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March 1997 Certain factors can maximize the pressure on privatized infrastructure companies to be more efficient: the threat of bankruptcy, internal controls imposed by shareholders, and external disciplines (such as the threat of hostile takeover). The privatization of infrastructure companies is expected to bring about gains for customers by increasing the efficiency of the privatized company. Because many infrastructure industries are not competitive, attention has focused on the development of regulatory regimes that replicate the operation of competitive markets and so lead to the efficiency gains. Less attention, however, has been paid to other institutional factors that encourage firms to operate efficiently. Alexander and Mayer study three institutional factors that can, in general, encourage efficiency: * The threat of bankruptcy. * Internal controls brought about by executive remuneration schemes and the ability of shareholders to remove underperforming management. * External disciplines brought about by the operation of the market for corporate control and the threat of hostile takeover. Applying these three aspects of corporate governance to monopolistic infrastructure firms is not simple. Infrastructure regulation may allow privatized firms to avoid financial problems by raising prices, for example, thus sheltering them from the threat of bankruptcy. And shareholder control may be hindered by restrictions on the proportion of the shares that can be owned by any one shareholder. Alexander and Mayer offer examples of the ways in which different regulatory, institutional, and governance systems work in different countries, especially in relation to infrastructure companies and provide a checklist of options that should be considered when designing the involvement of the private sector in infrastructure position. This paper-a product of the Private Participation in Infrastructure Group, Private Sector Development Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to analyze issues relating to private participation in infrastructure.
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Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
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With the growth of the literature on incentive compensation has come the belief by some that incentive pay may be less rigid than pay that is not designed to effect incentives. Some have gone so far as to argue that this may explain differences in unemployment rates across countries. it is shown that there is no direct link between incentives and wage rigidity. Many compensation schemes that provide incentives have the reverse effect: That is, they tend to make wages more rigid than would be the case were incentives not an issue atall. This paper explores the relationship between wage rigidity and the provision of incentives in a variety of circumstances.
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Taxation --- Labor supply --- Labor supply --- Tax incentives --- Tax incentives --- Taxation