those interested in ethics and the theory of normativity.